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Abstract
This thesis is an inquiry into the necessity of a diminished responsibility defence in
Irish law. The inquiry examines the controversy surrounding each attempt to
reformulate the insanity defence in the Anglo-American world. The thesis looks at the
success of the English defence of diminished responsibility in abating the controversy
in that jurisdiction. Following an analysis of the need for diminished responsibility in
Irish law, the thesis deals with the appropriate form of an Irish diminished
responsibility defence.
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INTRODUCTION
The Homicide Act, 1957 which introduced the defence of diminished
responsibility into English law, has no equivalent in Ireland. There the law's only
concession to mental abnormality is the insanity defence, which provides a total
exemption from criminal liability. Diminished responsibility, however, reduces
murder to manslaughter on evidence of mental abnormality and is founded on the
premise that the defendant is less guilty than a normal offender. The Irish insanity
defence has been altered from its initial form comprising solely of the McNaghten
Rules, which were inherited from England as the test of insanity following
independence in 1922. From this time onwards developments in the law of insanity in
each jurisdiction diverged widely. The McNaghten Rules had attracted incisive
criticism in both jurisdictions. However, while Ireland concentrated on reformulating
the insanity defence, England introduced a partial defence of diminished
responsibility.
This thesis examines the success of the English approach in abating the
controversy over the insanity defence, which the Irish expedient failed to do. It should
be borne in mind, where not specified, that this argument is limited solely to murder
cases because of the diminished responsibility defence's limited application. This
examination will begin in Chapter One by scrutinising the reasons for the inadequacy
of the McNaghten Rules in performing their stated function viz, excusing the insane
from punishment for their criminal acts. From Chapter One it will be seen that
subsequent attempts to soften their harshness merely served to exacerbate the
controversy, a controversy which intensified until the introduction of diminished
responsibility via the Homicide Act, 1957. In recent years the English controversy
over McNaghten has resurfaced, fuelled, no doubt, by American proposals for
abolition of the insanity defence. I will trace the origin of the polemic in the difficulty
of deciding who should be responsible (and who should not), especially in murder
cases, and in the long-standing tension between law and psychiatry over who should
have the final decision on this matter. This will show that the abolitionists' suggestion
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and the more recent test proposed by the Butler Committee are no match for the
Herculean challenge posed by reformulation of the insanity defence.
Chapter Two opens with a discussion of the origin of the English defence of
diminished responsibility and the events which led to its introduction into English
law. This will reveal that the defence of diminished responsibility was a half-hearted
response to growing pressure for abolition of the death penalty. Although hastily
implemented by parliamentarians who were largely ignorant of the issue they were
voting on, the operation of the defence of diminished responsibility has been a
success. Firstly, it has led to a satisfactory resolution of the medico-legal conflict at
the heart of the controversy over the insanity defence. Secondly, it has spared
mentally abnormal murderers falling outside the penumbra of the McNaghten Rules
and several other criminal law defences from the stigma of a murder verdict and its
consequence of capital punishment or, today, the mandatory life sentence. Thirdly,
due to developments in the law on insanity in recent years, the defence's flexible
disposal consequences have facilitated a just disposition where a finding of insanity
would have resulted in indefinite hospitalisation.
In Chapter Three I will examine the Irish insanity defence which comprises the
McNaghten Rules and an irresistible impulse test. I will illustrate the unsatisfactory
nature of the Irish insanity defence and the mandatory indefinite hospitalisation which
accompanies it. Particular emphasis will be placed on its failure to conform with the
Irish Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights. Drawing on the
lessons which have been taught to us in Chapter One from the English and American
attempts to improve McNaghten, I will argue that neither irresistible impulse nor any
other reformulation will prove as satisfactory as the introduction of diminished
responsibility into Irish Law.
I will then trace the growing support in Ireland since the 1970's for a defence
of diminished responsibility. This will reveal the weight of authority which is in
favour of an Irish diminished responsibility defence. Some final justifications will be
offered for a defence of diminished responsibility which will reveal that the present
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Irish judicial climate is favourable to the introduction of diminished responsibility.
However, viewed against a background of legislative inertia, it may still be a
considerable length of time before Ireland acquires a defence of diminished
responsibility.
I will then attempt to provide some guidelines for the Irish Legislature when
legislating for an Irish defence of diminished responsibility. The Irish Legislature can
learn from the experience of the English diminished responsibility defence and
improve on its shortcomings. The principal deficiency of the English defence lies in
the elliptical language which comprises it. Exposition in Parliament of its elliptical
nature and a more thoroughgoing analysis of the defence's aspirations might have
resolved its precise scope and spared the early prevarications of the courts, on whom
the burden of deciphering the meaning and delineating the scope of the defence
ultimately fell. Nonetheless, the vagueness of the defence has undoubtedly contributed
to the defence's success. This vagueness has allowed the psychiatric profession a
considerable role in the operation of the defence. I will conclude by providing specific
guidelines for the Irish Legislature on the procedural issues of burden of proof,
charges of diminished responsibility manslaughter and disposition and by attempting
to reconcile the two conflicting considerations of clarity and vagueness in a proposed
Irish defence of diminished responsibility.
This inquiry into the need for a diminished responsibility defence in Irish law
and the form it should take, is carried out using academic commentary, case-law,
official publications, Parliamentary debates and criminal statistics prior to 31/8/1995.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE MCNAGHTEN RULES AND VARIOUS PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
"No problem in the drafting of a penal code presents larger intrinsic
difficulty than that of determining when individuals whose conduct
would otherwise be criminal ought to be exculpated on the ground that
they were suffering from mental disease or defect when they acted as
they did".
1.1 MCNAGHTEN'S CASE
The theme of this chapter is the unsatisfactory nature of the insanity defence in
England and the controversy which attempts to improve it have generated. This I
illustrate by discussing the insanity defence as it stands at present, the long-standing
campaign to add irresistible impulse to the test of insanity, the proposal of the Royal
Commission on Capital Punishment (1949-53) 2, more recent proposals to abolish the
defence of insanity altogether and the proposal of the Butler Committee on Mentally
Abnormal Offenders (1975) 3 . Although pre-1922 proposals purported to apply in
Great Britain and Ireland, all of the alterations proposed since 1922 have purported to
apply only in Great Britain.
I intend to take as my starting point the McNaghten Rules which form the test
of insanity in both England and Ireland and which are considered to be "the point of
reference for the insanity plea's history". Pre-McNaghten authorities have long-since
been regarded as mere "antiquarian curiosities'.
'Quoted from Draft Four of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code by Fingarette The
Meaning of Criminal Insanity (Los Angeles, 1972) p.1
2 Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (1949-53) Cmd 8932 (London, 1953)
3 Report of the (Butler) Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders Cmnd 6244 (London, 1975)
4 R.Smith Trial by Medicine (Edinburgh, 1981) p.3
5 J.Fitzjames Stephen A History of the Criminal Law of England Vol.ii (London, 1883) p.150
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The Rules arose out of the highly controversial acquittal on the grounds of
insanity of Daniel McNaghten, for the murder of Sir Robert Peel's private secretary.
As a result, on March 13th 1843 the House of Lords took the unusual (though not
unprecedented) step of formulating a series of questions for the consideration of the
judges of England. Lord Brougham's stated reason for putting the questions to the
assembly of judges was his belief that their answers "would lead to more uniformity
in the language they used on future occasions in charging and directing juries on this
most delicate and important subject.. .They would no longer indulge in that variety of
phrase which only served to perplex others, if it did not also tend to bewilder
themselves, as he supposed it sometimes did; but they would use one constant phrase,
which the public and all persons concerned would be able to understand".
Following a debate in the House of Lords' the judges were asked the following
questions:-
1. What is the law respecting alleged crimes committed by persons afflicted with insane delusion, in
respect of one or more particular subjects or persons; as, for instance, where at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, the accused knew he was acting contrary to law, but did the act
complained of with a view, under the influence of insane delusion, of redressing or revenging some
supposed grievance or injury or of producing some supposed public benefit?
2. What are the proper questions to be submitted to the jury when a person alleged to be afflicted with
insane delusion respecting one or more particular subjects or persons, is charged with the commission
of a crime (murder, for example), and insanity is set up as a defence?
3. In what terms ought the question to be left to the jury, as to the prisoner's state of mind at the time
when the act was committed?
4. If a person under an insane delusion as to existing facts commits an offence in consequence thereof,
is he thereby excused?'
6 Hansard's Debates (1843) Vol.LXVII 714 pp.732 & 733
7 ibid
8 The 5th question is not relevant to my thesis.
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The answers given9, are known as the McNaghten Rules and they have been
applied ever since in determining the criminal responsibility of insane offenders. They
are:-
1...assuming that your Lordships' inquiries are confined to those persons who labour under such partial
delusions only, and are not in other respects insane, we are of opinion that notwithstanding the party
accused did the act complained of with a view, under the influence of insane delusion, of redressing or
revenging some supposed grievance or injury, or of producing some public benefit, he is nevertheless
punishable according to the nature of the crime committed, if he knew at the time of committing such
crime that he was acting contrary to law; by which expression we understand your Lordships to mean
the law of the land...
The answer to question 1. can be read in conjunction with the answer to
question 4. which also dealt with delusions.
...the answer must of course depend on the nature of the delusion: but, making the same assumption as
we did before, namely, that he labours under such partial delusion only and is not in other respects
insane, we think he must be considered in the same situation as to responsibility as if the facts with
respect to which the delusion exists were real. For example if under the influence of his delusion he
supposes another man to be in the act of attempting to take away his life, and he kills that man, as he
supposes, in self defence, he would be exempt from punishment. If the delusion was that the deceased
had inflicted a serious injury to his character and fortune, and he killed him in revenge for such
supposed injury, he would be liable to punishment.
Question 2. and question 3. were answered together and have come to be
regarded as the heart of the Rules'9:-
...the jurors ought to be told in all cases that every man is to be presumed to be sane, and to possess a
sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved to their
satisfaction; and that to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at
the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason
from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if he did
know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong. This mode of putting the latter part of the
question to the jury on these occasions has generally been, whether the accused at the time of-doing the
9 10 Cl.& Fin.200
10 N.Walker Crime and Insanity in England, Vol.! (Edinburgh, 1968) p.100
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act knew the difference between right and wrong: which mode, though rarely, if ever, leading to any
mistake with the jury, is not, as we conceive, so accurate when put generally and in the abstract, as
when put with reference to the party's knowledge of right and wrong in respect to the very act with
which he is charged. If the question were to be put as to the knowledge of the accused solely and
exclusively with reference to the law of the land, it might tend to confound the jury, by inducing them
to believe that an actual knowledge of the law of the land was essential in order to lead to a conviction;
whereas the law is administered upon the principle that everyone must be taken conclusively to know
it, without proof that he does know it. If the accused was conscious that the act was one which he ought
not to do, and if that act was at the same time contrary to the law of the land, he is punishable; and the
usual course therefore has been to leave the question to the jury, whether the party accused had a
sufficient degree of reason to know that he was doing an act that was wrong: and this course we think
is correct accompanied with such observations and explanations as the circumstances of each particular
case may require.
To establish a successful plea of insanity, therefore, it must be proved that the
accused at the time of the act, was labouring under such defect of reason from disease
of the mind that he did not know the nature and quality of his act and if he did know
this, he did not know that it was wrong".
The meaning of these key words has been settled by precedent. In R v
Clarke' the Court of Appeal held that "defect of reason" does not include mere
failure to exercise reasoning powers which are still intact. "Disease of the mind" has a
legal rather than a medical meaning" and has been construed broadly so as to include
mental disorders which are functional or organic, permanent or transient and
intermittent or whose source is physiological, provided that the disorder has impaired
the mental faculties of "reason memory and understanding'. In Bratty v A.G. for
Northern Ireland'', Lord Denning went so far as to say that "any mental disorder
which has manifested itself in violence and is prone to recur is a disease of the mind".
It now appears that absence of the danger of recurrence is not a reason for saying that
" P.Devlin "Responsibility and Punishment: Functions of Judge and Jury" [1954] Crim.L.R.661 pp.
678 & 679 says that the first requirement, that the accused did not know the nature and quality of his
act, is practically obsolete as anyone who does not know the nature and quality of his act is mad in the
popular sense and so will be found unfit to plead at all.
12 [1972] 1 All.E.R.219
13 Smith and Hogan op cit p.197
14 R v Kemp [1956] 3 All.E.R.249; R v Sullivan [1983] 2 All.E.R.673
15 [1961] 3 Al1.E.R.523 p.534
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an abnormal condition cannot be a disease of the mind'', provided that its cause can be
considered "internal" to the defendant rather than "external'. The meaning of "nature
and quality" of the act has been defined as an understanding of the physical nature of
the act' s and "wrong" implies knowledge of the illegality of the act'.
These interpretations have been subject to a great deal of criticism in the
considerable body of literature which has grown up around the Rules. By drawing on
this literature below I hope to show why the Rules caused as much controversy as they
did.
1.1.2 Criticism of the Rules
Criticism of the Rules commenced in the House of Lords itself°. Maule J.
protested that the questions were put without reference to the facts of any particular
case, that there had been no debate on them and that the answers given might
embarrass the administration of justice'.
Tindal C.J. protested that
"they deemed it at once impracticable, and at the same time dangerous
to the administration of justice, if it were practicable, to attempt to
make minute application of the principles involved in the Answers"22.
Although the status of the Rules was questionable, there is no doubt that they
have acquired authority through repeated reference to them'. However, their
extension in R v Windle to cover all cases of insanity (and not just delusion) has been
16 R v Burgess [1991] 2 Al1.E.R.769
17 This doctrine was introduced into English law by R v Quick and Paddison [1973] 3 All.E.R.347
18 R v Codere (1916) 12 Cr.App.R.21
19 R v Windle [1952] 2 Al1.E.R.1
20 H. Barnes "A Century of the McNaghten Rules" (1944) 8 C.L.J.300 p.308
21 R v McNaghten 10 Cl.& Fin.p.204
22 ibid p.208
23 H.Barnes op cit p.302
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most controversial'', as the questions and answers were framed solely with reference
to delusions.
The most incisive criticism of the Rules has probably been the fact some
insane offenders went to the gallows because the tests were too narrow a criterion of
responsibility25 . Although the death penalty has long been abolished in England and
Ireland, the McNaghten Rules continue to wreak fierce injustice. The interpretation of
"wrong" as meaning knowledge of the legal wrongness of the act' greatly narrows the
scope of the insanity plea since even grossly disturbed persons generally know that
murder, for example, is a crime'. The correctness of this interpretation is in fact
questionable in light of the judges' statement in McNaghten that
"If the question were to be put as to the knowledge of the accused
solely and exclusively with reference to the law of the land, it might
tend to confound the jury, by inducing them to believe that an actual
knowledge of the law of the land was essential in order to lead to a
conviction; whereas the law is administered upon the principle that
every one must be taken conclusively to know it, without proof that he
does know it. If the accused was conscious that the act was one which
he ought not to do, and if that act was at the same time contrary to the
law of the land, he is punishable'.
The scope of the Rules was restricted by the interpretation of "nature and
quality" to mean the physical quality of an act'. This excludes the offender who
knows what he is doing but does not appreciate the impact of his act or its
consequences. Stephen argued that knowledge required a deeper level of
understanding than "mere knowledge', but the courts have not required an
24 S.Glueck Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law (Boston, 1925) pp.168,180 & 426.
25 Report of the Committee on Insanity and Crime Cmd 2005 op cit p.293
26 R v Windle (1952) 2 All.E.R.1
27 Report of the (Butler) Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders op cit para.18.8
28 10 Cl.& Fin.200 p.210
29 R v Codere (1916) 12 Cr.App.R.21
30 Stephen op cit p.166
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appreciation or understanding of the nature, quality or wrongness of an act, thereby
excluding a vast number of medically insane offenders from the ambit of the insanity
plea. The broadness with which "disease of the mind" is interpreted (requiring simply
that the disease be internal to the defendant') has led to epileptics', diabetics (in a
state of hyperglycaemia) 33 and sleep-walkers34 being classified as insane. No argument
is needed to show that the indefinite confinement of the above-named classes of
offenders, who on a common sense interpretation of the word could not possibly be
considered insane, is unjust (although the situation in England has been ameliorated
somewhat by the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act, 1991
which has introduced discretionary disposal consequences for those who plead
insanity to offences which do not carry a fixed sentence). Furthermore, in deciding
that a condition is a "disease of the mind" for the purposes of the Rules, the courts
need not take account of the fact that the condition will not recur'. It is dicta like
these which have provoked the criticism that the Rules "have been interpreted with all
the clinical detachment of a tax statute"36.
It is also likely that the McNaghten Rules are in breach of Article 5(1)(e) of
the European Convention on Human Rights. In order to conform with Article 5(1)(e),
hospitalisation following an acquittal of criminal charges must be a "lawful detention"
of a person "of unsound mind" 37 . Public policy or perceived dangerousness are not
criteria which justify deprivation of liberty under the European Convention. However
in Burgess' these appear to be the factors which led to the application of McNaghten.
,Sullivan" pleaded guilty to avoid a finding of insanity and consequent indefinite
committal.
31 R v Quick and Paddison [1973] 3 Al1.E.R.347
32 Since R v Sullivan [1983] 2 All E.R.673
33 Since R v Quick and Paddison [1973] 3 All.E.R.347
34 R v Burgess [1991] 2 A1l.E.R.769
35 R v Sullivan [1983] 2 All.E.R.673; R v Burgess [1991] 2 All.E.R.769
36 P.J.Sutherland and C.A.Gearty "Insanity and the European Court of Human Rights" [1992]
Crim.L.R. 418 p.421
37 See ibid pp.422-424
38 [1991] 2 All E.R.769
39 [1983] 2 All E.R.673
Section 1(1) of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act,
1991 lays down that the jury must hear medical evidence from at least two medical
practitioners before returning an insanity verdict, one of whom must be "duly
approved" by the Secretary of State under section 12(2) of the Mental Health Act,
1983 "as having special experience in the diagnosis or treatment of mental disorder".
At first glance this appears to bring the McNaghten Rules within the terms of Article
5(1)(e), which has been interpreted as requiring psychiatric evidence of mental illness
and of the need for compulsory confinement'. In reality however, the necessary
medical evidence under section 1 lacks any binding force" and so the Rules continue
to be in breach of the European Convention, at least in murder cases where indefinite
hospitalisation remains the only possible disposal, and in the case of other offences,
where the chosen method of disposal involves the deprivation of liberty.
In recent years Lord Brougham's aspiration of a clear definition of legal
insanity has not been realised and "[i]t is doutful whether there is any field of law in
which there has been as much confusion and variation in interpreting the very same
words of a seemingly simple legal formula as there has been in the court-room
operation of the McNaghten rules'''. The majority of witnesses who gave evidence to
the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (1949-53) were of the view that the
Rules were now more liberally interpreted by judges, some going so far as to say that
"interpretation" might occasionally mean that the words were twisted into a meaning
that could not reasonably be put on them, or even that the Rules might be ignored
altogether'. The implications of this are revealed by the evidence of Mr Justice
Frankfurter to the Royal Commission":
"If you find rules that are, broadly speaking, discredited by those who
have to administer them, which is, I think, the real situation, certainly
with us - they are honoured in the breach and not in the observance -
40 Winterwerp v the Netherlands (1979) 2 E.H.R.R.387 para.39
41 E.Baker "Human Rights, M'Naghten and the 1991 Act" [1994] Crim.L.R.84 p.86
42 S.Glueck Law and Psychiatry (London, 1963) p.45
43 Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (1949-53) Cmd 8932 op cit para.232
44 ibid para.290
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then I think the law serves its best interests by trying to be more honest
about it. .1 think that to have rules which cannot rationally be justified
except by a process of interpretation which distorts and often
practically nullifies them, and to say the corrective process comes by
having the Governor of a State charged with the responsibility of
deciding when the consequences of the Rule should not be enforced, is
not a desirable system. .1 am a great believer in being as candid as
possible about my institutions. They are in large measure abandoned in
practice, and therefore I think the MNaghten Rules are in large
measure shams".
Their main criticism from a medical point of view is that they over-emphasize
the cognitive aspect of mental functioning and ignore the affective and conative
aspects'.
"The modern science of psychology. .does not conceive that there is a
separate little man in the top of one's head called reason whose
function it is to guide another unruly little man called instinct, emotion,
or impulse in the way he should go. The tendency of psychiatry is to
regard what ordinary men call reasoning as a rationalization of
behavior rather than the real cause of behavior".
The Rules are founded on the now "half scientific, half fantastic" 47 doctrine of
phrenology, (first put forward by Franz Gall, a Viennese physician, at the turn of the
18th century) which divides the mind into separate compartments and assumes that
each aspect of mental functioning can operate independently of the others. This
doctrine has long been totally discredited". The Rules have been criticised for
assuming that although one region of the brain may be diseased e.g. volition, the mind
may be sound in all its other aspects and that reason or understanding may function
45 S.Glueck, Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law op cit pp.173,180,184,423 & 425.
46 Holloway v US. (1945) 148 F.2d. 665 (1945) p.667
47 S.Glueck Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law op cit p.170
48 See G.W.Keeton, Guilty but Insane (London, 1961) p.193.
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perfectly'. In fact one critic goes so far as to say that the judges' stipulation -
"assuming that your Lordships' inquiries are confined to those persons who labour
under such partial delusions only, and are not in other respects insane", vitiates any
credibility that the Rules might have as criteria of responsibility as "this is a class of
offender that does not exist and never has existed'.
The judges' treatment of delusion (questions 1. and 4.) has been much
criticised, especially their assumption that a deluded man can reason as a sane man
and should be judged by the same standard'. This in effect, makes the courts pick and
choose between delusions'. According to Stephen, to a sane man, the belief that his
finger was made of glass "would supply no reason for taking any particular view
about murder, but if a man is mad and such a belief is a symptom of his madness,
there may be a connection between the delusion and the crime as insane as the
delusion itself'''. Fortunately this objection is of less practical importance today since
the scenario of the deluded offender in question 1. is now governed by the knowledge
tests'. Another valid criticism is that by focussing entirely on knowledge of the nature
and quality of the act and its wrongness, the court is apt to lose sight of what should
be the central issue:- a defect of reason caused by disease of the mine. Sutherland
and Gearty assert that the courts have traditionally attached only limited significance
to medical opinion regarding mental abnormality' and McAuley speaks of "the
relatively neglected notion of 'disease of the mind'"57.
The Rules are framed in such a way that psychiatric testimony is limited to an
account of the accused's cognitive powers. The fact that psychiatrists cannot give an
overall account of the accused's condition, which would paint a much more realistic
picture than snippets of information do, has provoked strong dissatisfaction amongst
49 S.Glueck, Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law op cit pp. 124,125, 424, & 426.
C.Mercier, Criminal Responsibility (London, 1905) pp.174 & 176.
51 W.C.Sullivan, Crime and Insanity (London, 1924) p.130.
52 A.Norrie Crime Reason and History A Critical Introduction to Criminal Law (London, 1993) p.179
53 J.Fitzjames Stephen op cit p.162
54 Perkins and Boyce Criminal Law (3rd edition) (New York, 1982) p.967.
55 W.C.Sullivan op cit p.130
P.J.Sutherland and C.A.Gearty "Insanity and the European Court of Human Rights" op cit
57 F.McAuley Insanity, Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility (Dublin, 1993) p.62
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the medical profession'. Goldstein, however, claims that there is virtually no support
in law for the view that McNaghten is responsible for inhibiting the flow of testimony
on the insanity issue" but that prolonged criticism of the Rules has convinced
psychiatrists that they cannot give a full account of the accused's mental life and that
the critics have in fact "created the very devil they were trying to exorcise'.
On the other hand there are some staunch defenders of the Rules. As Baron
Bramwell said in his evidence before the Select Committee on the Homicide Law
(Amendment) Bill in 187461
"I think that although the present law lays down such a definition of
madness, that nobody is hardly ever really mad enough to be within it
yet it is a logical and good definition."
Lady Wooton has praised the intellectualist quality of the McNaghten formula
which, she says, makes it "a model of clarity and precision" 62 . In the light of the
defence of irresistible impulse, discussed below, she praises the McNaghten Rules,
saying
"The state of a man's intellect or knowledge is much more easily tested
by such court procedures as cross-examination, than is say, the state of
the will"62.
The Rules have also been commended on the grounds that they are in harmony
with the law's fundamental doctrine of mens rea.
58 W.C.Sullivan op cit p.242.
59 A.Goldstein The Insanity Defense (New Haven and London, 1967) pp.53 & 54
69 ibid p.212
61 Report and Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee on the Homicide Law Amendment Bill
B.P.P.,1874, Vol.ix p.475 p.27
62 Lady Wooton "Mental Disorder and the Problem of Moral and Criminal Responsibility" in Social
Science and Social Pathology (London, 1959) p.229
63 ibid p.230
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"As part of the doctrine of mens rea it ensures that a man who does an
injurious act without appreciation of its consequences does not forfeit
the protection of the law. But the failure to appreciate must be total,
for, if he has an appreciation in some degree, he is rightly made
answerable to the law"'.
Later Lord Devlin says
"there is something logical - it may be astringently logical, but it is
logical - in selecting as the test of responsibility to the law, reason and
reason alone. It is reason which makes a man responsible to the law. It
is reason which gives him sovereignty over animate and inanimate
things. It is what distinguishes him from the animals, which emotional
disorder does not; it is what makes him man; it is what makes him
subject to the law. So it is fitting that nothing other than a defect of
reason should give him complete absolution"65.
McNaghten's critics on the other hand, argue that mens rea requires volition66
and also requires a guilty healthy mind67.
As the above discussion reveals, much ink has been spent on criticising the
McNaghten Rules. Many of the critics have advocated different tests of insanity. Of
these the irresistible impulse test has gathered the most supporters in English and Irish
Law. I will now examine its history and attempt to discover why, in light of
McNaghten's inadequacies, it failed to win acceptance in English law.
64 Lord Devlin "Mental Abnormality and the Criminal Law" in R.St.J.Macdonald Changing Legal
Objectives (Toronto, 1963) p.83
65	 •ibtd p.85
66 S.Glueck Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law op cit pp.173 & 180
67 ibid p.173
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1.2 THE DEFENCE OF IRRESISTIBLE IMPULSE
The defence of irresistible impulse will mean little or nothing to today's jurist.
However, for over a century it was urged by both members of the medical and legal
professions, both in England and Ireland, either as a replacement for or a supplement
to the right-wrong test embodied in the McNaghten Rules. By examining this defence
and its application, I will illustrate a facet of the dissatisfaction with the McNaghten
Rules which pervaded medico-legal thinking in England until the late 1950's when the
defence of diminished responsibility was introduced into English law.
Medical witnesses felt that there were many cases of insanity which
McNaghten excluded but which would be covered by a defence of irresistible impulse.
In England, for reasons which I deal with below, McNaghten finally emerged
triumphant. In Ireland the defence of irresistible impulse, albeit in modified form, was
eventually appended to the McNaghten Rules and forms part of a bipartite test of
insanity. By a thorough discussion of those cases which featured the defence of
irresistible impulse, I hope firstly, to set the scene for the defence as it exists in Irish
law today. Secondly, with the help of those committees and debates which rejected
irresistible impulse as a test of insanity, I will illustrate that it is not the solution to the
defects contained in the McNaghten Rules.
The idea of irresistible impulses, arising from volitional or moral insanity, has
its roots in the faculty psychology of Aristotle's time, which held that the mind was
composed of localised independent faculties such as will, imagination and
understanding", any one of which was liable to disease. In the course of the
eighteenth century faculty psychology regained lost popularity as a result of the
spread of the doctrine of phrenology', whose origin has been described supra'.
68 A.R.Hayward "Murder and Madness: A Social History of the Insanity Defence in Mid-Victorian
England' M.Litt., (Oxford, 1983) p.32
69 ibid
70 See Section 1.2
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The French psychiatrist Pinel's teachings that the reasoning faculties could
remain intact during insanity, were taken up by James Cowles Prichard (1786-1848),
the Bristol asylum superintendent, who by combining Pinel's manie sans delire and
Esquirol's monomania, was responsible for "identifying" the eclectic category of
moral insanity in 1833 72 . In this form of insanity, due to disease of the "moral"
faculties, "the passions were under no restraint" and the will was surrendered
impetuously to the emotions'. In his article on Soundness of Mind (1835) Prichard
argued that
"there is a form of insanity existing independent of any lesion of the
intellectual powers, in which connected in some instances with evident
constitutional disorder and with affections of the nervous system
excited according to the well known laws of the animal economy, a
sudden and often irresistible impulse is experienced to commit acts,
which under a sane condition of mind would be accounted atrocious
crime".
Five years later Prichard was less convinced that irresistible impulse was a
form of moral insanity'. In The Different Forms of Insanity in Relation to
Jurisprudence, published in 1842, he said "Instinctive madness seems to be rather an
affection of the will or voluntary powers than of affections", describing it in the
following terms:
"In this disorder the will is occasionally under the influence of an
impulse, which suddenly drives the person affected to the perpetration
of acts of the most revolting kind, to the commission of which he has
71 translated by N.Walker Crime and Insanity Vol.2 (Edinburgh, 1973) p.207 as "mania without
confusion"
72 A.R.Hayward op cit p.73
73 ibid p.77
74 Quoted ibid p.89
75 ibid
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no motive. The impulse is accompanied by consciousness but it is in
some instances irresistible'.
Although the identification of moral insanity may be attributed to Prichard, it
appears that Etienne Georget (1795-1828), a disciple of the French psychiatrist
Esquirol, was responsible for the "discovery" of volitional insanity'. In a series of
pamphlets he identified the condition of monomania instinctive'. Georget proclaimed
that murderers were insane even though they showed no signs of intellectual
disturbance'. He acknowledged that they reasoned perfectly well and were even
morally repelled by their deeds, but maintained that the murderers had been propelled
by an irresistible urge, committing crimes with full knowledge of their horror". This
he attributed to a "lesion of the will" which left the rational faculties intact and moral
discernment unimpaired". In this respect volitional insanity differed from moral
insanity where the moral faculties were impaired. However as Smith notes"
"[i]mpulsive insanity and moral insanity were rarely thought to exist in a pure form;
rather, they were two overlapping classes. In the former, the dominant feature was
uncontrollable, motiveless, sharp and spasmodic violence; in the latter, it was
disordered emotion leading to general violence and aggressiveness".
With a climate favourable to the reception of psychological theories
reconcilable with phrenology, Prichard's moral and instinctive insanity were readily
accepted in English medical circles'', as is evidenced by the plethora of cases below,
where these conditions were offered as evidence of insanity. However the concept of
moral insanity did not gain widespread lay and legal notice until the trial of Edward
Oxford in 1840 for treason, for the attempted murder of Queen Victoria". Lord
Denman C.J. directed the jury that
76 Quoted by R.Smith op cit p.39
77 R.Harris Murders and Madness: Medicine Law and Society in the Fin de Siecle (Oxford, 1989) pp.8
& 9
78 ibid
ibid p.9
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R.Smith op cit p.97
83 A.R.Hayward op cit p.95
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"If some controlling disease was, in truth, the acting power within [the
defendant] which he could not resist, then he will not be responsible".
When McNaghten was tried for the murder of Drummond, defence counsel
Cockburn argued that the accused was the "creature of delusion, and the victim of
ungovernable impulses, which wholly [took] away from him the character of a
reasonable and responsible being".
Drawing on the medical theories of the day Cockburn continued:
"the mistake existing in ancient times, which the light of modern
science has dispelled, lay in supposing that in order that a man should
be mad.. it was necessary that he should exhibit those symptoms which
would amount to total prostration of the intellect; whereas modern
science has incontrovertibly established that any one of these
intellectual and moral functions of the mind may be subject to separate
diseases, and thereby man may be rendered the victim of the most
fearful delusions, the slave of uncontrollable impulses impelling or
rather compelling him to the commission of acts such as that which has
given rise to the case now under your consideration"87.
After an array of medical experts had testified in these terms Tindal C.J.
stopped the trial. Although Tindal C.J. instructed the jury that the relevant question
for their consideration was whether at the time of the crime McNaghten knew right
from wrong in relation to the act, he left no doubt in their minds that he was entirely
convinced by the uncontradicted medical evidence.
A moral panic ensued as a result of McNaghten's acquittal which was
interpreted as "a precedent for every lunatic to take the law into his or her own
85 R v Oxford 9 C.& P.525 p.546
86 R v McNaghten 4 St.Tr.N.S.847 p.875
87 ibid p.887
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hands'. As a result the judges of England were asked to clarify the law's position on
insanity. In their reply, no mention was made of the test used in Oxford, but this is
undoubtedly attributable to the fact that their answers were confined to the questions
put to them regarding persons who suffered from delusion. The Rules were no more
than a set of answers to specific questions and were not intended as a general
statement of the law". This is evident from statements of Tindal C.J. to the effect that
"they deemed it at once impracticable, and at the same time dangerous
to the administration of justice, if it were practicable, to attempt to
make minute application of the principles involved in the Answers".
and his caution that the Rules "should be accompanied by such observations and
explanations as the circumstances of each particular case may require"9'.
It was not long, however, before they had evolved into an inflexible yardstick
of legal insanity and as a result in 1848 a plea of irresistible impulse was swiftly
dismissed in Reg v Stokes 92, Baron Rolfe stating that
"it is true that learned speculators, in their writings, have laid it down
that men with a consciousness that they were doing wrong were
irresistibly impelled to commit some unlawful act. Who enabled them
to dive into the human heart and see the real motive that prompted the
commission of such deeds".
In R v Barton' Baron Parke approved Baron Rolfe's view and noted that
"the excuse of an irresistible impulse co-existing with the full
possession of reasoning powers, might be urged in justification of
88 A.R.Hayward op cit p.108
89 ibid p.109
90 10 CL.& F.200 p.208
91 ibid p.211
92 A.R.Hayward op cit p.113
93 (1848) 3 Cox C.C.275
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every crime known to the law - for every man might be said, and truly,
not to commit any crime except under the influence of some irresistible
impulse. Something more than this was necessary to justify an acquittal
on the ground of insanity and it would be therefore for the jury to say
whether. .the impulse under which the prisoner had committed the deed
was one which altogether deprived him of the knowledge that he was
doing wrong. Could he distinguish between right and wrong?"".
Smith has uncovered some unreported cases in the medical literature of the
day, where medical evidence of an irresistible impulse led to a successful defence of
insanity. When Mary Ann Brough was tried for the murder of her six children in
June 1854, medical opinion at her trial argued that there was a general syndrome in
which brain disease led to an inability to control movements and classified Mrs
Brough as belonging to this group. Mrs Brough was acquitted by reason of insanity".
At the trial of Martha Prior in 1848 for the murder of her baby, although Lord
Denman attacked the notion of irresistible impulse, he nevertheless conceded the jury
would act on the medical testimony in order to acquit her" and in 1862 Dr Hood from
Bethlem successfully argued that disease had led to uncontrollable conduct at the trial
of Mrs Vyse for the murder of her two children'''. Smith opines" that in Mrs Brough's
case it was the extreme and exceptional nature of the crime coupled with awe and
humanitarian sentiment towards a mother who had killed her children which led to the
acquittal, rather than deference to the medical viewpoint. It is worth noting at this
point that women at this time were viewed as mentally weaker than men, especially in
matters connected with reproduction, and therefore more prone to insanity - a view
which no doubt influenced the introduction of the partial defence of infanticide in
94 ibid p.276
95 R.Smith "The Boundary Between Insanity and Criminal Responsibility in Nineteenth Century
England" in A.Scull (ed) Madhouses, Maddoctors and Madmen (Philadephia, 1981) pp.372 & 373
96 R.Smith Trial by Medicine op cit p.109
97 ibid p.112
98 R.Smith "The Boundary Between Insanity and Criminal Responsibility in Nineteenth Century
England" op cit p.373
99 R.Smith Trial by Medicine op cit pp.143 and 144	
.(For further insight on medical views of women and sexuality during this era see E.Showalter
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1922. Hence the success of Martha Brixey in an insanity plea in 1845, where the
defence argued that obstructed menstruation led to an irresistible impulse to murder
(there was no evidence of delusion or intellectual aberration)'. Disordered
menstruation ("amenorrhoea") was the reason for Shepherd's acquittal for stealing a
fur boa and for the acquittal of Amelia Snoswell for killing her baby niece', but
whether evidence of uncontrollable impulses was tendered here is uncertain.
At the trial of James Hill in 1856 for cutting off his nephew's head Willes J.
asserted that
"such a thing as a person not being able to control himself in the doing
of an act which he knows to be wrong, is a phrase that is not known to
the law of this country"
but he finally compromised by inferring that as the question was the
consciousness of right and wrong at the moment of the deed, consciousness might
have been swept aside by the actual impulse'''.
However each successful plea was matched by more cases where irresistible
impulse was rejected. John Smith was hanged in 1849 following Lord Denman's
direction to the jury to ignore the defence'''. In Alnutt the plea was unsuccessful at
the trial of a twelve-year-old boy who poisoned his grandfather'''. At the trial of
Robert Pate in July 1850 for hitting Queen Victoria on the head with his walking
stick, Baron Alderson asserted that if a man claimed that he picked a pocket from
some uncontrollable impulse, the law would have an uncontrollable impulse to punish
him for it'. The failure of the defence in Buranelli's and Dove's cases are further
illustrations of the law's antagonism to the medical theories of the day.
I °° Described by R.Smith ibid pp.155 & 156
1 ° 1 Both of these cases are described by R.Smith ibid p.156
102 ibid p.111
103 ibid p.109
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There were a number of reasons for the Judiciary's opposition to an insanity
defence which considered irresistible impulse. A utilitarian theory of punishment
prevailed which favoured deterrence and retribution' and the above-named medical
entities proposed to excuse not only the mad but the bad in pursuit of reformation. As
Prichard himself noted of moral insanity "there is scarcely an act in the catalogue of
human crimes which has not been imitated..by this disease'''. Further, there was no
evidence that medicine could in fact cure these "illnesses'''. The difficulty of
identifying accurately who would be affected by the threat of sanction led to a
preference for McNaghten over the irresistible impulse test'. With judges and
prosecuting counsel seeing themselves as delegates of public morality and "society's
guardians" it was felt that errors should be made in the direction of more sanction
rather than less'''.
There were also competing professional and status claims involved in the
conflict'''. The medical profession was attempting to advance itself within the realm
of the criminal law but encountered great difficulty. Judiciary and counsel had
unquestionable professional autonomy compared with the alienists' questionable
social authority'''.
It was a frequent criticism of the medical argument for a re-phrasing of the
Rules to include irresistible impulse, that logical consistency meant that alienists were
invoking the determinism of all human actions'''. Deterministic theories threatened to
undermine the law's traditional modus operandi, based on the theory of free will'.
Because the law's approach to miscreants was entrenched it appeared natural and self
evident116.
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Finally, the notion of defective will power was unlikely to gain credence in
Victorian Society where will power and restraint were values which were cherished'''.
Hence in R v Haynes'', Baron Bramwell gave the notion short shrift telling
the jury:
"If the influence itself be held a legal excuse rendering the crime
dispunishable you at once withdraw a most powerful restraint - [law]
forbidding and punishing its perpetration'''.
This observation reveals Baron Bramwell's distrust of the genuineness of truly
irresistible impulses. In similar vein, Wightman J. observed that moral insanity was
"a most dangerous doctrine and fatal to the interests of society and
security of life" '2°.
He went on to hold that the notion was inconsistent with the rule laid down by
the judges, namely that a man was responsible for his actions if he knew the
difference between right and wrong.
By now the notion of irresistible impulse had gained widespread approval in
medical circles. The discovery of reflex action of the cerebrum and spinal cord and
increasing knowledge of the effects of epilepsy, whilst exposing the crudity of
phrenology 121,
 nevertheless bolstered the medical argument that there were
uncontrollable movements which the law should recognize. In July 1864 the
Association of Medical Officers of Hospitals and Asylums for the Insane passed a
resolution to the effect
1 " ibid p.72
118 (1859) 1 F.& F.666
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"That so much of the legal test of the medical condition of an alleged
criminal lunatic as renders him a responsible agent, because he knows
the difference between right and wrong, is inconsistent with the fact
well known to every member of this meeting, that the power of
distinguishing between right and wrong exists very frequently among
those who are undoubtedly insane, and is often associated with
dangerous and uncontrollable delusions'''.
The wording of the motion seems to suggest that some insane persons should
be excused because their delusions led to uncontrollable impulses.'23
This resolution was moved by Dr. Harrington Tuke who also gave evidence to
the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment in 1865 124 . However, he stipulated in
his evidence before the Commission that irresistible impulse should not be a defence
in the case of a sane man and that he would require evidence of his insanity, except
where the killing was without possible motive. This approach shows a willingness to
deduce insanity from an ostensibly insane act without reference to the accused's state
of mind, an approach which was utterly at odds with the law's emphasis on states of
mind. If medical experts habitually took this approach then it is no wonder that the
legal profession was opposed to a defence of irresistible impulse which could be only
too easily inferred from the perpetration of a criminal act. Mr William Tallack also
quoted the above resolution in his evidence before the Royal Commission'''.
The Royal Commission in its report declined to make any recommendation on
the law of insanity on the ground that this issue was not confined to capital cases but
affected the entire administration of criminal law. It did, however, recommend further
investigation of this area of law'.
122 N.Walker Crime and Insanity in England Val op cit pp.105 and 106
123 ibid p.106
124 Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (1949-53) op cit appendix 8 (d) p.398
125 Report and Minutes of Evidence before the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 1864-6 in
B.P.P.1866, xxi at pp.xxviii and xxix
126 ibid p.ii
-26-
The most relentless judicial advocate of irresistible impulse was Sir James
Fitzjames Stephen (1829-94). In a paper to the Juridical Society in 1855 he appeared
wary of the notion of irresistible impulse, saying'':
"There may have been many instances of irresistible impulse of this
kind, although I fear there is a disposition to confound them with
unresisted impulses".
At this point in time his view was that "if the prisoner is to be acquitted, it
must be because the impulse is irresistible, because the act is not wilful. .the guilt turns
upon the wilfulness of the act, and not upon the sanity of the prisoner" 128 . No doubt
this approach was influenced by his reluctance to see any increase in the numbers
acquitted by reason of insanity.
The same view pervaded his General View of the Criminal Law of England'
where he said
"The great object of the criminal law is to induce people to control
their impulses, and there is no reason why, if they can, they should not
control insane impulses as well as sane ones'''.
Stephen was of the opinion that the commonest and strongest cases were those
of women who, without motive or concealment, killed their children after recovery
from childbirth'''. With regard to moral insanity, his view was that if proved, it would
be a ground for acquitting the accused on the ground of lack of malice'. However, he
stated
127 On the policy of maintaining the limits at present imposed by law on the criminal responsibility of
madmen - Papers read before the Juridical Society, 1855-8 (London, 1855) p.81
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"The evidence given in support of the assertion that a man is "morally
insane" is, generally speaking, at least as consistent with the theory that
he was a great fool and a great rogue, as with the theory that he was the
subject of a special disease, the existence of which is doubtful"133.
By the 1870's Stephen had altered his stance. In 1872 Stephen prepared a draft
of a Homicide Law Amendment Bill to codify the law relating to homicide'. When
this was referred to a Select Committee in 1874 the provision on insanity had been
amended slightly to provide
"24. Homicide is not criminal, if the person by whom it is committed is, at the time
when he commits it, prevented by any disease affecting his mind -
(a) from knowing the nature of the act done by him;
(b) from knowing that it is forbidden by law;
(c) from knowing that it is morally wrong; or,
(d) from controlling his own conduct.
But homicide is criminal, although the mind of the person committing it is affected by
disease, if such disease does not in fact produce some one of the effects aforesaid in
reference to the act by which death is caused, or if the inability to control his conduct
is not produced exclusively by such disease.
If a person is proved to have been labouring under any insane delusion at the time
when he committed homicide it shall be presumed, unless the contrary appears or is
proved, that he did not possess the degree of knowledge or self-control hereinbefore
specified"".
What is noteworthy is the emphasis on mental disease rather than on lack of
will which marked his earlier discussions on the subject. Lord Chief Justice Cockburn
133 ibid pp.95 & 96
134 B.P.P.,1872, Vol.2 p.241
135 B.P.P.,1874, Vol.2 p.370
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was opposed to the provision on delusion but expressed his approval of Stephen's
main proposal, saying
"I most cordially concur in the proposed alteration of the law, having
always been strongly of the opinion that, as the pathology of insanity
abundantly establishes, there are forms of mental disease in which,
though the patient is quite aware he is about to do wrong, the will
becomes overpowered by the force of irresistible impulse; the power of
self-control, when destroyed, or suspended by mental disease,
becomes, I think, an essential element of responsibility"36.
However the other witnesses were opposed to the provision on irresistible
impulse, Mr. Justice Blackburn on the ground that it would exclude cases which ought
to be included' 37 and Baron Bramwell on the ground that it would weaken the
deterrent value of the criminal law. His view on the subject was summed up in the
following statement
"It is obvious that what is called an uncontrollable impulse is one as to
which the deterring or controlling motives are not strong enough; and
this is a proposition in all cases to take away from a man in a state of
mind in which he is more likely to do mischief than anything else, a
deterring motive".
However his approach to mothers who killed their children under an
irresistible impulse was in marked contrast to the above. Of these he stated
"Surely such a case as this is a case of misfortune and not of
crime. .The act is a spasmodic one, like a cough or winking of the eye.
It gives a man no practical pleasure to cough or wink, but if you
136 B.P.P.,1874, Vol.ix p.549
137 ibid p.527
138 ibid p.513
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threatened to flay him alive for it he would not be able to abstain for
any length of time".
Baron Bramwell was also opposed to the presumption proposed in cases of
delusion. In any event, the Select Committee decided not to proceed with partial
codification'.
In 1878 Stephen included a provision on similar lines in the Draft Criminal
Code Bill. However, in a deliberate attempt to placate the Bramwellian opposition"'
he provided
"No act shall be an offence if the person who does it is at the time when it is done
prevented, either by defective mental power or by any disease affecting his mind,
(a) from knowing the nature of his act; or
(b) from knowing either that the act is forbidden by law or that it is morally wrong; or
(c) if such person was at the time when the act was done, by reason of any such cause
as aforesaid, in such a state that he would not have been prevented from doing that act
by knowing that if he did do it the greatest punishment permitted by law for such an
offence would be instantly inflicted upon him, provided that this provision shall not
apply to any person in whom such a state has been produced by his own default"142.
Nonetheless the Commission was of the view that
"The test proposed for distinguishing between such a state of mind and
a criminal motive, the offspring of revenge, hatred or ungoverned
passion, appears to us on the whole not to be practicable or safe, and
we are unable to suggest one which would satisfy these requisites and
139 ibid p.514
140 ibid pp.iii and iv
141 S.Davies "Irresistible Impulse in English Law" (1930) 17 Can.B.R.147 p.159
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obviate the risk of a jury being misled by considerations of so
metaphysical a character"
By 1879 the revised form of the Code showed that the orthodox view had
prevailed over that of Stephen'. By the time he wrote A History of the Criminal Law
of England' Stephen was casting doubt on the authority of the McNaghten Rules'.
As to the status of irresistible impulse as a criminal law defence he asserted
"the proposition that the effect of disease upon the emotions and the
will can never under any circumstances affect the criminality of the
acts of persons so afflicted is so surprising and would, if strictly
enforced, have such monstrous consequences, that something more
than an implied assertion of it seems necessary before it is admitted to
be part of the law of England"147.
He even opined that in cases of insanity judges might rightly feel themselves
at liberty to direct the jury in such terms as they felt appropriate' 48 in other words, to
ignore the Rules. Although he continued to require that an impulse be irresistible' 49 he
was of the view that a man who by reason of mental disease was prevented from
controlling his conduct was in any event covered by the McNaghten Rules'. This is
because of the broad interpretation which he ascribed to knowledge within the Rules,
saying
"Knowledge has its degrees like everything else and implies something
more real and more closely connected with conduct than the half
knowledge retained in dreams"51.
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A requirement of a deeper level of knowledge would cover cases of irresistible
impulse. According to Stephen knowledge and self-control were inter-dependent:
"It is as true that a man who cannot control himself does not know the
nature of his acts as that a man who does not know the nature of his
acts is incapable of self-control" 152•
In R v Davis (1881)'" Stephen took the initiative himself. Two medical men
gave evidence that the accused, who was charged with feloniously wounding his
sister-in-law with intent to murder her, was suffering from delirium tremens, as a
result of which his actions would not be under his control and he would not be able to
distinguish between moral right and wrong at the time he committed the act.
Stephen's summing-up had all the appearance of orthodoxy, for he told the
jury that they must follow "the great test laid down in McNaughten's case" but then he
did his best to show the dependence of knowledge of right and wrong on possession
of self control:
"As I understand the law, any disease which so disturbs the mind that
you cannot think calmly and rationally of all the different reasons to
which we refer in considering the rightness or wrongness of an action -
any disease which so disturbs the mind that you cannot perform that
duty with some moderate degree of calmness and reason may be fairly
said to prevent a man from knowing that what he did was wrong... both
the doctors agree that the prisoner was unable to control his conduct,
and that nothing short of actual physical restraint would have deterred
him from the commission of the act. If you think there was a distinct
disease caused by drinking, but differing from drunkenness, and that by
152 ibid p.171
153 (1 88 1) 14 Cox.C.C.563
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reason thereof he did not know that the act was wrong, you will find a
verdict of not guilty on the ground of insanity ti154.
The jury returned a verdict of not guilty on the ground of insanity.
Stephen J. again used irresistible impulse as evidence of lack of knowledge of
right and wrong in R v Burt (1885) and R v Davies (1888)155
Soon other judges were going a step further than Stephen J. In R v Duncan
(1890) Lawrence J. added, as an alternative to the usual charge, the question:
"Was the prisoner unable to control his actions in consequence of a
disordered mind?"156.
In Jordan (1872) Baron Martin had said "When such impulses come upon
men, according to the medical view they were unable to resist them. It would be safe
in such a case to acquit the accused on the ground of insanity'''. The defence was
again admitted in Gill (1883)158.
In 1910 the Court of Criminal Appeal had its first opportunity to settle the
issue in the case of Victor Jones'. The accused was convicted of the murder of a
schoolteacher friend before Grantham J., at the Monmouth Assizes. He appealed inter
alia on the ground of misdirection as to the law relating to insanity as a defence.
Counsel for the appellant contended that his crime showed all the characteristics
which Taylor and other writers on medical jurisprudence recognised as notes of
homicidal mania or impulsive insanity namely,
1) no motive
154 ibid p.564
155 These cases were cited by the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (1949-53) Cmd 8932 op
cit appendix 8(d) p.400
156 The Law Times (1960) Vol.229 p.192
157 H.Barnes op cit p.316
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2) the victim an object of sincere love
3) no concealment
4) no attempt to escape
5) confession of the act
6) outward appearance of utter coolness and indifference.
Defence counsel contended that even if these facts were not of themselves
sufficient to show insanity, taken together with the appellants mental history, they
were of great moment. Arguing that knowledge and self control are interdependent he
drew support from Stephen's History of the Criminal Law of England' and from
Baron Rolfe's dictum in Layton'', in justification of his argument that, "knowing"
that an act is right or wrong requires something more than mere consciousness.
That the Court of Appeal was not satisfied that either McNaghten madness or
irresistible impulse had properly been made out is evident from the words of
Alverstone L.C.J.:
"There is no need here to enter upon a disquisition as to the terms in
which the question ought to be left, where a person is prevented by
defective mental power or mental disease from knowing the nature of
his acts or from controlling his conduct. It is not made out in this case
that the appellant was not in a condition to be aware of the nature of his
acts or that he was prevented from exercising self contror62.
The Court of Appeal decided to postpone determination of the issue for an
occasion when the facts established uncontrollable impulse. Alverstone L.C.J.
asserted that
160 Stephen A History of the Criminal Law of England Vol.ii op cit
161 (1849) 4 Cox.C.0 155
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"when that day comes the Court will not shrink from the duty of
deciding those matters of controversy and declaring the law. But in this
case they do not arise'.
The plea of irresistible impulse enjoyed success for some time after the trial of
Victor Jones. In R v Hay' Darling J. directed a jury that they would be justified in
finding the accused insane, if through disease of the mind he was unable to control a
homicidal impulse, although he knew the nature and quality of his act and knew that it
was wrong.
That same year the Court of Criminal Appeal was required to consider an
uncontrollable impulse in R v Thomas'. Thomas was convicted of murder and
appealed on the ground that the trial judge erred in not allowing irresistible impulse to
go to the jury. Darling J., now sitting in the Court of Criminal Appeal, found that the
trial judge's direction was perfectly adequate in light of the evidence and that
"Impulsive insanity is the last refuge of a hopeless defence".
It is submitted that this ruling cannot be taken as a rejection of irresistible
impulse by the Court of Criminal Appeal. The Court was merely urging for caution
where uncontrollable impulse was pleaded.
In the face of the Court of Appeal's indecision, trial judges continued to give
approval to the doctrine of irresistible impulse. In R v Fryer", where medical
witnesses offered conflicting evidence as to the accused's insanity, Bray J. (referring
to the McNaghten rules) directed the jury in the following terms
"That is the recognised law on the subject but I am bound to say it does
not seem to me to completely state the law as it now is and for the
163 ibid p.218
164 22 Cox.C.C.268
165 (1911) 7 Cr.App.R.36
166 ibid p.37
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purposes of to-day I am going to direct you in the way indicated by a
very learned judge, Fitzjames Stephen and follow his direction, that, if
it is shown that he is in such a state of mental disease or natural mental
infirmity as to deprive him of the capacity to control his actions I think
you ought to find him what the law calls him - 'insane'.
Not long after, Bray J. directed a jury in similar terms, where a plea of guilty
but insane was based on evidence that the prisoner was an epileptic and had acted
under the influence of an uncontrollable impulse'. This time, however, he qualified
the defence of irresistible impulse with the requirement that the accused be deprived,
at the time, of all control over his actions.
In R v Coelho' the Court of Appeal refused to set aside a conviction for
murder on the ground that the trial judge should have allowed a defence of irresistible
impulse to go to the jury. Again the decision seems to have been based on lack of
evidence of the condition as nothing in the judgment suggests a rejection of
irresistible impulse per se.
However, resistance to recognition of irresistible impulse as a defence
reasserted itself and in R v Holt"' the Court of Appeal put an end to the notion. The
question of whether the accused was suddenly overcome by an uncontrollable impulse
was left to the jury by the trial judge (Greer J.) but they decided against the appellant.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal (Reading L.J. speaking on behalf of Avory J. and
surprisingly Bray J., who had presided over R v Fryer and R v Jolly) held that
"The tests in McNaughten's case must be observed, and it is not
enough for a medical expert to come to the Court and say generally
that in his opinion the criminal is insane"72.
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Soon afterwards Darling J., hearing an appeal against a conviction for murder,
held
"The contention. .that the prisoner was insane was based upon grounds
never yet admitted in any English Court of Justice'''.
This is a surprising observation considering that he himself had accepted these
grounds as evidence of insanity in R v Hay. He continued:
"We are satisfied that the learned judge.. .gave the correct definition of
the kind of insanity, according to law, which would have justified a
special verdict and pointed out that if the question of uncontrollable
impulse had to be considered there was no evidence that the prisoner
was under an uncontrollable impulse, because every fact went to shew
premeditation" 174
Despite the Court of Appeal's recent pronouncements, in True 1922' the trial
judge, McCardie J., allowed a defence of irresistible impulse to go to the jury but they
rejected it. On appeal the Court of Appeal reasserted the supremacy of the McNaghten
Rules, saying:
"there is no foundation for the suggestion that the rule derived from
McNaghten's case has been in any sense relaxed"176.
Furthermore Greer J. denied that in Holt he had directed the jury that
irresistible impulse was a defence. He stated:
173 R v Quarmby (1921) 15 Cr.App.R.163 p.164
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"What I really told the jury was that the definition of insanity in
criminal cases was the one laid down by the judges in McNaghten's
case but that men's minds were not divided into separate
compartments, and that if a man's will power was destroyed by mental
disease it might well be that the disease would so affect his mental
powers as to destroy his power of knowing what he was doing or
knowing that it was wrong. 'Uncontrollable impulse' in this event
would bring the case within the rule laid down in McNaghten's case'.
The medical tests prevailed when True was reprieved by the Home Secretary
on the grounds of his mental condition. (To secure a reprieve a medical report by two
doctors was necessary, which in this instance the Home Secretary treated as
conclusive evidence of True's insanity). As a result of this, the Home Secretary came
under an onslaught of criticism'''. However, the controversy generated by this
reprieve did have the effect of bringing into the open the tension between the law's
definition of insanity (i.e. McNaghten) and the medical theories of the day' ''. The
outcome of all this was the appointment by the Government of a Committee on
Insanity and Crime "to consider what changes, if any, are desirable in the existing law
and practice relating to criminal trials in which the plea of insanity as a defence is
raised, and whether any and, if so, what changes should be made in the existing law
and practice in respect of cases falling within the provisions of section 2(4) of the
Criminal Lunatics Act, 1884" 18° (the section dealing with psychiatric inquiries
instituted after sentence by the Home Secretary).
The Committee was chaired by Lord Justice Atkin and its members were
appointed by the Lord Chancellor, the Earl of Birkenhead. Its composition was
overwhelmingly legal (the only non-legal members were the permanent head of the
Home Office and one of his senior subordinates)' 81 . It contained the two civil servants
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mentioned, the Attorney-General, the Solicitor General, Senior Treasury Counsel, the
Director of Public Prosecutions, Sir Herbert Stephen (a Clerk of Assize) and Lord
Atkin (a Lord Justice of appeal). By subsequent correspondence it was made clear that
the Lord Chancellor intended the inquiry to have a wide scope and to include
consideration of the Rules in McNaghten's case'. The Committee on Insanity and
Crime (Atkin Committee) received memoranda from both the British Medical
Association and the Medico Psychological Association.
In composition the Committee was not only overwhelmingly legal but was
official to an extent that could be considered quite improper'. It is clear that by
appointing such a legally representative body of members the Lord Chancellor was
doing his best to ensure that their report would preserve the status quo.'". Surprisingly
however, the Atkin Committee favoured the British Medical Association's proposal to
add the defence of irresistible impulse to the McNaghten Rules. The report of the
British Medical Association proposed that a person should be held to be irresponsible,
if prevented by mental disease "from controlling his own conduct unless the absence
of control is the direct and immediate consequence of his own default'''.
The Committee felt that the exception as to direct consequence of his own
default was superfluous as the only case suggested was the taking of drink or drugs as
an incentive to do the act, which would presumably show that loss of control was not
caused by mental disease'''. The British Medical Association's witnesses had
proposed that complete loss of control caused by mental disease would be necessary
and the Committee preferred loss of control with reference to the act charged than
general loss of control'''. It noted that general lack of control would be relevant to the
question whether the lack of control in the particular case was due to mental disorder
or to a mere vicious propensity'.
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Finally, the Committee, pointing to the body of conflicting case law, advised
clarification of the law by an express statutory provision introducing irresistible
impulse as a defence'. The Atkin Committee was most convinced by the genuineness
of irresistible impulses in the case of "mothers who have been seized with the impulse
to cut the throats or otherwise destroy their children to whom they were normally
devoted" and who in practice were found insane'. This was the only example which
they gave in support of their argument for an insanity defence accommodating
irresistible impulse.
On 6/3/1924 the Home Secretary made it clear that the Government did not
contemplate proposing any legislation on this subject'', possibly because of the
introduction of infanticide as a partial defence in 1922. To some, no doubt, this
rendered the Atkin Committee's recommendation otiose. As a result of the
Government's inertia Lord Darling introduced a private members bill in 1924, the
Criminal Responsibility (Trials) Bill, designed to give effect to these
recommendations.'
Clause One of this bill enacted in statutory form the existing McNaghten
Rules, with the proposed addition as to uncontrollable impulse. The House of Lords
refused to give the bill a second reading after a debate in which it was opposed by
Lord Sumner, the Lord Chief Justice (Lord Hewart) - who said that he had consulted
12 of the 15 judges of the King's Bench Division and 10, like himself, emphatically
opposed the bill - the Lord Chancellor (Lord Haldane), Lord Dunedin and Lord
Cave".
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The arguments on which the opposition to the bill was founded have been
summarised briefly by the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (1949-53) as
follows'94:-
1) Even if it were accepted that there was such a thing as an irresistible
impulse, cases were uncommon and could be satisfactorily dealt with under the
existing law. The McNaghten Rules were sufficiently flexible to allow a verdict of
guilty but insane to be founded in those cases of irresistible impulse where it was
justified.
2) There was no clear criterion by which to decide whether an impulse was
irresistible or only unresisted, and the proposed addition to the McNaghten Rules
would place juries in an impossible position, besides making it much more difficult
for the judge to give an adequate direction to the jury.
3) In practice this defence would be most often raised when no other defence
had any chance of success. Juries were apt to take a merciful view and would be
reluctant to reject medical evidence that an impulse was irresistible. Thus,
responsibility would, in effect, be transferred from the jury to the doctors, with the
result that many offenders would escape just punishment.
4) The proposed change would apply to other crimes as well as murder and
might lead to a serious increase in crimes of violence, especially in offences against
women and children. Sane and insane persons alike were subject to such impulses as
anger and sexual passion and there would be a great danger that sane persons who
committed crimes under such impulses would successfully plead that the impulse was
irresistible.
5) There was no justification for suggesting that everyone who was insane was
wholly irresponsible for his actions. The penalties of the law were, in fact, a
restraining influence on many persons of unsound mind and if this restraint were
removed, many would yield to impulses which they would otherwise have resisted.
That much of the opposition to irresistible impulse was based on the law's.fear
of medical dominance in cases where insanity was pleaded is evident from a lecture
194 ibid pp.405 & 406
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delivered by Lord Hewart before the Medical Society of London where he said of the
defence of irresistible impulse
"If the law were relaxed in the way which has been suggested. .the
result might be to transfer to a section of the medical profession the
question whether a great number of ordinary criminals should be held
responsible to the law"195.
Any doubt as to the status of the defence of irresistible impulse was resolved
by Kopsch (1925) 196 . Kopsch had strangled his uncle's wife with his tie at her request.
There Hewart L.C.J. categorically rejected irresistible impulse as a defence, saying:
"It is the fantastic theory of uncontrollable impulse which if it were to
become part of our criminal law would be merely subversive. It is not
yet part of the criminal law and it is to be hoped that the time is far
distant when it will be made so"197.
Flave11 198
 was the last case in the series to reject the defence of irresistible
impulse and Sodeman 199 marked the end of its life in the dominions.
In A.G. for South Australia v Brown' the irresistible impulse issue arose
again but this time from a different angle. Brown was found guilty of the murder of
his employer Neville Lord. After the killing he made a statement to the police to the
effect that he knew what he was doing was wrong but he couldn't help himself. At the
trial, the medical witnesses agreed that Brown was a schizoid personality and was not
suffering from any disease or disorder of the mind but differed with regard to whether
Brown knew that his act was wrong.
195 Excerpts of the lecture have been published by the Law Times (1927) Vol.164 p.384
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Although the issue of irresistible impulse was not raised by the defendant, the
trial judge, Abbot J., asserted that it was no defence in law. Brown was found guilty of
murder and sentenced to death and his appeal was dismissed by the Full Court of the
Supreme Court of South Australia. He appealed to the High Court of Australia, which
quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial.
The High Court held that the trial judge's reference to uncontrollable impulse
was open to serious objection because irresistible impulse, as such, had not been
raised as a defence. Nor had anyone suggested that it could amount to a defence.
However, this did not mean that evidence concerning the prisoner's domination by an
uncontrollable impulse was irrelevant because
"it may afford strong ground for the inference that a prisoner was
labouring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind as not
to know that he was doing what was wrong".
Although at first sight the above words seem to refer to irresistible impulse
evidencing insanity within the McNaghten Rules, on closer analysis it appears that the
High Court was referring to uncontrollable impulse evidencing lack of knowledge of
the wrongness of an act. Hence, the High Court of Australia was following the
Stephen interpretation of "wrong" as denoting more than mere knowledge. If
irresistible impulse would prevent the defendant from reasoning calmly about the
moral character of the act he would be prevented from knowing that the act was
wrong. It was the above statement by the High Court which the Privy Council
objected to, restoring the verdict of the trial court. Lord Tucker's worry was that the
above words
"would naturally be read as requiring [judges] to tell the jury as a
matter of law and in the absence of any medical evidence (emphasis
added) to the effect that irresistible impulse is a symptom of some
disorder of the mind, which although not preventing the patient from
-43-
knowing the nature and quality of his act yet does prevent him from
knowing that it is wrong't201.
This is a peculiar interpretation of the High Court's judgment, and it is
submitted that it is not the correct one. The High Court was not asserting that
irresistible impulse might, in the absence of medical evidence, demonstrate the
existence of a disease of the mind but rather, that it might evidence lack of knowledge
of the wrongfulness of an act. The Privy Council noted that where evidence was given
that irresistible impulse was a symptom of the particular disease of the mind from
which the prisoner was allegedly suffering and as to its effect on his ability to know
the nature and quality of his act or that his act was wrong, it would be the duty of the
judge to deal with the matter in the same way as any other relevant evidence given at
the tria1202.
In 1930 the report of the Select Committee on Capital Punishment' stated:
"We are satisfied that there is a strong case for bringing the McNaghten
Rules up to date, so as to give the fullest scope to general medical
considerations and to extend in some way the area of criminal
irresponsibility"'.
The Committee recommended, in the event that Parliament should decide to
maintain the death penalty, that the McNaghten Rules be revised "so as to give further
scope to general medical considerations, and to extend the area of criminal
irresponsibility in the case of the mentally defective and of those who labour under
some distinct form of insanity ti205.
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Once again no action was taken on their recommendation and when the Royal
Commission on Capital Punishment of 1953 reported', the Rules were unaltered
from their form in 1843. The British Medical Association was still urging extension of
the McNaghten Rules to cover irresistible impulse. Although the Association received
express and implied support from a substantial number of witnesses', the majority of
witnesses felt that the Rules were by now being interpreted so loosely that cases of
irresistible impulse caused by disease of the mind were now embraced by them.
Rejecting all the traditional arguments against adopting irresistible impulse as
a defence, the Royal Commission felt that if anything, the addition of irresistible
impulse would be too narrow a test of responsibility208, saying:
"If therefore, the McNaghten Rules are to be extended by the addition
of a third limb to meet the case of insanity affecting not the reason but
the will, it is important that this should be formulated not merely in
terms of inability to resist an impulse, but in wider terms which will
allow the court to take account of those cases where an insane person
commits a crime after a long period of brooding and reflection or is
gradually carried towards it without any real attempt to resist this
tendency" 2°9.
Although the Commission preferred that the jury be left free to determine
whether, at the time of the act, the accused was suffering from disease of the mind or
mental deficiency to such a degree that he ought not to be held responsible', it felt
that the British Medical Association's proposal was preferable to leaving the
McNaghten Rules intact'. The Commission recommended that a formula on the
following lines should be adopted in the alternative to their main recommendation:-
2" Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (1949-53) Cmd 8932 op cit
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"The jury must be satisfied that, at the time of committing the act the
accused, as a result of disease of the mind or (mental deficiency) (a)
did not know the nature and quality of the act or (b) did not know that
it was wrong or (c) was incapable of preventing himself from
committing it"212.
However every one of the Commission's major recommendations was rejected
by the conservative Government of 1953 whose primary concern was the preservation
of the status quo ante'. One of the reasons given for rejecting the Commission's
proposals on the law of insanity, was that they extended beyond the law on murder'.
This was the last word in England on irresistible impulse as a criminal law
defence but it was later admitted, in modified form, into Irish Law as part of the
insanity defence. It appears that the medical profession eventually lost interest in it as
the categories of volitional and moral insanity became outmoded. But although the
most tenacious, it is not the only test of insanity which has been recommended by the
medical profession and this was by no means the end of the controversy over the
insanity defence.
1.3 THE PRODUCT TEST OF INSANITY
In this section I will examine the "product test" of insanity which provided that
an accused should be excused if his act was the product of insanity. Many variants on
this theme have been suggested, all of which would have given the medical profession
considerable authority in criminal trials. The use of this defence in D.C. from 1954
prompted fresh discussion of the insanity defence and set in motion a train of events
which will highlight the futility of redefining the insanity defence.
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While irresistible impulse was being urged in English law, the McNaghten
Rules were also receiving an onslaught of criticism from the psychiatric profession in
the United States. Dr.Isaac Ray, one of the founders of the American Psychiatric
Association, believed that mental illness, where the patient seems to be the victim of
emotional or "moral" forces beyond his control, can exist in spite of seemingly intact
intellectual ability and that the symptoms of mental disease are so diverse that no
legal definition or test of universal application is possible'. These observations lead
him to suggest in his Treatise on the Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity (1838) that
"if the mental unsoundness, necessary to exempt from punishment,
were required by law to have embraced the criminal act within its
sphere of influence, as much perhaps would then be accomplished as is
practicable within a specific enactment'''.
His personal influence on Judge Charles Doe 217
 led the latter to introduce this
principle in a trilogy of New Hampshire cases, starting with Boardman v
Woodman'. This was a probate case in which Judge Doe offered as a dissenting
opinion that delusions were not the test of insanity and that insanity is a question of
fact for the jury to decide and not a question of law for the judge to direct the jury on.
Judge Doe was aware that a new rule would be less likely to win acceptance than a
return to basic principles of common law' which he felt had been corrupted by the
failure of the "great lawyers" to distinguish issues of fact from issues of law.
According to Reid, although Doe was concerned by the fact that the law advanced an
outdated theory of mental disease, his primary concern was the restoration of the
distinction between law and fact'. Hence his dissenting judgment in Boardman:
215 L.E.Reik "The Doe-Ray Correspondence: A Pioneer Collaboration in the Jurisprudence of Mental
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"The question whether Miss Blydenburgh had a mental disease was a
question of fact for the jury, and not a question of law for the court.
Whether a delusion is a symptom, or a test, of any mental disease, was
also a question of fact, and the instructions given to the jury, were
erroneous in assuming it to be a question of law. The jury should have
been instructed that if the writing propounded in the probate court was
the offspring of mental disease, the verdict should be that Miss
Blydenburgh was not of sound mind"221.
His eagerness to have his doctrine accepted by the legal profession was the
reason for his failure to accredit Dr.Isaac Ray with it. Antagonism towards the
medical profession from the legal profession also meant that insanity had to be put
forward as an issue of fact for the jury to decide, without seeming to accommodate
recent medical theories222.
In State v Pike' Judge Doe, serving as junior to Chief Justice Ira Perley,
persuaded the latter to instruct the jury that
"whether there is such a mental disease as dipsomania, and whether the
defendant had that disease, and whether the killing of Brown was the
product of such disease, were questions of fact for the jUryi1224.
Under the law as it then stood, the justices of the Supreme Judicial Court who
presided as nisi prius judges at trial term, also reviewed their own decisions as
appellate judges during law term. Thus when Pike appealed his conviction, Doe was
able to develop, in a concurring opinion, the theoretical basis for Perley's charge'.
After this decision, Doe sought to minimize his role in it and maximise Perley's,
.-....0.
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hoping that the latter's prestige would lend it respectability in the eyes of the legal
profession226.
Six months after the Pike decision was handed down, Doe presided at another
murder trial in which the plea of insanity was entered. Hiram Jones of Newmarket was
an uxoricide who had slit his wife's throat from ear to ear with a razor because, he
said, she was unfaithful to her marriage vows. The defence specifically asked the
court to charge the jury that delusion, knowledge of right and wrong, and irresistible
impulse were all tests of criminal responsibility. Doe refused and instead gave
substantially the same charge Perley C.J. had given in Pike. Jones appealed but the
New Hampshire Appellate Court unanimously approved Judge Doe's charge that if
"the killing was the offspring or product of mental disease, the defendant should be
acquitted", Ladd J. saying:
"Whether the defendant had a mental disease..seems to be as much a
question of fact as whether he had a bodily disease; and whether the
killing of his wife was the product of that disease, was also as clearly a
matter of fact as whether thirst and a quickened pulse are the product of
a fever. That it is a difficult question does not change the matter at all.
The difficulty is intrinsic, and.. symptoms, phases, or manifestations of
the disease as legal tests of capacity to entertain a criminal intent. .are
clearly matters of evidence, to be weighed by the jury upon the
question whether the act was the offspring of insanity: if it was, a
criminal intent did not produce it; if it was not a criminal intent did
produce it, and it was crime".
Among commentators there is disagreement about whether New Hampshire
requires that the jury find that the defendant's mental illness caused the criminal act
before he can be exculpated'''. But in view of the evolution of the New Hampshire
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doctrine from the law of evidence and the fact that at no time did the New FIampshire
judges attempt to define "product" and the fact that they expressly held that all
definitions of "insanity" (or "responsibility" or "mental disease" etc.) are questions of
fact for the jury, the better position is that the New Hampshire doctrine does not
require that a causal connection between the mental disease and the act be shown, to
exempt from legal responsibility'. With this in mind it would seem that, despite
some contradictory words"°, Judge Doe expressed the New Hampshire position on
causation when he said:
"Whether an act may be produced by partial insanity when no
connection can be discovered between the act and the disease, is a
question of fact"231.
This has led Reid to conclude' that Doe intended not only the word "product"
to be a question of fact, but also whether or not a finding of causation is necessary, to
be a matter of fact for the jury.
Judge Doe confirmed his faith in jury competence in a letter to Dr. Ray dated
14/4/1868233
"Giving this matter to the jury leaves the way open for the reception of
all progress in your science. One jury is not bound by the verdict of
another jury on a general question of fact or science, as courts
sometimes feel themselves bound by decisions on general questions of
law. My result takes off the shackles of precedent and authority, -
opens the subject to be decided in each case as an entirely new subject.
Juries may make mistakes, but they cannot do worse than courts have
done in this business".
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Although the New Hampshire solution was praised by some, it was criticised
by others on the ground that its inherent ambiguity left juries with insufficient
guidance on the critical issue of responsibility'''. The practical effect of the New
Hampshire rule has been to transfer the decision on insanity to the psychiatrists, as
prosecution and defence alike almost unquestioningly accept the psychiatric evidence
tendered by the State Mental Hospital'''. Reid reveals that the medical experts tend to
limit insanity to psychosis"' and to require a causal connection between the act and
the illness'', some experts even requiring McNaghten madness before it will return a
finding of insanity'''. The obvious inference is that the medical profession decides the
issue of insanity based on a misunderstanding of the prevailing test, whilst the true
New Hampshire rule is, in effect, ignored. On the other hand, it may be argued that
the doctors had to take upon themselves the task which Judge Doe and his successors
on the New Hampshire bench should have undertaken; namely to give a separate legal
definition of mental illness as a legally excusing condition'''. That the New
Hampshire rule did not acquire success, is evident from the fact that for the next
eighty three years, no other American jurisdiction adopted the New Hampshire rule or
even gave it serious consideration"°.
However, this approach to insanity had some supporters in England, as is
evident from the testimony of Blackburn J. before the Select Committee on the
Homicide Law Amendment Bill in 1874:
"on the question what amounts to insanity, that would prevent a person
being punishable or not I have read every definition which I ever could
meet with, and never was satisfied with one of them, and have
endeavoured in vain to make one satisfactory to myself; I verily
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believe that it is not in human power to do it. You must take it that in
every individual case you must look at the circumstances and do the
best you can to say whether it was the disease of the mind which was
the cause of the crime, or the party's criminal will'.
The proposal formulated by the Medico Psychological Association before the
Atkin Committee in 1922 was also clearly influenced by developments in the United
States. That proposal was that
"(1) the McNaghten rules be abrogated and the responsibility of a person should be
left as a question of fact to be determined by the jury on the merits of the particular
case.
(2) In every trial in which the prisoner's mental condition is in issue the judge should
direct the jury to answer the following questions
(a) Did the prisoner commit the act alleged?
(b) If he did was he at the time insane?
(c) If he was insane, has it nevertheless been proved to the satisfaction of the jury that
his crime was unrelated to his mental disorder?"242.
The Atkin Committee's main reason for rejecting this recommendation was
their belief that it treated insanity as co-extensive with irresponsibility and it also
feared the far-reaching effect of granting immunity to everyone of unsound mind,
especially since unsoundness of mind was no longer regarded as a disorder of the
intellectual or cognitive faculties but as a morbid change in the emotional and
instinctive activities with or without intellectual derangement'. All the witnesses
agreed that the requirement that the prosecution satisfy the jury that the act was
unrelated to the mental disorder would cast a burden which could not be discharged',
and when the vagueness of "unrelated" was pointed out, the phrase was altered to "the
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mental disorder was not calculated to influence the commission of the act"245.
However, the Atkin Committee felt that this failed to alter the difficulty of burden of
proof".
The Committee summed up its reasons for rejecting the recommendation of
the Medico Psychological Association as follows:-
"In such a case as that mentioned there seems no reason to suppose that
during the early stages at least the person would not be affected by
every motive for committing or abstaining from committing a criminal
act that would be likely to affect a person of sound mind and in
substantially the same degree. The difficulty of diagnosis of the state of
mind and when some unsoundness of mind was indicated, of
establishing the non-relation of the act to the unsound state of mind
would introduce so much uncertainty into the administration of the
criminal law as to create a public danger"247.
It continued
"It appears to us. .that much of the criticism directed from the medical
side at the McNaughten Rules is based upon a misapprehension. It
appears to assume that the rules contain a definition of insanity, and the
legal definition thus obtained is contrasted with the medical conception
of insanity. .11 may be that the judges who framed the rules took into
consideration the medical view as to the nature of insanity generally
accepted in 1843 if there was one. But it is certain that they were not
professing to define "disease of the mind" but only to define what
degree of disease of the mind negatived criminality. .When once it is
appreciated that the question is a legal question, and that the present
law is that a person of unsound mind may be criminally responsible,
245 • •ibid p.5
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the criticism based upon a supposed clash between legal and medical
conceptions of insanity disappears"'.
Although in 1953, in evidence given before the Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment, the Medico Psychological Association (which had now added Royal to
its name) were content to rely on the "increasing elasticity" with which the Rules were
being interpreted and were no longer in favour of their abrogation, the Gowers
Commission felt (with one dissentient) that the test of responsibility encompassed by
the McNaghten Rules was so defective that the law on the subject ought to be
changed'. The Commission's main recommendation (with three dissentients) was
that the McNaghten Rules be abrogated and the jury be left free to determine whether,
at the time of the act, the accused was suffering from "disease of the mind or mental
deficiency to such a degree that he ought not to be held responsible""°.
Although at first glance this does not appear to resemble Isaac Ray's
formulation, the Commission was certainly influenced by it. The Commission
categorically denied that mental disease or mental defect of any type is co-extensive
with irresponsibility 251 but stated that
"if it appears that the crime was wholly or very largely caused by
insanity then [the accused] ought to be treated as irresponsible; for to
punish a person for a crime caused by insanity would in effect be to
punish him for his insanity"252.
This echoes the words of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in aatti
Ico ___ II e that
_...-
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"No argument is needed to show that to hold that a man may be
punished for what is the offspring of disease would be to hold that he
may be punished for disease. Any rule which makes that possible
cannot be law"253.
In assessing causation the Commission stated that
"Where a person suffering from a mental abnormality commits a crime,
there must always be some likelihood that the abnormality has played
some part in the causation of the crime; and generally speaking, the
graver the abnormality and the more serious the crime, the more
probable it must be that there is a causal connection between them. But
the closeness of this connection will be shown by the facts brought in
evidence in individual cases and cannot be decided on the basis of any
general medical principle 11254.
The Commission justified its proposal to allow the jury wide general discretion by
saying
"Whatever the rule of law may say, and however broadly it may be
interpreted, it can never be all-embracing and it must be expected that
members of the jury will sometimes find that their common sense
drives them to look behind the rule and to address their minds directly
to the essential question of responsibility"255.
The Commission denied that their proposal would lay a difficult or impossible
task on the jury and asserted the advantages of the judges' new freedom to direct the
juries attention to all the evidence for and against a finding of insanity'.
.........
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However the Commission's proposals were never enacted and the law on
insanity remained precisely the same as it was in 1843. The Commission's
recommendation on the wording of the insanity defence has been taken up by a 1978
Interdepartmental Committee on Mentally Ill and Maladjusted Persons which
recommended that a variant of it replace the McNaghten-irresistible impulse test of
insanity which prevails in Irish law257.
The Royal Commission's report also influenced developments in the U.S., and
one year later Judge David Bazelon, in Durham v U.S.', ruled that if the defendant's
act was the product of mental disease or defect he was not criminally responsible. In
doing so he overruled the right-wrong test supplemented by the irresistible impulse
test which had prevailed until then in D.C.. The court in Durham stated that the "rule
we now hold..is not unlike that followed by the New Hampshire court since 1870'59,
a statement which has led to the two decisions being twinned together and jointly
criticised although they are not in fact the same, as causation is not a legal
requirement under the New Hampshire "rule".
Although not well articulated, the court in Durham wished to remedy the well
known criticism directed at the insanity tests, that experts were required to testify as to
issues beyond their competence'. Whilst the medical experts would advance
evidence of disease or defect, the jury would determine the ultimate question of
whether the act was the product of mental disease or defect. What was clear from the
Durham decision was its foundation on the premise that factfinders should be able to
weigh any and all expert information about the accused's behaviour'.
Durham heralded the arrival of a new reformative era of punishment instead
of the previous utilitarian one and hinted that increasing numbers would be removed
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from the criminal justice system to the mental health system because they suffered
from mental disease262.
The shortcomings of Durham soon became obvious. The only explanation
given of "mental disease" and "mental defect" was that disease is "a condition which
is considered capable of either improving or deteriorating" whereas defect is a
nonchanging condition "which may be either congenital, or the result of injury, or the
residual effect of a physical or mental disease" 263 . The vagueness of these phrases was
pointed out in Wright v U.S.' where the court said "the terms "disease" and "defect"
are not so self-explanatory and our definition of them in Durham is not so definitive
as to make elucidation always superfluous"'. One of the earliest critics of the
Durham rule observed that
"the decision left unresolved the question whether the controlling
criterion, "mental disease or defect", was intended to be psychiatric (in
the sense that psychiatric conceptions of "mental disease" would
legally be equated to "insanity") or jural (in the sense that the jury's
view of "mental disease" would control). Upon this "pending" decision
hangs the critical issue of whether psychiatrist or jury will have the
final say of criminal responsibility"'.
That the issue of mental disease was to be turned over to the medical witnesses
was confirmed in Wright, where the D.C. Court of Appeals defined mental disease as
synonymous with mental illness. Then in Carter v U.S." the court stated that
"Mental "disease" means mental illness. Mental illnesses are of many
sorts and have many characteristics. They, like physical illnesses, are
the subject matter of medical science. .The problems of the law in these
--,-
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cases are whether a person who has committed a specific criminal
act. .was suffering from a mental disease, that is, from a medically
recognized illness of the rnind""s.
This decision gave rise to the problem that "mental disease" exculpated
anyone whom psychiatrists chose to label as "mentally diseased." The problem was
dramatically highlighted by the "weekend flip flop case", In Re Rosenfield 269 where
the petitioner was described as a sociopath. A psychiatrist from St.Elizabeth's hospital
testified that a person with a sociopathic personality was not suffering from a mental
disease. That was on a Friday afternoon. On Monday morning, through a policy
change at the hospital, it was determined, as an administrative matter, that the state of
a psychopathic or sociopathic personality did, afterall, constitute a mental disease.
Whatever the psychiatrist testified amounted to "mental disease", he was making a
judgment about criminal responsibility, a judgment that he was not authorised to make
and with respect to which he is not expert'. (In this respect Durham differed from
the New Hampshire doctrine and the recommendation of the Royal Commission on
Capital Punishment (1953) where the issue of insanity is clearly a jural question). The
effect of the reduction of insanity to a scientific question was to minimise the
relevance of moral judgment, although pace Fletcher I do not feel that this was the
implicit ambition of Durham'. The end result was that in McDonald v U.S. 272 the
D.C. Court of Appeals stated that "a "mental disease or defect" for clinical
purposes. .may or may not be the same as mental disease or defect for the jury's
purpose in determining criminal responsibility" 273 , thus replacing the issue of "mental
disease or defect" on the jury.
Where there was agreement on the existence of mental disease the controversy
shifted to "product" 274 . The jury was left entirely dependent on the expert's
-
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classification of conduct as the "product" of mental disease 275 . As a result, in
Washington v U.S.', psychiatric testimony on the issue of productivity was
prohibited, on the ground that such testimony was likely to usurp the jury's function of
resolving the ultimate question of guilt. Further, it was said that the "product"
requirement assumed a compartmentalized mind, like McNaghten had done, because
it implied that mental disease "caused" some unlawful acts and not others'''. Although
the New Hampshire test also requires that the act be a product of mental disease, their
requirement of causation is less objectionable as it does not amount to a substantive
legal rule. On a philosophical level, the problem with the requirement of causation in
Durham was the failure to see the possibility of there being differing sets of equally
sufficient conditions existing to cause the same event. To say that a bodily movement
is the product of an abnormal condition of the brain does not preclude one from
describing that movement as an action performed by an agent for reasons'''. The
practical effect of Durham was that it shifted the court-room controversy from the
words of the insanity defence to the nature of the particular disease and to whether the
criminal act was the product of such disease'''. Wright and Carter attempted to
clarify the "product test" by the adoption of a "but for" test (i.e. the crime would not
have occurred "but for" the mental disease or defect). Because it is not possible to say
that a crime would have been committed if mental disease or defect had not been
present, the result of the "but for test" was a direct move from a finding of mental
disease to a finding of lack of responsibility"°. While thirty four acquittals on the
basis of Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity had been given during the four years
previous to the application of the Durham rule, in the four years after Durham was
decided the number of acquittals from insanity pleas rose to one hundred and fifty'''.
Durham left lawyers feeling that the liberty of the individual was seriously
threatened: he or she was no longer regarded as a person with rights but as an object
of control according to scientific techniques'''.
-
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While Durham centred on the effect of mental disease or defect on the
conduct of the actor, it provided no measure of the necessary effect which was present
in the McNaghten Rules and even in the irresistible impulse test. In these formulations
at least the jury was presented with the task of determining whether the mental disease
had the effect of impairing cognitive or volitional capacities'. With no standard by
which to judge the evidence the jury was left with the burden of deciding between
conflicting expert testimony as to whether the defendant was suffering from "mental
disease" and whether his act was the "product" of disease.
The erosion of Durham began in 1962 with McDonald v U.S. where the court
said
"neither the court nor the jury is bound by ad hoc definitions or
conclusions as to what experts state is a disease or defect. .The jury
should be told that a mental disease or defect includes any abnormal
condition of the mind or emotional process that substantially impairs
behaviour controls. The jury would consider testimony concerning the
development, adaptation and functioning of these processes and
controls".
In short, Durham had travelled a remarkably circuitous path towards the
conclusion that the jury needed some guidance, and that words like mental disease and
product were inadequate and that the standard would have to incorporate somehow, a
description of the sorts of effects of disease that were relevant to compliance with the
criminal law". That the jury is left with no standard with which to judge the
evidence, is an objection that applies equally to the New Hampshire rule and to the
recommendation of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (1949-53). A
variation of the Royal Commission's test had been approved by a minority of the
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American Law Institute, a body of noted attorneys, judges and scholars which had
undertaken to revise the criminal law and to write a model penal code that could be
adopted by the states', as an alternative to the test adopted in the code. This variation
of the Royal Commission's test was urged as a replacement of the Durham test by
Bazelon J. in Browner. Bazelon's test proposed that
"A defendant is not responsible if at the time of his unlawful conduct
his mental or emotional processes or behavior controls were impaired
to such an extent that he cannot justly be held responsible for his
act"2".
However the court in Browner' was impressed by Professor Goldstein's
warning in The Insanity Defense 289 that the
"overly general standard [whether the accused may justly be held
responsible] may place too great a burden upon the jury. If the law
provides no standard, members of the jury are placed in the difficult
position of having to find a man responsible for no other reason than
their personal feeling about him. Whether the psyches of individual
jurors are strong enough to make that decision, or whether the "law"
should put that obligation on them, is open to serious question. It is far
easier for them to perform the role assigned to them by legislature and
courts if they know - or are able to rationalize - that their verdicts are
"required" by law".
Rejecting the Gowers Commission's proposal as an alternative to the Durham
rule, the court in Browner expressed the view29°
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"that an instruction overtly cast in terms of "justice" cannot feasibly be
restricted to the ambit of what may properly be taken into account but
will splash with unconfinable and malign consequences".
Whilst admitting that
"there may be a tug of appeal in the suggestion that law is a means to
justice and the jury is an appropriate tribunal to ascertain justice"
it claimed"'
"This is a simplistic syllogism that harbors the logical fallacy of
equivocation, and fails to take account of the different facets and
dimensions of the concept of justice..The thrust of a rule that in essence
invites the jury to ponder the evidence on impairment of the
defendant's capacity and appreciation, and then do what to them seems
just, is to focus on what seems "just" as to the particular individual.
Under the centuries-long pull of the Judeo-Christian ethic, this is likely
to suggest a call for understanding and forgiveness of those who have
committed crimes against society but plead the influence of passionate
and perhaps justified grievances against that society, perhaps
grievances not wholly lacking in merit..The judgment of a court of law
must further justice to the community, and safeguard it, against
undercutting and evasion from overconcern for the individual. What
this reflects is not the rigidity of retributive justice. .but awareness how
justice in the broad may be undermined by an excess of compassion as
well as passion. Justice to the community includes penalties needed to
cope with disobedience by those capable of control, undergirding a
social environment that broadly inhibits behavior destructive of the
common good. An open society requires mutual respect and regard and
mutually reinforcing relationships among its citizens, and its ideals of
291 ibid p.988
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justice must safeguard the vast majority who responsibly shoulder the
burdens implicit in its ordered liberty. Still another aspect of justice is
the requirement for rules of conduct that establish reasonably
generality, neutrality and constancy. .This concept is neither static nor
absolute, but it would be sapped by a rule that invites an ad hoc
redefinition of the "just" with each new case."
As a result of the Durham experience, when the American Law Institute
(A.L.I.) made its recommendations on insanity for its Model Penal Code, a year after
the decision in Durham, it rejected the advice of its psychiatric advisory committee,
which endorsed Durham', and adopted the following test:-
(I) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a
result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease" do not include an abnormality
manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.
Although signalling a return to the McNaghten and irresistible impulse tests,
the A.L.I.'s formula contained two important changes. It used "appreciate" instead of
"know" in the McNaghten Rules, which suggested that responsibility required a
deeper level of understanding than mere knowledge or perception. The wording of
section 2 ensured that psychopaths would not be encompassed by the insanity
defence293 (it is commonly asserted that a psychopath is one who exhibits an
abnormality only in the repetitious performance of antisocial or criminal acts)294.
Although the formulation did not use the words "irresistible impulse", the terminology
"to conform his conduct" made it clear that impairment of volitional capacity as well
as impairment of cognition should be considered in determining criminal
responsibility. The substitution of language avoided the criticism directed at the
"irresistible impulse" test by the Gowers Commission in 1953, that volitional control
-
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may be impaired not only by a sudden occurrence but may be impaired after
brooding295 . Furthermore, the word "substantial" eliminated the need to show total
impairment of cognitive or control capacities'. Because no more than three essential
facts were required under the A.L.I. test, if psychiatry decided in the future to classify
other abnormal behaviour as symptomatic of a mental illness that impaired a person's
ability to obey the law, individuals thus afflicted could raise the insanity defence to
criminal charges arising out of such behaviour 297 .
Court after court refused to adopt Durham, using the occasion to reaffirm its
faith in free will and deterrence, its hostility to psychiatry and the deterministic view
of human behaviour, its scepticism about psychiatry's status as a science and its fear
that the concept of mental disease was so broad that it might encompass all or most
serious crime and especially the psychopath'. The author of the Durham formula,
Judge Bazelon, has described his own reasons for abandoning it in the following
terms:
"In the end, after eighteen years, I favoured the abandonment of the
Durham rule, because, in practice it had failed to take the issue of
criminal responsibility away from the experts. Psychiatrists continued
to testify to the naked conclusion instead of providing information
about the accused so that the jury could render the ultimate moral
judgment about blameworthiness. Durham had secured little
improvement over McNaghten"'.
Professor Goldstein is of the view that "Durham's principal contribution has
been less as a "solution" to the insanity problem than as a dramatic demonstration that
there are no solutions"'. Durham was finally overruled in U.S. v Brawner in favour
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of a variant of the Model Penal Code rule, a rule which has been urged (albeit
unsuccessfully) in court, as the appropriate test of insanity in Irish Law'''.
The A.L.I. rule was far more successful'', possibly a reaction of the legal
profession against the degree to which Durham had been championed by
psychiatrists and in part, as a result of the widespread acceptance of the stereotyped
view of McNaghten and irresistible impulse - a view which Durham did a great deal
to intensify'''. In 1961 only one state had a standard similar to the A.L.I. test. By 1985
approximately half of the states used the A.L.I. test, either verbatim or with slight
modifications'.
However this flight to the A.L.I. formula did not continue. The Model Penal
Code was open to the same objection as Durham in its reference to "mental disease or
defect" but its second limb raised other problems. In particular, the test of capacity to
conform had to face a well-known philosophical criticism. How can one tell the
difference between an impulse which is irresistible and one which is merely not
resisted?' 5 . Judge David Bazelon, author of the Durham rule, stated squarely in U.S.
v Brawner that
"Instead of asking a jury whether the act was caused by the
impairment, our new test asks the jury to wrestle with such unfamiliar
if not incomprehensible concepts as the capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of one's action, and the capacity to conform ones
conduct to the requirements of law. The best hope for our new test is
that jurors will regularly conclude that no-one - including the experts -
can provide a meaningful answer to the question posed by the AL!
test'''.
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It is not necessary to criticize the A.L.I. formula in much depth as it is no more
than a reformulation of the McNaghten and irresistible impulse tests' and the main
defects in those two tests (which have already been dealt with) are present in the
A.L.I. formulation. The phrase "as a result of' prolongs the requirement of a causal
connection which was the cause of so much controversy while Durham reigned and
use of the words "substantial capacity" and "appreciate" has been questioned on the
ground that they are bound to encourage differences among expert witnesses and also
among jurors over whether the defendant's degree of impairment or depth of
awareness was sufficient'''. No doubt these objections influenced the rejection of the
A.L.I. test by a majority of the Canadian Royal Commission on the Law of Insanity,
the Massachusetts Special Commission on Insanity and by the New Jersey Supreme
Court'. There is weak but provocative support for the conclusion that switching from
the McNaghten test which prevailed in most states, to the A.L.I. test, also resulted in
more successful insanity pleas. Between 1966 and 1972, Oregon had only 44
successful insanity pleas using the McNaghten test; between 1972 and 1982, a total of
734 insanity acquittals occurred using the A.L.I. standard. Maryland experienced an
increase of 143% in the proportion of defendants found not guilty by reason of
insanity in the years after that state changed from McNaghten to the A.L.I. test'''.
After the Hinckley verdict (when President Reagan's would-be assassin was
acquitted by reason of insanity), seven states made changes that restricted the
definition and use of the insanity defence. Four jurisdictions changed from the A.L.I.
or McNaghten plus irresistible impulse tests to the simple McNaghten test. Two
jurisdictions restricted the use of the insanity defence to certain types of offences and
one jurisdiction repealed the plea and the test of insanity altogether'. At this time,
reports of the American Psychiatric Association and the American Bar Association
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were advocating a cognitive test of insanity'. The American Bar Association's
Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards stated that
"psychiatric information relevant to determining whether a defendant
understood the nature of his act, and whether he appreciated its
wrongfulness, is more reliable and has a stronger scientific basis, than
for example, does psychiatric information relevant to whether a
defendant was able to control his behavior" 313 .
The American Bar Association accordingly rejected the "control" test in
favour of an exclusively cognitive test because it concluded that "there are occasional
mistakes, and. .these mistakes are most likely to be associated with the volitional
criterion" 314 . It added that "any volitional inquiry involves a significant risk of 'moral
mistakes' in the adjudication of responsibility"315.
In what has been viewed as an attempt to save the insanity defence from
complete extinction 316, the United States Congress in 1984 enacted legislation that
took the power to decide which version of the insanity defence to adopt away from the
federal circuit courts of appeal, and mandated that a uniform insanity test be used in
all federal prosecutions'. Several of the bills introduced in Congress in the aftermath
of the Hinckley verdict would have done away with the insanity defence altogether
and limited evidence of mental illness solely to the issue of the defendant's mens
red'. As a result, Congress responded by passing legislation which restricted the
scope of the insanity defence even further than McNaghten had done and would
excuse a criminal defendant only
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"if at the time of the offense, the defendant, as a result of severe mental
illness or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the
wrongfulness of his acts"319.
1.4 JUSTIFICATIONS OF THE INSANITY DEFENCE
Any discussion of the insanity defence must involve consideration of why we
excuse the insane. If a defence for the insane cannot be justified then we would be
better off abolishing it, a view which has been adopted in recent years by many
American academics 320 . On the other hand, if the insane do merit excuse, then,
arguably, the insanity defence should apply to all insane persons who commit criminal
acts and not just to a restricted group of insane persons.
Bracton's 13th century treatise On the Laws and Customs of England excused
the insane on the basis of the principle furiosus solo furore punitur - a madman is
punished by his madness alone. This justification of the insanity defence was
borrowed from Roman law'' but it is difficult to accept it as a justification for the
insanity defence today. In practice it has been subsumed by a more rational
justification. This is that a madman cannot be blamed as he is amens (id est) sine
mente, without his mind or discretion and actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. This
approach is similar to the law's treatment of children under ten years of age, who are
treated as being incapable of having mens rea and who cannot be found guilty of a
criminal offence. This rationale for the insanity defence goes back at least as far as
1280 when a Nottingham jury, who tried a man who had hanged his daughter in a
frenzied state, certified that "he did as aforesaid, and not feloniously or through malice
afore-thought" 322 . However, unless the state of mens rea presupposes a guilty healthy
mind it is not easy to see that the insane offender does in fact lack mens rea,
particularly if the state of mind required for the offence is objective recklessness or
strict liability. Fingarette feels that the equating of insanity with lack of mens rea has
been responsible for the assumption that the specific conditions that normally show
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absence of mens rea are also the ones that must be shown to be present where there is
insanity323
. As a result, the insanity defence has been limited to cognitive and
volitional impairment. Furthermore, the use of this justification may render the
insanity defence otiose' since any person who lacks mens rea will in any event be
acquitted.
A third justification which is commonly urged on behalf of the special verdict
is that an insane offender lacks blame for what he has done. Although closely allied to
the mens rea principle it seems to based on compassionate rather than academic
grounds. The York plea rolls for the year 1212 record a case in which
"The King must be consulted about an idiot who is in the prison
because in his witlessness he confessed that he is a thief, although in
fact he is not to blame".
This was the justification underlying Durham v U.S., which held "[o]tir
collective conscience does not allow punishment where it cannot impose blame'''.
This is also a justification for the defence of diminshed responsibility which reduces
the responsibility of those who are less blameworthy for their criminal acts. Another
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rationale for excusing the insane is that the process of prosecution, conviction and
imposition of sanctions which serves to educate the public by making known what
conduct is prohibited by the criminal law, cannot serve this function by punishing the
insane. Because this group is regarded as not blameworthy their punishment could
only blur the distinction between good and bad conduct and thus work against the
education theory'. A final justification which is commonly urged on behalf of the
insanity defence is Bentham's view that the deterrent effect of the law cannot have its
usual impact on insane offenders and hence, punishing an insane offender will not
deter those who can identify with him. The problem with this justification is that there
is no way to say a priori that some people should be excluded from the category of
potential deterrables and without empirical evidence the argument of pointless
punishment hardly generates a rationale for the existing excusing conditions in the
law3".
1.5 PROPOSALS TO ABOLISH THE INSANITY DEFENCE
As a result of the American experience, many academics have abandoned
attempts to reformulate the insanity defence and prefer instead to advocate its
abolition'. They have questioned the purpose of the insanity defence, stating that this
"either has been assumed to be so obvious as not to require articulation"° or has been
expressed in such vague generalizations as to afford no basis for evaluating the
multitude of formulae'''. Examination of the mens rea rationale has led the
abolitionists to the conclusion that "[w]ithout the essential element of mens rea there
is no crime from which to relieve the Defendant of liability and consequently, since
no crime has been committed, there is no need for formulating an insanity defense'''.
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Some abolitionists favour the invocation of insanity, as evidence bearing on the
presence or absence of mens rea. According to Morris 333 this was the status quo until
the 19th century
"But by the time of McNaghten (1843) this clear position was
frustrated by the increasing tendency of lawyers, psychiatrists, public
opinion and legislators to turn questions of evidence into matters of
substance and to transmute medical evidence about legal issues into
substantive legal rules. McNaghten was just such a substantive rule
confusing evidence for a proposition with the proposition itself'.
By far the most radical proposal has been the removal of the concept of
responsibility from the law and with it the insanity defence. These abolitionists would
have insanity considered at the sentencing stage, in deciding how to dispose of the
offender.
A variety of arguments have been put forward in favour of abolition, which
can be encapsulated within four main headings334 : Failure of administration of the tests
of insanity; Lack of practical importance of the insanity defence; The insane are not
the only offenders who should be held not responsible; The present situation is bad;
abolition would make it better.
The abolitionists claim that the administration of the insanity tests has been a
failure' because at the end of the day the jury's decision depends on either over-
identification with or alienation from the defendant'. The jury's decision will often
be largely governed by the credentials and presentation of the psychiatric experts'
who are encouraged to parade their opinions, guesses and speculations under the
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banner of scientific expertise338 . Thus insanity is a "rich man's defense" in that it
favours the wealthy who can afford the array of experts needed to mount a convincing
defence whilst discriminating against the poor who cannot afford the time of
influential experts - experts who are in short supply and whose time would be better
spent treating those who have been committed to hospital or imprisoned 339 . Because of
the above, and the fact that there is no workable distinction between responsibility and
irresponsibility, psychiatry should not frame the dividing line between the two".
Three further arguments have been advanced in favour of abolition'". Firstly, the
crucial decision to be made concerns the proper disposition of mentally abnormal
persons who commit criminal acts, and this is a matter which is better dealt with in a
direct way following conviction than indirectly during trial. Secondly, a number of
informed observers believe that it is therapeutically desirable to treat behavioural
deviants as responsible for their conduct rather than as involuntary victims playing a
sick role. Thirdly, persons channelled out of the criminal process following a finding
of insanity are not protected against administrative abuse of their rights to the same
degree that they would be if they remained within the criminal justice system.
Those in favour of abolition also stress that the defence of legal insanity is of
little practical importance. With increasing frequency, issues concerning the mental
abnormality of the offender are being taken into account after conviction rather than
before'. Another abolitionist argument is that the retention of the distinction between
those to be punished and those only to be treated is unfortunate and invidious because
it is in all cases, not only in some, that persons who do harms should be treated and
held in the interest of the public's protection. In most crimes psychical and social
determinants inhibit the capacity of the actors to control their behaviour'. The
abolitionists assert that the present situation is bad and that abolition could only make
it better'''.
...........
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The abolitionist argument has not fallen on deaf ears. Rising crime rates and
the coincident widening of the insanity defence convinced many Americans that the
two were related'''. Strict commitment criteria applied following a finding of insanity,
with the result that insane offenders, if not considered mentally ill and dangerous,
could be released within hours of acquittal. When the American public learned that
John Hinckley could be released from Saint Elizabeth's Hospital at virtually any time,
public awareness of the insanity defence changed dramatically'''. An Associated
Press-NBC newspoll in 1981 following the Hinckley verdict, showed that 70% of the
American public favoured total elimination of the insanity defence. The state
Legislatures of Idaho, Montana and Utah responded by completely abolishing the
insanity defence347 . The Supreme Courts of Montana and Idaho upheld the
constitutionality of abolishing the insanity defence and the U.S. Supreme Court
indicated that it too, would not strike down as unconstitutional, legislation that
abolished the insanity defence.
However, this is not to say that the abolitionist argument has received
unanimous support. Kadish has answered all the abolitionist arguments. He concedes
that the administration of the insanity defence is very bad indeed but scarcely the only
feature of our criminal justice system which is badly administered in practice'''.
Inefficiency and inequity are endemic to a system committed to an adversary process
but not committed to supplying the resources of legal contest to the typically
penurious vb ho make up the bulk of criminal defendants'''. The lesson of all this
v* ould not be to abandon the adversary method on that score, but to improve its
operation. Likewise with the insanity defence, improvement of its operation rather
than its abolition would seem to be the more appropriate response'''.
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To the extent that the case for abolition rests on the inequitableness and
irrationality of its administration, the very infrequency of the invocation of the
insanity defence reduces the import of the criticism 351 . The defences of necessity or
duress are invoked in a minute fraction of criminal cases, yet few would regard this as
a reason for abandoning them352 . The function of a legal defence is not measured by it
use but by its usefulness in the total framework of the criminal justice system353.
If a crime requires mere negligence then absence of an insanity defence would
leave the defendant with no defence at all, since all that is required is that the
defendant has fallen substantially below the standard of the reasonable man and this,
by definition, a McNaghten defendant has done' (except, of course, to the extent that
the subjective feature of the concept of negligence - requiring that some special
characteristics of the defendant be considered in defining the standard, as for example,
his inability to see or hear - were enlarged to embrace his special cognitive
disabilities)".
The proposal for abolition opens to the condemnation of a criminal conviction
a class of persons who, on any common sense notion of justice are beyond blaming
and ought not to be punished356 . It is true that a person adjudicated Not Guilty by
Reason of Insanity suffers a substantial social stigma but this results from the
misinterpretation placed upon the person's conduct by people in the community'. It is
not, like the conviction of the irresponsible, the paradigmatic affront to the sense of
justice in the law which consists in the deliberative act of convicting a morally
innocent person of a crime, of imposing blame when there is no occasion for it 358 .
,
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Further arguments for retaining the insanity defence are the requirement that
the decision be made by a jury, representative of the public, rather than by experts'''.
Moreover, the receipt of psychiatric input in a trial, subject to traditional adversary
procedures filters out the genuine from the fraudulent'''. The American experience of
abolition has shown that efforts to keep the insanity question out of the criminal trial
have been largely unsuccessful' with the result that psychiatric evidence has to be
heard twice, firstly, as bearing on the issue of mens rea and secondly, in deciding the
appropriate disposition. The result is that the defendant is given "two shots at the
same thing". In addition to the extra cost to the state, a defendant may be handicapped
by financial incapacity to procure psychiatric testimony for two hearings362.
More recently, the Butler Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders
rejected proposals made by the British Psychological Society and others to abolish the
special verdict363 . Two kinds of two-stage trial were proposed. According to the first,
the jury (in a trial on indictment) would find the external facts and it would then be for
the sentencer (the judge) to find what was the defendant's mental state at the time of
the act, as one of the matters bearing upon sentence. Under this system the trial would
not be concerned with the notions of guilt and responsibility except insofar as such
matters had a bearing on the appropriate measures to be taken to prevent a recurrence
of the forbidden act. The Committee felt that it would not be acceptable to remove
these questions altogether from the jury and that in theory, the proposal would render
a person involved in a fatal accident through no fault of his own, liable to detention
for life, in the same way as if he had committed murder. Such protection as he would
have would rest only on a wise use of discretion by the sentencing tribunal. The
Committee felt that sentencers would apparently be left with no guidance on the
relative importance that the community attaches to different prohibitions and some
359 LaFaye and Scott Jr. op cit p.435
360 ibid
361 See Louisell and Hazard "Insanity Defense" The Bifurcated Trial" (1961) 49 Calif.L.Rev.805 for
an insight into the operation of the bifurcated trial in California, Colorado Texas and Louisiana
362 ibid p.823
363 Report of the (Butler) Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders Cmnd 6244 op cit paras.18.10-
18.13
-75-
parts of the present law which rest particularly upon proof of intention, such as the
law of conspiracy and attempt, would become unworkable'.
The second form of the proposal the Committee felt to be less extreme: it
would allow the jury to decide the question of guilt in the first stage and hear and
pronounce on psychiatric evidence in the second stage. However, they felt' that this
makes the mistake of supposing that the question of guilt can be decided merely by
the establishment of the external facts. The defendant's state of mind, with possible
psychiatric evidence bearing upon it, necessarily arises in the first stage and cannot be
removed from it. In consequence, this form of two-stage trial would sometimes lead to
the jury having to consider the same psychiatric evidence twice: in the first stage, on
the issue of guilt in relation to the definition of the offence, and in the second stage,
on the issue of exemption from responsibility on account of mental disorder. In these
circumstances there is no advantage, and some disadvantage in separating the trial
into two stages, as was found in California when this form of trial was introduced
there.
The Committee felt that the decline in the use of the special verdict to the
point where it is scarcely used at all, did not indicate that the law need no longer
provide for total exemption from criminal responsibility for the mentally disordered
offender' and they then went on to reformulate the insanity defence.
1.6 REPORT OF THE (BUTLER) COMMITTEE ON MENTALLY
ABNORMAL OFFENDERS (1975)
In 1972 the Butler Committee embarked upon the formulation of an insanity
defence suitable for the Law Commission's Draft Criminal Code. The history of the
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insanity defence had taught them that certain requirements must be met by any
reformulated insanity defence', namely that it should
(a) avoid the use of medical terms about which there may be disputed interpretations
or whose meaning may change with the years; and
(b) be such as to allow psychiatrists to state the facts of the defendant's mental
condition without being required to pronounce on the extent of his responsibility for
his offence. Degrees of responsibility are legal, not medical concepts.
Moreover, to the extent that the question of "insanity" is to remain one for the
jury to decide the defence must
(c) avoid the use of words and expressions which may confuse the jury and
(d) be capable of being the subject of a clear direction by the judge.
The Committee reported in 1975 and recommended 3" that the jury be directed
to return a verdict of "not guilty on evidence of mental disorder" where satisfied
(1) that the defendant is not proved to have had the state of mind necessary for the
offence and where they are satisfied on the balance of probability that at the time of
the act or omission he was mentally disordered or
(2) where they are satisfied on the balance of probability that at the time he was
suffering from severe mental illness or severe subnormality.
The judge would be required not to leave (2) to the jury unless the defence was
supported by the evidence of two psychiatrists, who must be medical practitioners,
approved by an area health authority as having special experience in the diagnosis or
treatment of mental disorders (with an exception for transient states of mental
disorder).
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For the purposes of section (1), "mental disorder" means the same as it does in
section 4 of the Mental Health Act, 1959 - that is
"mental illness, arrested or incomplete development of mind,
psychopathic disorder and any other disorder or disability of mind"
The Committee stressed 369
 that "mental disorder" would not embrace transitory
states not related to other forms of mental disorder and arising solely as a consequence
of (a) the administration, mal-administration or non-administration of alcohol, drugs
or other substances, or (b) physical injury.
For the purposes of section (2), the Committee defined mental subnormality
by drawing on its meaning under section 4(2) of the Mental Health Act, 1959 as
"a state of arrested or incomplete development of mind which includes
subnormality of intelligence and is of such a nature or degree that the
patient is incapable of living an independent life or of guarding himself
against serious exploitation, or will be so incapable when of an age to
do so".
The Committee stated' that "A mental illness is severe when it has one or
more of the following characteristics:-
(a) Lasting impairment of intellectual functions shown by failure of memory,
orientation, comprehension and learning capacity.
(b) Lasting alteration of mood of such degree as to give rise to delusional appraisal of
the patient's situation, his past or his future, or that of others, or to lack of any
appraisal.
(c) Delusional beliefs, persecutory, jealous or grandiose.
(d) Abnormal perceptions associated with delusional misinterpretation of events
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(e) Thinking so disordered as to prevent reasonable appraisal of the patient's situation
or reasonable communication with others".
Finally the Committee stressed' that severe mental illness or severe
subnormality would not include psychopathic disorder, subnormality or the other
abnormal states of mind mentioned in section 4 of the Mental Health Act, nor the
transient states excluded under the Committee's proposals for section (1) of the special
verdict.
To summarize, section (1) excludes from criminal liability one who did the
prohibited act without mens rea and who is proved to have been suffering from
"mental disorder" at the time of the act. Section (2) would save from conviction one
who did the act with mens rea but who is proved to have been suffering from "severe
mental illness" or "severe subnormality" at the time of his offence.
As with every other insanity test that I have discussed, the Butler Committee
criteria are equally open to objection. Limb 1 has been criticised, firstly, on the
grounds that McNaghten's ghost will still be with us insofar as the mental disorder
must be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the intention,
foresight or knowledge required for the offence. Those varieties of mental disorder
which affect not cognition but motivation and will power would strictly fall outside
this ground for the special verdict'. Secondly, it has been pointed out that the
inclusion of psychopathic disorder within section 1 of the Mental Health Act, 1959
will be of little avail to the psychopath who will only qualify for a mental disorder
verdict in the unlikely event of his lacking mens red'.
It is not clear that the Butler Committee's insanity defence will meet
requirement (d)" that is, that it be capable of being the subject of a clear direction by
the judge. In fact the Butler test may be far from clear to the doctors who are required
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to testify as to the accused's mental state. Although "severe subnormality" is already
defined in section 4(2) of the Mental Health Act, 1959 the term "severe mental
illness" is not a term of art in law or psychiatry 375 . The Mental Health Act does not
provide a definition of mental illness and the criteria Butler list for "severity" increase
the likelihood of disagreement among experts. If the practical effect of the Butler
formula is that medical witnesses are to be entrusted with the decision as to what
constitutes mental illness, then the Butler Committee defence will be greeted with the
same criticism as the Durham rule was. In fact the Medical Advisory Committee of
Broadmoor Hospital has rejected the definition altogether, suggesting that "the
psychiatric disorder in this context is something which the jury should decide'''.
It is noteworthy that in the Butler formulation there is no requirement of causal
connection, as the Committee thought that the disorders specified are of such severity
that a causal connection can safely be presumed. Treating insanity as a status
exempting from responsibility signals a return to the policy of the eighteenth century
and earlier, when the mentally disordered were regarded as a category outside the
bounds of responsibility like children under ten are today'. Kenny points out two bad
effects of this approach to insanity'''. On the one hand, it gives a certified mental
patient a licence which is not given to others (he knows that there are certain things
which he may do without being held criminally responsible, while all others not of the
same status will be held responsible). On the other hand, it attaches a stigma to
insanity by assuming, without any need of proof, that insanity, as such, predisposes to
criminal action. The concern here is a resurfacing of the age-old conflict between
lawyers and psychiatrists. For the former the accused might be suffering from a severe
mental illness, but still retain a residue of responsibility for his actions; for the latter,
the medical condition explains all the accused's actions'''. Although the Butler
approach avoids the criticism that was directed at Durham's "product test", the Law
Commission felt that a requirement of causal connection is necessary and in Clause
_.._
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35(2) of the Draft Criminal Code provides that the mental disorder verdict does not
apply if the court or jury is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offence was not
attributable to the severe mental disorder. As Norrie points out "In this apparentlli,
innocuous clause, there lurks the germ of the old law psychiatry conf:ct.
unresolvedjand] the possibility. .of an open power struggle in the courts between
lawyers and psychiatrists remain[s]"''.
The Butler Committee point out that the phrase "arrested or incomplete
development of mind" in section 4 of the Mental Health Act, 1959 should be wide
enough to cover not only all dangerous mentally handicapped people but also persons
of limited intelligence who might otherwise gain an outright acquittal. Unfortunately
the Committee do not specify whether the danger of a person repeating the offence is
part of the definition of mental subnormality or whether limited intelligence by itself
is sufficient to bring a person within this definition'. Similarly the Conunittee do not
specify the relevance of the danger of recurrence when they recommend that expressly
excluded from the special verdict should be any case in which the mental disorder is a
transient state, not related to other forms of mental disorder, and caused by physical
injury or by the abuse of alcohol, drugs or other substances but that "all other cases
now regarded as non-insane automatism would be left to fall under the special
verdict'''. Whilst expressing a wish to exclude from their mental disorder verdict a
person who had failed to take insulin, who was concussed or who had unintentionally
become intoxicated', they fail to discuss the issues of somnambulism, fainting and
strokes which, it appears, may still result in a mental disorder verdict. In this respect
the Commission seem to have fallen short of their aim of clarifying the distinction
between the special verdict and the existing law on non-insane automatism'.
The enactment of the Mental Health Act, 1983 has posed problems for the
Butler Committee formulation. Severe subnormality has now given way to severe
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mental impairment. Now "arrested or incomplete development of mind" must also be
"associated with abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct" 385 . Two
meanings of this phrase might cause confusion. In any event the Draft Criminal Code
Bill contains some 1 udical alterations. The Code requires a finding of "severe mental
illness" or "severe mental handicap" under section (1). The Code has defined severe
mental handicap as
"a state of arrested or incomplete development of mind which includes
severe impairment of intelligence and social functioning".
In Clause 34 of the Code Bill "mental disorder" is defined as
"severe mental illness, arrested or incomplete development of mind, or
a state of automatism (not resulting only from intoxication) which is a
feature of disorder, whether organic or functional and whether
continuing or recurring, that may cause a similar state on another
occasion".
In light of the history of the insanity defence it should not be assumed that the
Draft Criminal Code definition will fare any better than previous tests of insanity. It
will be impossible for the prosecution to prove that the crime was unattributable to the
mental disorder. Thus, the decision as to responsibility will hinge on the expert's
testimony of severe mental illness or severe mental handicap, a move which proved
fatal to the Durham Rule.
1.7 CONCLUSION
The above discussion has shown the impossibility of formulating a test of
insanity that will prove satisfactory to all. As early as 1896 the Criminal
Responsibility Committee of the Medico Psychological Association reported that
385 E.Griew op cit p.57
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"the framing and answering of new abstract questions [on the criminal
responsibility of the insane], if it could be brought about, would be but
the beginning of a new controversy and of new heart-burnings" 386 .
Similarly, the Gowers Commission concluded in 1953
"that it is not possible to define with any precision the state of mind
which should exempt an insane person from responsibility".
These observations were proved correct as the irresistible impulse rule, the
product test and the A.L.I.'s test were beleaguered by criticism. The controversy did
not stem exclusively from the wording of the defence but involved a wide range of
social issues, for example, the decision who should be held responsible to the law and
liable to punishment (or to the death penalty as the case may be) and who should be
excused and receive treatment (or be released where this applies). As is evident from
the discussion of Durham and irresistible impulse above, it also involved the issue of
whether law or medicine should decide the dividing line between responsibility and
irresponsibility.
In England much of the controversy over the McNaghten Rules stemmed not
from "any defect in themselves but the fact that. .persons who [were] totally
irresponsible [were] rarely at large, and if at large, [were] rarely put on trial: persons
of diminished responsibility [were] frequently put on trial, and when they [were]
convicted and sentenced to death, it [was] erroneously supposed that the McNaghten
Rules [had] failed in their purpose'. This is a criticism whose import has been
curtailed by the operation of diminished responsibility in English law since the
Homicide Act, 1957 which is premised on the notion of partial or lesser responsibility
when the accused was suffering from mental abnormality.
-
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Wexler suggests3" that public distrust of the insanity defence today stems
"almost exclusively" from its application in homicide cases'. Similarly Professor
Norval Morris claims that "the insane killer" is "at the heart of the argument about the
special defence" 390 .
Other observers feel that the polemic stems from the dispositional
consequences attached to the insanity defence. This view is lent weight by the
American controversy over the insanity defence, whose consequence was often
immediate release unless mentally ill and dangerous. Hence the words of an American
commentator
"The public's concern is less with ascertaining whether blame properly
can be assigned to a particular defendant than with determining when
he will get out. And the delusion of law professionals to the contrary
notwithstanding, it is the public's concern that drives the debate on
possible changes in the insanity defense"391.
In the United States the focus of concern was whether insane defendants were
released from custody before they had paid for their crime. In England and Ireland the
controversy has been fuelled by the mandatory indefinite committal of insanity
acquittees who are neither insane nor dangerous. English Parliament remedied the
situation somewhat in 1957 by providing a partial defence of diminished
responsibility for mentally abnormal murderers. The result of a successful plea of
diminished responsibility is a manslaughter conviction to which are attached wide
methods of disposal. In 1991 English Parliament went further by enacting the
Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act which extended these
discretionary disposal consequences to offenders found insane under the McNaghten
Rules, in respect of offences whose sentence is not fixed. This piece of legislation,
which has been anticipated as the solution to the McNaghten dilemma, is likely to
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revive the United States polemic on English territory. The first case under the new act
was reported under the provocative headline "'Drink Mad' Attacker Walks Free'.
The defendant was a 36-year-old Petty Officer who suffered from serious brain
damage such that small amounts of alcohol could motivate him without warning to
dangerous acts of violence. The jury found him not guilty of attempted rape on the
grounds of insanity and Auld J. discharged him.
Mackay and Kearns' research on the first cases dealt with under the 1991 Act
has revealed the imposition of a supervision and treatment order in disposing of a
defendant who pleaded somnambulism to a charge of attempted murder'''. With no
legal sanctions available to deal with an offender who does not comply with treatment
or the conditions of the order"' there is huge potential for public outrage.
On the other hand the failure of the Act to provide for discretionary disposal
consequences in murder cases and insanity defences at Magistrates Court level'
makes this piece of legislation a very half-hearted measure. As a result of the latter
failure, unconditional liberation is the likely result of a successful insanity defence at
Magistrates Court lever'. This view is reinforced by the provision that in choosing
between orders for guardianship, supervision and treatment and absolute discharge the
court must select that which "in all the circumstances of the case is the most suitable
means of dealing" with the defendant but no similar requirement governs the making
of a hospital order. The implication is that a court may make an admission order even
though it does not think such an order to be the most suitable disposition, for example,
where a special verdict has been returned in respect of an atrocious attempted murder
by a defendant whose sanity is restored by the time of trial but whose outright release
might provoke public outrage'''. This half-heartedness is also evident in the absence
392 The Daily Telegraph, 15 Jan.1992
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of any provision allowing for appeal against a decision of the Crown Court to choose
one disposition rather than another. I have already discussed the failure to surrender
any degree of sovereignty to the medical profession, by the requirement of medical
evidence under section 1(1) which is to have no binding force'.
Ireland has enacted no such legislation amending the mandatory consequence
of indefinite committal to the state mental hospital, release being at the Government s
pleasure. A defence of diminished responsibility would abate the controversy which
surrounds the insanity defence if there is truth in the view that it stems from acquittals
by reason of insanity in murder cases. If the polemic stems from where the dividing
line between responsibility and irresponsibility should be drawn, then diminished
responsibility, which is premised on the notion of partial responsibility would
alleviate the controversy where murder is concerned. There have been hints by a
succession of Irish Governments since 1991 that an Irish defence of diminished
responsibility is imminent. For the moment an examination of the defence of
diminished responsibility is in order, to ascertain whether it has been successful in
satisfactorily disposing of mentally abnormal murderers and alleviating the
controversy over the McNaghten Rules.
398 E.Baker op cit p.86
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CHAPTER TWO
THE HOMICIDE ACT, 1957 AND THE DEFENCE OF DIMINISHED
RESPONSIBILITY IN ENGLISH LAW
"This doctrine, NN hich is now firmly established, has, in the view of the
Criminal Authorities, worked satisfactorily and has the effect of
preventing convictions of murder in the technical sense and consequent
sentences of death where the prisoners are abnormal from a mental
aspect, and tends greatly to the side of mercy'.
2.1 THE ORIGIN OF THE ENGLISH DEFENCE OF DIMINISHED
RESPONSIBILITY
Although a feature of ancient Irish and Germanic law, Roman law' and Dutch
law of the middle aues401, diminished responsibility is relatively novel in En glish law.
In this Chapter, I will trace its development in Scottish law, from which it was
borrowed in 1957. (English Parliament had already gone half-way in 1922 by
adopting a partial defence of infanticide, restricted to women who killed their
children). By examining the Parliamentary debates which preceded the Homicide Act.
1957, I will show that it was hastily adopted to placate those M.Ps. who advocated the
abolition of capital punishment and that lack of discussion of the defence would later
lead to uncertainty as to its limits, with virtually the only guide-lines coming from
Scottish law. The end result was that the English Judiciary was placed in the difficult
position of having to legislate which mental abnormalities would fall within the
defence of diminished responsibility (and vica versa, which would not), a decision
which ought to have been taken by the draughtsmen and Parliamentarians. In this
Chapter I will examine the decision to admit irresistible impulse, epilepsy and other
Evidence from the Scottish Crown Agent to the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (1949-
53) Cmd 8932 para.383
400 M.Zeegers "Diminished Responsibility: A Logical, Workable and Essential Concept" (1981) 4
Intl.J.Law and Psychiat.433 pp.435 & 436
401 N.Walker Crime and Insanity in England Vol.1 (Edinburgh, 1968) p.139 shows that the Scottish
defence of diminished responsibility was borrowed from Dutch law.
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states traditionally viewed as falling within the defence of automatism, and pre-
menstrual tension within the scope of the diminished responsibility plea and the
limitations placed on the right to plead mental abnormality arising from intoxication.
This will show that diminished responsibility has been a satisfactory solution to the
limitations of the McNaghten Rules and that it has abated the medico/legal conflict at
the heart of the controversy over the insanity defence.
As stated, the English defence of diminished responsibility has its roots in
Scottish law where it was developed in order to avoid the consequences of the death
penalty. In Scotland the defence made its first appearance in Sir George MacKenzie's
The Laws and Customs of Scotland in Matters Criminal (1674) where he claimed that
"..since the law grants a total impunity to such as are absolutely furious
therefore it should by the rule of proportions lessen and moderate the
punishments of such, as though they are not absolutely mad yet are
Hypochondrick and Melancholy to such a degree, that it clouds their
reason""2.
The earliest cases of diminished responsibility were non-capital charges where
the court imposed a reduced sentence in view of the accused's mental condition'. In
capital cases mental weakness could be taken into account only by way of the Royal
prerogative of mercy'. Mitigation of punishment because of partial insanity was in
stark contrast to the English law on the subject, as stated by Hale:
"There is a partial insanity of mind. .some persons, that have a
competent use of reason in respect of some subjects, are yet under a
particular dementia in respect of some particular discourses, subjects or
applications; or else it is partial in respect of degrees; and this is the
condition of very many, especially melancholy persons, who for the
most part discover their defect in excessive fears or griefs, and yet are
402 ibid
403 G.H.Gordon The Criminal Law of Scotland (2nd ed) (Edinburgh, 1978) p.38I
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not wholly destitute of the use of reason; and this partial insanity seems
not to excuse them in the committing of any offence for its matter
capital; for doubtless most persons, that are felons of themselves, and
others are under a degree of partial insanity when they commit these
offences. .The best measure that I can think of is this; such a person as
labouring under melancholy distempers hath yet ordinarily as great
understanding as ordinarily a child of fourteen years hath, is such a
person as may be guilty of treason or felony'''.
It was not until the decision in Dingwall' that the practice was established of
returning a verdict of culpable homicide rather than murder, in those cases in which
responsibility was thought to be diminished. Dingwall was tried for the murder of his
wife by stabbing her with a knife in the arm and side. "Habitually and irreclaimably
addicted to drinking", he committed the fatal deed after his wife had hidden a pint
bottle of whiskey and some money from him, to prevent him from getting more
alcohol. Lord Deas pointed out to the jury that
"if [they] believed that the prisoner, when he committed the [murder of
his wife], had sufficient mental capacity to know, and did know, that
the act was contrary to the law, and punishable by the law, it would be
their duty to convict him' but he "could not say that it was beyond
the province of the jury to find a verdict of culpable homicide if they
thought that was the nature of the offence"".
In deciding whether to convict the accused of culpable homicide rather than
murder, the relevant considerations were
1. the unpremeditated and sudden nature of the attack;
405 Hale Historia Placitorum Coronae, Vol.1 (London 1736), p.30
406 (1867) 5 Irv.466
407 ibid pp.475 & 476
4 8 ibid p.479
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2. the prisoner's habitual kindness to his wife; of which there could be no doubt when
drink did not interfere;
3. that there was only one stab or blow; this while not perhaps like what an insane
man would have done, was favourable for the prisoner in other respects;
4. that the prisoner appeared not only to have been peculiar in his mental constitution,
but to have had his mind weakened by successive attacks of disease. It seemed highly
probable that he had had a stroke of the sun in India, and that his subsequent fits were
of an epileptic nature. There could be no doubt that he had had repeated attacks of
delirium tremens, and if weakness of mind could be an element in any case in the
question between murder and culpable homicide, it seemed difficult to exclude that
element here409.
Dingwall was found guilty of culpable homicide and sentenced to ten years'
penal servitude. It should be noted that Lord Deas did not regard the accused's mental
weakness as the only basis for a verdict of diminished responsibility; Rather, it was
one of a number of grounds which he thought might justify such a verdict' - a view
which he continued to espouse until his retirement in 1887 4 ". A culpable homicide
verdict obviated any risk of a recommendation to mercy being rejected and also left
the treatment of the accused in the hands of the judge who could impose what he
considered to be a suitable sentence'''.
Thus the doctrine of diminished responsibility took 193 years come to fruition,
a delay which Dr.Wright holds its creator, MacKenzie, partly responsible for'. The
object of punishment in early days was primarily retribution and any interference with
the revenge due to the lieges (higher Lords) was unlikely to be met with kindly. (The
accused had to suffer the full penalty as a lesser penalty would not have appeased the
wrath of the lieges at the heinousness of the crime"). MacKenzie was suggesting that
409 ibid
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punishment be moderated without explaining that the quality of the act was seriously
to be questioned when the accused suffered from mental illness'''. Part of the fault
may also lie with the Scottish jurists Hume and Alison, neither of whom found
MacKenzie's suggestion acceptable and who went to great lengths to ensure that there
were only two classes of accused - the sane and the insane'. One must also bear in
mind the absence of medical knowledge of the working of the brain and its disorders
and the court, charged with the protection of society, was not willing to show too
much compassion towards the accused lest it be accused of emotionalism'.
Dr.Wright has ventured to suggest that in Somerville (1704) and Spence
(1747) the court was very near to enunciating the doctrine and that had there been
suitable cases following close upon their heels, it is doubtful whether Scotland would
have had to wait until Dingwall before the unveiling of her humane doctrine'''. The
spirit of the doctrine had been living and there for any to take up and consider its
possible application in practice'. Erskine admitted its existence when he said that the
lesser degrees of fatuity saved from the poena ordinaria but he too, focused attention
upon the moderation of punishment without linking it to a reduction in the quality of
the crime'. Dr.Wright feels 421
 that the doctrine was beginning to make itself felt as
the nineteenth century approached but in Kinloch (1795) the Lord Advocate, Dundas,
rejected this third category of accused - neither sane nor absolutely furious. Alison
hesitantly acknowledged the lessening of responsibility but he was too closely allied
to Hume to be able to unfetter his mind of the requirement of absolute alienation of
reason422 . At this point in time, a liberal exercise of the Royal prerogative of mercy
permitted the court to adopt a strict interpretation of the kind of insanity which
excused the prisoner and Dr.Wright considers that this also contributed to the delay in
launching the doctrine"•
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To some it was disappointing that such an important case as Dingwall had
been heard on circuit and when Tielie 424 was tried for murder neither the
prosecution nor the defence saw fit to refer Lord Ardmillan to Dingwall'. It was ,A)t
to be long, however, before the opportunity arose again and this time the court
ensured that the doctrine was accepted fully as part of the criminal law of Scotland.
John McLean's case' was certified after the jury found him guilty, with a
recommendation to mercy on account of his weak intellect. McLean's medical history
showed a stay of two years in a lunatic asylum and for more than a year he had been
in the refractory ward. It may be that the trial judge (Lord Moncrieff) had found
himself unable to direct the jury on the lines of diminished responsibility as the charge
was theft and the doctrine had been applied in a case of murder only. The court
consisted of the Lord Justice-Clerk, Lord Deas, Lord Young and Lord Craighill. Lord
Deas had no doubt that it was proper for the court to take into consideration, in
awarding sentence, the mental weakness of the accused, saying
"I am of opinion that, without being insane in the legal sense, so as not
to be amenable to punishment, a prisoner may yet labour under that
degree of weakness of intellect or mental infirmity which may make it
both right and legal to take that state of mind into account, not only in
awarding the punishment, but in some cases, even in considering
within what category of offences the crime shall be held to fall"427.
Lord Deas' example was followed by his fellow judges. In several of the cases
in which this direction was given there was evidence of a weakness of the mind by
alcoholism'. Lord McLaren also considered the doctrine of diminished responsibility
..-.......
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to be relevant in a case of child murder 429 . The same judge in H.M. Advocate v
Robert Smith' considered that the judge would be justified in giving effect to the
defence if they found that the accused's mind had become so unhinged by a long
course of verbal persecution that he had finally reacted to a trivial insult by shooting
his tormentors. The Scottish defence of diminished responsibility was restricted to
some debility amounting to brain disease in Aitken'. By 1909, if not earlier, the
phrase "diminished responsibility" was being used by judges and by the 1930's the
stage had been reached at which the defence of insanity was rarely offered in a
Scottish court to a charge of murder 432 . Moreover, the Lord Advocate seems to have
been willing to accept medical evidence of diminished responsibility to reduce the
charge itself to culpable homicide". Thus, almost all the cases where the issue figured
at trial were those in which the Lord Advocate's Crown Office had not been satisfied
that responsibility had been diminished'''.
Despite the finding of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (1949-
53) that the Scottish defence of diminished responsibility worked welr, it was not
introduced into English law until 1957. Given its creation in Scotland in 1867, the
adoption of diminished responsibility into English law was a very lengthy process. By
tracing this process it will be seen that, although hastily adopted in 1957 to placate the
opponents of the death penalty, England had ample experience of the defence of
diminished responsibility in the form of the Infanticide Acts of 1922 and 1938 and the
evidence of its satisfactory operation in Scottish law. I will now trace the tentative
steps towards creating the defence which were taken in the Infanticide Acts of 1922
and 1938, prior to the adoption of a full defence of diminished responsibility via the
Homicide Act, 1957.
,
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2.2 THE INTRODUCTION OF THE DEFENCE OF DIMINISHED
RESPONSIBILITY INTO ENGLISH LAW.
2.2.1 Infanticide
English law's first concession to the Scottish practice of reducing murder to
manslaughter on evidence of mental unsoundness, was the introduction of the partial
defence of infanticide in 1922. By tracing the history of this defence I will show its
similarities with diminished responsibility in Scotland and how the adoption of a full
defence of diminished responsibility in English law was just a short step away.
Throughout the nineteenth century determined efforts were made to
circumvent the death penalty in cases of child-murder by women, with the last
execution for this crime occurring in 1849. The insanity defence played a significant
role in the salvation of this class of female murderer from the damnation of the death
penalty. As I have shown in Chapter One, medical evidence of an irresistible impulse,
which was so fervently resisted by the judiciary, was often taken seriously in the case
of women who had killed their children'. Medical theories of puerperal and
lactational insanity were openly embraced by the courts in an endeavour to exculpate
these women, as occurred in Wilson (1864). At the trial of Eliza Dare s for the
attempted drowning of her daughter, Lord Justice Brett stated that "it was a mistake to
suppose that, in order to satisfy a jury of insanity, scientific evidence must be
adduced. If the evidence of facts were such as to indicate an unsound state of mind
that was quite sufficient" and very often verdicts of insanity were returned where its
only evidence was in the commission of the deed itself, particularly where the killing
was accompanied by circumstances of poverty or other hardship439.
The Home Secretary's mercy was a final safeguard against the death penalty
and it is at this point that parallels with the Scottish practice begin. According to Sir
436 See section 1.2, above
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George Grey's evidence to the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment of 1866,
Home Secretaries were aware that public opinion was against hanging for infanticide:
"I do not think that it would be possible for any one, consistently with
public opinion, which must have a great influence in these matters, to
carry the sentence in these cases into effect; and that, I believe, is the
opinion of almost every person who tries them'''.
Reprieves were granted to women like Maria Clarke (1851) and Mrs Maria
Chitty44
 where circumstances of poverty had prevailed at the time they had killed
their children. Even in as notorious a case as that of Celestina Somner, "the Brighton
murderess", the Home Secretary issued a reprieve after she had been found guilty of
the murder of her ten-year-old stepdaughter'.
By the time the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment of 1866 reported,
infanticide had emerged as an issue of national importance in England'. This
Behlmer attributes to four factors': Firstly, that child-murder had reached such
epidemic proportions by the 1860's as to demand attention from a public normally
disposed to ignore unpleasant social realities. Secondly, that disturbing knowledge of
the practice of child-murder as a custom in British India broke upon the popular
consciousness just when medical journals were starting to decry domestic infanticide.
The County Coroners Act of 1860 was followed by a 17% increase in the amount of
money spent on inquests in England and Wales and this corresponded with a 31%
increase in the number of verdicts of murder returned by coroners' juries. Fourthly,
greater receptiveness to domestic subjects of a sensational nature during a time of
peace ("peace must have offered dull reading") and increased circulation of the
London dailies meant that news of infanticide could make a greater impact on the
national consciousness.
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Despite the perceived scale of infanticide, the evidence given before the Royal
Commission on Capital Punishment of 1866 showed that the law had completely
broken down in relation to child-murder". Shee J. spoke of "the utter and hopeless
failure of the existing theory of the law of murder as respects infanticide"'; Lord
Cranworth stated that infanticide was "practically never" treated as murder";
Bramwell B. had tried nine cases of infanticide and in eight of them the prisoner was
either acquitted or found guilty of concealment of birth (a lesser alternative verdict)
and in one exception the jury found the prisoner guilty of manslaughter'. Lord
Wensleydale had had a great number of cases of infanticide but never a conviction as
"the woman always escaped"' (a plot, which evidence before the Royal Commission
shows that the judges were conspirators to). Keating J. deposed "[i]t is in vain that
Judges lay down the law and point out the strength of the evidence, as they are bound
to do, juries wholly disregard them, and eagerly adopt the wildest suggestions which
the ingenuity of counsel can furnish. .Juries will not convict whilst infanticide is
punished capitally" 45° and in similar vein, Byles J. thought that practically every case
of concealment of birth was in fact a case of infanticide, a crime which had greatly
increased and was of daily occurrence'.
Some explanations were offered for this reluctance to convict infanticidal
mothers. According to Blackburn J. "the whole sympathies of everyone seem to me
against the law which treats this crime as not different from other murders'''. Some
witnesses were of the opinion that child murder was not as heinous as other forms of
murder. A child could not be regarded in the same light as an adult; the loss to the
child could not be estimated. The prevailing view was that the killing of a child by its
mother did not create the same feeling of alarm in society as other forms of murder
445 D.Seabome Davies "Child-Killing in English Law" (1937) 1 M.L.R.203 p.217. For the sake of
convenience I treat the evidence before the 1866 Commission in substantially the same manner and
order as Seaborne Davies does in this article.
446 Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 1866 op cit p.628
447 ibid p.4
448 D.Seaborne Davies op cit p.217
449 Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 1866 op cit p.49
450 ibid p.625
451 ibid p.627
452 ibid p.624
-96-
did and public opinion, consequently, did not insist upon the death sentence as a
deterrent. The general opinion was that the common motive of hiding the shame of an
illegitimate birth lessened the heinousness of the crime and that the execution of the
law in its full severity would be barbarous. There was a widespread realisation that
bad economic conditions frequently led to the commission of these crimes and that the
malice was generally less in this class of murder because of the general state of health
and mind of the perpetrators of them.
The judges' view was that the "solemn mockery" of the law, which compelled
them to pass the death sentence where it would never be carried out, contributed to
reduce the deterrent value of capital punishment and it was widely believed that the
breakdown of the law was responsible for the perceived increase in the number of
child murders. A minority of members recommended that infanticidal mothers be
dealt with by giving jurors the power to bring in a verdict of "guilty of murder" with
"extenuating circumstances". Keating J. would have allowed the jury to decide
between capital and non-capital cases"; Sir Morduant Wells would have restricted
this power to cases of infanticide' with the effect being to reduce murder to culpable
homicide as in Scotland 455 . However, the other proponents of this jury discretion were
vague and unspecific and gave no indication that mental unsoundness should be a pre-
requisite to this finding nor that the verdict of murder should be reduced to some
lesser charge. The majority view was that this discretion would be better vested in the
judges as juries would almost always find the accused guilty with extenuating
circumstances rather than guilty of murder whose possible consequence was the death
penalty.
As a result the Royal Commission recommended' that an act should be
passed "making it an offence - unlawfully and maliciously to inflict grievous bodily
harm or serious injury upon a child during its birth, or within seven days afterwards,
in case such a child has subsequently died. No proof that the child was completely
453 ibid p.625
454 ibid pp.468 & 469
455 ibid p.469
456 ibid p.1
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born alive should be required". They objected to concealment of birth being an
alternative verdict on an indictment of murder and felt that the accused should not be
entitled to be acquitted on trial for the new offence, or for concealment if it should be
proved that the offence amounted to murder or manslaughter. Finally, they
recommended restoration of the judicial power to record the death sentence (which
had been abolished by the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861). However no action
was taken to implement these recommendations.
In 1872 the Homicide Law Amendment Bill provided that if a woman
murdered her child "at or soon after birth, and whilst deprived of her ordinary power
of self-control by the physical effects of its birth", the trial judge in his discretion
could sentence her to penal servitude for any term of not less than five years' s '. The
first attempt to have infanticide treated like manslaughter (and hence like the more
recent Scottish defence of diminished responsibility) occurred when the above bill
was reintroduced in 1874. Section 29(3) stated "[c]riminal homicide is manslaughter
and not murder..[i]f the person whose death is caused is the child of the person who
causes it, and if the act by which death is caused is done whilst such last-mentioned
person, though not within the provisions of section 24 [which dealt with the
exemptive effects of insanity] is deprived of the power of self-control by any disease
or state of mind or body produced by bearing the child whose death is caused's.
Concurrently with the Homicide Law (Amendment) Bill another group of
members was attempting to pass an Infanticide Law Amendment Bill introduced in
1873 and 1874, which in its amended form proposed that concealment of birth should
be repealed as an alternative on an indictment of murder and that a new felony should
be created to meet the case of a mother maliciously wounding or inflicting grievous
bodily harm upon her child during or immediately after its birth, punishable with
penal servitude for a term not exceeding ten years or with imprisonment for a term not
exceeding two years'.
457 B.P.P.1872, Vol.ii p.247
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Both bills were referred to a Select Committee in 1874. Stephen justified
according the mitigating effects of provocation to infanticide by reminding the
witnesses of the practical impossibility of getting a jury to convict of infanticide when
occurring at the time of the birth and by claiming that "a woman in that state is
entitled to some kind of indulgence to human weakness'°. Although Baron Bramwell
praised section 29(3) as "a very excellent one", Cockburn L.C.J. demurred to the
failure of the section to deal with child killing by omission'''. Blackburn J. appeared
to favour the Infanticide Bill over Stephen's section 29(3) 463 . He too, objected to the
latter's failure to deal with child killing by omission, where it could not be proved that
the mother had done violence to the child'. He also protested at the treatment of this
provision in a clause altering the law of murder, instead of making it a separate
enactment'''. This approach appears to reveal a bias on the part of Blackburn J. in
favour of according infanticide the status of a substantive offence as opposed to a
defence to a charge of murder. Stephen countered by saying "I should look with great
jealousy on any attempt to make a special offence, which is a kind of exception out of
a major offence"'. He did not like "a thing to be at once murder and something else
for which you can try a person if you are so disposed"' and felt that the bill's
approach was preferable: in these circumstances "the crime is extenuated"468.
Following the objection to partial codification expressed by the Select
Committee469, Stephen J. began preparing the Criminal Code (Indictable Offences)
Bill, 18784". However, Blackburn J. had his way when Stephen J's. provision on
infanticide, section 138, was deleted and replaced by sections 185 and 186471 . The first
declared that every woman should be guilty of an indictable offence punishable with
penal servitude for life, who, being with child and about to be delivered, with the
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intent that the child should not live, neglected to provide reasonable assistance in the
delivery, if the child died immediately before, during, or shortly after birth, unless she
proved that such death was not caused either by such neglect or by any wrongful act
to which she was a party. The second created a similar, but minor offence punish“ble
with seven years' penal servitude, in which the omission to obtain assistance was
connected with an intent to conceal the fact of her having a child and which resulted
either in the death of, or permanent injury to the child'. One of the Commissioners'
stated reasons for substituting sections 185 and 186 was their belief that these new
provisions would often afford a means of punishing child-murder where there would
be practical difficulty in obtaining a conviction of murder because of the necessity of
proof of live-birth'. The Criminal Code of 1878 was consigned to the Parliamentary
shelves where it died a dusty death.
In 1880 another Criminal Code Bill was introduced by a group of private
members which proposed that a woman who intentionally did an unlawful act from
which the death of her child resulted, either in the act of birth or immediately
thereafter, being at the time deprived of her self-control by reason of physical or
mental suffering or distress, should be punished as for manslaughter and that proof of
live-birth was not to be necessary for conviction, the proof of dead-birth being placed
on the woman. Bodily harm inflicted on the child within fourteen days of birth by its
mother in such circumstances was to be punishable, if it resulted in death, by a
maximum term of twenty years' penal servitude'.
That amelioration of the legal position with regard to infanticidal women
remained a pressing concern was demonstrated in 1908, when Mr.George Greenwood
introduced a Law of Murder Amendment Bill "to carry out the recommendations of
the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1866". It proposed to divide murder
into two classes and specifically provided that no woman was to be indicted for
killing her child at birth or within one month thereafter, but a woman who maliciously
inflicted serious injury upon her child during that period, resulting in death; was to be
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guilty of an indictable offence punishable with penal servitude, imprisonment, or
detention during H.M's. pleasure".
At the committee stage of the Children Bill, 1908 the Lord Chancellor, Lord
Lorebum, moved to insert a clause to the effect that "where a woman is convicted of
the murder of her infant and that child was under the age of one year, the Court may,
in lieu of passing a sentence of death, sentence her to penal servitude for life or any
less punishment" 476 . His main argument in support of it was that it would avoid the
"solemn mockery" of pronouncing the death sentence in cases where it would not be
carried out, a practice which was inhuman and contrary to public opinion'. He
compared the Scottish position where a verdict of culpable homicide was returned in
this kind of case, with the English position where juries took refuge in verdicts of
concealment of birth', presumably to illustrate that the position in Scotland was
preferable, although adoption of diminished responsibility in its entirety does not
seem to have occurred to him. In his opinion the English practice and the refusal of
witnesses to give evidence in these cases, obstructed the administration of justice in
England'. However, the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Alverstone, doubted the propriety
of dealing with infanticide within the Children Bill which related to the protection of
children480 , envisaging that the clause as it stood would lead to an increase in the worst
kind of child murders'. His main objection was that this discretion should be left to
the Executive rather than be vested in the Judiciary482. The result would be "hanging
judges and non-hanging judges" 483 . The clash between the two lawyers prompted the
Bishop of Southwark to suggest that if the Lord Chief Justice did not like the Lord
Chancellor's proposal he should take some other action himself'''.
475 B.P.P.1908, Vol.ii p.74; B.P.P. 1909, Vol.iii p.426
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Thus Lord Alverstone was more or less trapped into introducing a bill of his
own', the Child Murder (Record of Sentence of Death) Bill, 1909. His bill would
have restored the judges' discretion to record the death sentence in cases of child
murder'. Lord Lorebum objected on the ground that the bill would make no
difference to the present state of the law'''. The death penalty would still hang over
the prisoner unless the prerogative of mercy was exercised', the only difference
being that the "sad pageant" of passing the death sentence in open court would be
dispensed with489 . Consequently, the same influences would continue to operate on
witnesses and juries, with the knowledge that capital punishment remained'. In
committee, Lord James who could find "no cause for enthusiastic support of the
Bill'', moved an amendment to provide that if a mother who had not recovered from
the effects of child-birth killed her infant, the judge could direct the jury that they
might acquit of murder and convict of manslaughter'''. Lord Alverstone surrendered
and accepted this amendment493 . Lord Ashbourne then moved an amendment which,
in addition to the disturbances of childbirth, would take account of such circumstances
as the desertion of the father, expulsion from her family, unemployment, sickness and
destitution'''. In such cases the judges could direct a verdict of manslaughter if they
considered that course proper, having regard to all the circumstances of the case. Lord
Alverstone objected to vesting such a wide discretion in the judges 495 , but Lords
Loreburn496
 and James" agreed with the substance of the amendment, the latter
remarking that, in fact, the judges did exercise such discretion as they advised the
Home Office on all questions of reprieve498 . The amendment was withdrawn for
reconsideration before the report stage and that was the last that was heard of it. The
bill finally reached the Commons in July, when they were already in difficulties with
485 N.Walker op cit p.130
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their timetable and it was probably a lack of Parliamentary time which prevented it
from proceeding further'.
Thirteen years later Mr.Arthur Henderson, secretary of the Labour Party,
introduced the Child Murder (Trial) Bill' which closely resembled its predecessor of
1909. However this bill left it open to the jury to bring in a verdict of manslaughter
instead of murder (whenever evidence was given that at the time of the killing the
woman "had not recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child") instead of
leaving it to the judge's discretion whether or not to leave this decision to them. In the
House of Lords Lord Phillimore expressed the view that the earlier proposals on
infanticide had approached the problem in the wrong way". He stated that the judges
felt a strong aversion to the placement of this issue in their hands, being of the view
that it was for the jury, under proper direction, to find the crime and for the judge to
award the proper punishment".
Although it was no wider than the principle on which the Home Secretary was
using the prerogative of mercy"' the Lord Chancellor, Lord Birkenhead, condemned it
as "almost terrifying" in its lack of particularity'. He warned that the provision might
appear to reflect on the jury's right to return a manslaughter verdict in any case and
objected to the absence of a time limit on the operation of the defence; a woman might
not recover from the physical consequences of giving birth to a child for as many as
nine years'. Finally, there was nothing to connect the fact that the woman had not
recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child with the commission of the
offence', with no requirement that her will power, judgment of right and wrong or
capacity of judging right from wrong should be impaired'''.
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As a result he moved an amendment"' which he had drafted and which had the
approval of the D.P.P. and the law officers of the Crown, which restricted the scope of
the bill to those cases "where a woman unlawfully by any direct means intentionally
causes the death of her newly born child, but at the time. .had not fully recovered from
the effect of giving birth to such child, and by reason thereof the balance of her mind
was disturbed". In such cases the jury were enabled to find her guilty of infanticide,
for which the woman could be sentenced as if she were guilty of manslaughter.
Following objections from Lords Parmoor' and Phillimore 51° the bill was amended
and the resulting Infanticide Act, 1922 ran
"Where a woman by any wilful act or omission causes the death of her
newly-born child, but at the time of the act or omission she had not
fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to such child, and by
reason thereof the balance of her mind was then disturbed, she shall,
notwithstanding that the circumstances were such that but for this Act
the offence would have amounted to murder, be guilty of felony, to
wit, of infanticide."
The limitations of the defence became obvious when in 1927, a woman named
O'Donoghue who had killed her thirty-five-day-old infant, was not allowed to avail
of the partial defence of infanticide since the child could not be said to be "newly-
born"5".
The Infanticide Bill of 1936 was a bold attempt to widen the scope of this
legislation to correspond more closely both with public feeling and with the Home
Secretary's use of the prerogative of mercy'. Introduced by a number of Labour back-
benchers, it would have exempted the killing of infants up to the age of eight years
from the death penalty and would have widened the definition of an infanticidal
5" ibid p.758
509 ibid pp.762-764
51° ibid p.766
511 R v O'Donoghue (1927) 20 Cr.App.R.132
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mother's state of mind to cover "mothers who commit acts of this kind under extreme
stress arising from other causes than the immediate effects of childbirth" 513 . Following
the abdication of the King the bill lapsed. The Home Secretary and Lord Chancellor,
who saw "a number of difficulties" in amending the 1922 Act, would promise no
Government legislation for this purpose'.
Finally Lord Dawson successfully introduced a bill which became the
Infanticide Act of 1938. It made clear that the child could be of any age under twelve
months and that the woman's mental imbalance was to be attributable either to the
birth of the child or to the consequent lactation'. Although the bill received
unanimous support in House of Lords, the extension of the mitigatory effects of
infanticide to cover the killing of children under the age of one year caused
controversy, some commentators feeling that it was too broad and others feeling that it
was too narrow.
At the committee stage, Lord Arnold stated 516
 that he would like the time limit
to be longer and would like the causes which could justify a verdict of infanticide to
be extended so as to cover "mental disturbance due to distress and despair arising
from solicitude for the child and extreme poverty, or either of these" but in the end he
refrained from putting these amendments down because of the difficulty of passing a
bill of this kind which was not a Government measure. The bill received the Royal
assent on 23/6/1938 and remains to this day the law on infanticide.
Although commmentators speak of infanticide as a substantive offence' it
may also be viewed as a partial defence to murder. Walker, who describes infanticide
as a crime", goes on to describe it as "a crime which was expressly equated with
manslaughter. It was an intermediate verdict of the same nature as that which was
513 H.C.Deb.1936-7, Vol.318 p.236
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introduced thirty-five years later under the name of "diminished responsibility"519.
Parallels with the Scottish defence of diminished responsibility can be seen in the
origin of the defence of infanticide in the use of the prerogative of mercy to secure
release from the death penalty and both defences can be regarded as the handwork of
the Judiciary. Edwards describes the Scottish defence of diminished responsibility as
"a classic example of judge-made law"' while Seaborne Davies says of infanticide:
"If any legislation could be described as above all others the creation of
the Judges, it is the Infanticide Act, 1922. Their evidence against "the
solemn mockery" in 1866 really marks the starting point of this reform;
it was they who frequently made proposals for the amendment of the
law during the next two decades; it was they who revived the whole
question in 1908 and 1909; it was they who mostly discussed in
Parliament the proposals of the Bill of 1922 after it had been cast into
more or less its final form by Lord Birkenhead and his
collaborators'''.
The above discussion is a vivid illustration of the law's preoccupation with
women who killed their children. The tentative gropings for a satisfactory solution
resulted in the Infanticide Acts of 1922 and 1938. In line with the Scottish defence of
diminished responsibility, infanticide evolved into a partial defence, reducing murder
to manslaughter and it also hinges on the requirement of a mental imbalance. The
Infanticide Act 1922 was the first step taken to introduce diminished responsibility
into English law and the adoption of a full defence of diminished responsibility in
1957 was, therefore, a natural progression.
-
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2.2.2 Diminished Responsibility Imported
As stated above, the vesting of discretion in the jury to decide between capital
and non-capital cases had been advocated by a minority of the 1866 Royal
Commission on Capital Punishment. Only one proponent, however, linked it to a
reduction of murder to culpable homicide. Stephen J. offered no evidence on the
subject. By the time he wrote his History of the Criminal Law of England however,
Stephen J., discussing cases in which self-control was weakened by insanity, was
suggesting522
"the law ought. .where madness is proved, to allow the jury to return
any one of three verdicts: Guilty; Guilty, but his power of self-control
was diminished by insanity; Not guilty on the ground of insanity".
No notice was taken of his suggestion however, and the Atkin Committee and
the two medical associations which gave evidence to it in 1922 seem not to have
considered it523.
By the time of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (1949-53) the
British Medical Association was recommending not only the enlargement of the
McNaghten Rules to cover irresistible impulse but also that the jury should be
empowered to return a verdict of "guilty with diminished responsibility" if they found
that the accused
"at the time of the committing of the act was labouring, as a result of
disease of the mind, under a defect of reason or a disorder of emotion
to such an extent as not to be fully accountable for his actions"524.
The Association recommended detention in a special institution for an
indeterminate period where such a verdict was returned, rather than a fixed term of
522 J.Fitzjames Stephen A History of the Criminal Law of England Vol.ii (London, 1883) p.175
323 N.Walker op cit p.147
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imprisonment as in Scotland'''. Their recommendation was based on a recognition of
the gradation of intermediate states between full knowledge and complete lack of
knowledge and that
"no revision of the McNaghten formula can completely solve the
problem of determining responsibility for crime unless it is made
possible for the defence in the English courts, as in the Scottish courts,
to set up, as an alternative to the plea of insanity, a plea of diminished
responsibility"526.
Although the British Medical Association's proposal was also supported by the
Scottish psychiatrists, the Institute of Psychoanalysis and Lord Denning'', the
majority of witnesses were against its introduction528 , the psychiatrists on the grounds
that it would place too much responsibility on medical witnesses and would give rise
to conflicting testimony which could confuse the jury. Sir John Anderson thought that
it would be hard to draft a statutory definition of diminished responsibility and that in
any case the use made of it in Scotland between the wars had weakened the deterrent
effect of capital punishment (an argument for which he did not offer any evidence)".
Although the Commission recognised that "no clear boundary can be drawn
between responsibility and irresponsibility"' and saw no reason to apprehend that
juries would find the issue too difficult or would take refuge in it unreasonably 531 , they
concluded that
"although the Scottish doctrine of "diminished responsibility" works
well in that country, we are unable to recommend its adoption in
England"532.
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Their argument was that the conditions which gave rise to diminished
responsibility were relevant to offences other than murder". As their terms of
reference were restricted to the law of murder they did not think "that so radical an
amendment of the law of England would be justified for this limited purpose'''.
Some writers have interpreted this to mean that they advocated its introduction in
relation to all offences'. This view may have arisen from the argument of Scottish
witnesses that diminished responsibility was part of the general law of Scotland536.
Instead, the Commission recommended that juries should be able to decide between
life and death sentences, taking into account extenuating circumstances such as the
mental state of the murderer.
It is important to know that the Goverment resorted to the appointment of the
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment amidst growing agitation for abolition of
the death penalty. However, the Commission was specifically forbidden by its terms
of reference from considering the question of abolition and was therefore limited to
considering how the law could be improved given that the death penalty persisted.
The Gowers Commission's report was likely to be ignored since, as is well known, the
appointment of a Royal Commission is a time-honoured device, used by all
Governments, when they wish to fend off opposition and at the same time do
nothing'''. Not surprisingly, therefore, Mr.Lloyd George announced on 10/11/1955
that the Conservative Government rejected all the main recommendations of the
Gowers Commission and would introduce no amending legislation to the law of
murder'.
The Government's unwillingness to propose any legislation prompted a group
of their supporters to take the initiative. The Inns of Court Conservative and Unionist
533 ibid para.413
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Society appointed a committee of barristers and legally qualified M.P's. to take the
initiative under the chairmanship of Sir Lionel Heald. The Heald Committee produced
a short report' which recommended changes in the law regarding provocation,
constructive malice, accomplices and the defence of insanity in trials for murder. Over
the last of these they seem to have had great difficulty'. They sought advice from
Dr.Max Grunhut, the Oxford Criminologist, who was disposed in favour of the
defence of diminished responsibility, and after listening to his advice the Heald
Committee consulted the Scottish Lord Advocate, W.R.Milligan Q.C.541 . The Heald
Committee rejected the Gowers Commission's recent proposal to allow the jury to
decide whether or not the accused was suffering from disease of the mind (or mental
deficiency) to such a degree that he ought not to be held responsible' and instead,
recommended the adoption of the Scottish expedient so far as murder was concerned,
pointing out that it was no innovation to provide a special defence which was confined
to a specific crime'. They followed this with the recommendation that the result of a
diminished responsibility verdict should be detention during Her Majesty's pleasure'.
The Government, fearing that if it remained obstinate it would be defeated by
the abolitionists whose cause was attracting an increasing number of Conservatives,
decided to throw its support behind the Heald Committee's recommendations'''.
The Government published its Homicide Bill later in the year, section 2 of
which provided that
"Where a person kills or is a party to the killing of another he shall not
be convicted of murder if he was suffering from such abnormality of
mind (whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded
-
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development of mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or
injury) as substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts
or omissions in doing or being a party to the killing".
The words bracketed closely resemble the words of the definition of "mental
defectiveness" in the Mental Deficiency Act 1927 - "arrested or incomplete
development of mind existing before the age of 18 years". The 1927 Act however,
seems to mean "however arising or caused" whilst the 1957 parenthesis is intended for
the purpose of limitation rather than the avoidance of doubt'.
The following subsections of the Homicide Bill provided that it was for the
defence to raise this issue, and if successful in doing so, the accused became liable to
be convicted of manslaughter. The effect of this (which was not stated in the bill)
would be to free the judge from the necessity of pronouncing the death sentence (or
life imprisonment if the murder belonged to the newly created category of "non-
capital murder") and to allow him a choice between life imprisonment, imprisonment
for a specified term, a fine, a probation order, or an absolute or conditional
discharge'. If the necessary medical evidence were forthcoming at the stage when he
was considering sentence he could commit him to a mental hospital, but was not
compelled to do so as he would have been by a verdict of "guilty but insane'.
The attempts to amend this clause during its passage through Parliament were
not very determined, and the Attorney General and Lord Chancellor successfully
resisted them'. At the committee stage in the House of Commons Mr.Silverman,
who throughout took the leadership of the abolitionist members in the House of
Commons', proposed that the phrase should be amended so as to read "abnormality
of mind (however arising)" 551
 so that the law could keep abreast of advances in
546 E.Griew "The Future of Diminished Responsibility" [1988] Crim.L.R.75 p.77
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medical knowledge'. He himself gave no clear example of the sort of case which
might otherwise be excluded, but his supporters instanced people who were partners
in suicide pacts, or who were merely "simple" or irresponsible' without suffering
from "arrested or retarded development of mind". Pointing out that Mr.Silverman's
amendment would include murderers who were merely bad-tempered or who
committed a murder as a result of an outburst of rage or jealousy 554, the Attorney
General stipulated that the chosen wording was intended "to bring English law into
line with the Scottish doctrine, and not to go further than that' s ' and in the end the
amendment was not accepted.
Another unsuccessful proposal of the abolitionists would have shifted the onus
of proof from the defendant to the prosecution'', a move which has more recently
been advocated by both the (Butler) Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders'
and by the Criminal Law Revision Committee'''. Its proponent Mr.Paget (M.P.for
Northampton) stipulated that he wished to correct the anomaly of insanity, rather than
add to it by putting diminished responsibility into the same category' and he pointed
out that McNaghten's case was "rather a slim foundation on which the doctrine was
built""°. The reasons advanced in favour of this amendment were firstly, the
convenience which would result if the onus was on the prosecution, as these are the
people who have the evidence, the defendant being under constant observation in the
prison hospital and secondly, the difficulty for defence counsel in obtaining
instructions from a madman 561 . The Attorney General countered Mr.Paget's first
argument by asserting that the prosecution make evidence of insanity available to the
defence'. He claimed that the proposal would add considerably to the length of all
_-
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trials, would amount to a radical change in our criminal administration and would be a
change difficult to confine solely to murder charges'''. He also pointed out that the
defendant in a murder case may not wish to put forward a plea of insanity or
diminished responsibility' and that such a change would prejudice the defence'''. The
amendment having failed, Sir Frank Soskice (M.P.for Newport) moved to leave out
"prove" and insert "satisfy the jury"' to indicate that the burden of proof was on a
balance of probability'''. The Solicitor General made clear that this was what was
intended by "prove"' and again this amendment failed.
Considerable discontent was expressed in the House of Commons at the
Government's determination to rush this piece of legislation through, in advance of a
more far-reaching proposal on capital punishment'. Mr.Anthony Greenwood
(M.P.for Rossendale) expressed the view that
"It is becoming more and more obvious that the Government have not
been motivated by a burning passion to amend the law, but rather with
a determination to ditch [Mr.Silverman]. From some of the answers we
have had to our queries, it seems obvious that the Government
embarked upon the Bill with as little preparation and with as reckless a
disregard of the results as in the case of a much graver enterprise that
the Government have undertaken'''.
Similarly, Mr.Paget claimed that
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"the Clause is not nearly as good as it might be or as good as it would
be if the Government were dealing with this matter with any measure
of sincerity'''.
Partly because of the haste with which the bill was rushed through and the
consequent lack of discussion of it, many M.Ps. were left in the dark as to the working
of the section. Mr.Greenwood expressed the view that
"the Bill is just as far from clear to many of us who have been
considering it for that considerable length of time"'
while Mr.Silverman expressed disquiet that the proposed amendment on burden of
proof
"should ultimately be decided by votes cast one way or the other by
hundreds of people who have not the slightest notion what question
they are deciding, still less what are the arguments on either side'''.
Mr.Silverman was also of the opinion that this was a matter which should be
decided by a free vote rather than according to the collective political philosophy of
each party'''. No doubt the general ignorance of this area of law and the fact that this
was a party issue contributed to the M.Ps'. failure to attend the debates. Fewer than a
half dozen members on either side were present on 27/11/1956575.
In the House of Lords, similar discontent was expressed at the Government's
motives and actions'. Lord Chorley moved two amendments, the first being to insert
"environmental" after "inherent" and the second to insert "or disorder of the mind"
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after "disease'', the object being to include cases of diminished responsibility
produced by external and environmental causes without disease'. However the Lord
Chancellor, Lord Kilmuir, noted that the proposed amendments would go beyond the
Scottish defence', and Lord Chorley withdrew his amendment'. Lord Chorley also
moved an amendment which would have made detention during H.M rs. pleasure the
automatic result of a successful defence under this clause'. His object was to
eliminate the possibility of a fixed sentence, after two thirds of which, a man could
claim his freedom although he might still be regarded by the authorities as dangerous.
This was rejected by Lord Kilmuir, the Lord Chancellor, on the grounds that there
would also be cases in which the accused had virtually recovered by the time of trials'
and in which it would be unduly severe to deprive the judge of discretion. After the
Lord Chancellor asserted his faith in the judges to give appropriate sentences' Lord
Chorley withdrew his amendment'.
The act received the Royal assent on 21/3/1957. The new Home Secretary,
Mr.Butler, hailed the bill as a victory for the forces which represented majority
opinion in the country585 . There was not, in fact, the slightest support for such a
contention'''. All the evidence showed that public opinion was overwhelmingly either
retentionist or abolitionist and that those who supported some middle position of
grading murders were few in number, and expert opinion such as the Gowers
Commission, had, whenever it had examined these proposals, decided that they were
impracticable'''. In fact there was nobody who favoured such a law on its own merits.
The very Goverment which passed it had declared itself against it only two months
before'. As Lord Templewood opined in the debate in the House of Lords, it was
"nothing more than an expedient to extricate the Government out of a very difficult
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position'. However, as Hollis comments', the right thing can be done for the
wrong reasons;
"The motive for which the Act was passed is one thing. But, whatever
its motive, we must examine objectively how it has worked. Parliament
might have passed a wise act by a happy accident. Such things have
happened before'''.
2.3 THE OPERATION OF THE DEFENCE OF DIMINISHED
RESPONSIBILITY
As shown above, the introduction of diminished responsibility was a half-
hearted response by the Government of 1956 to the growing pressure for abolition of
the death penalty. The perfunctory discussion of the defence's terms and the haste with
which the bill was rushed through were later to lead to uncertainty as the precise scope
of the defence. As a result, it fell on the Judiciary to imbue the words of the defence
with meaning (impaired mental responsibility, for example, is not a term of art in law
or psychiatry) and to delineate its precise scope. By tracing the development of the
defence I will show that the introduction of diminished responsibility into English law
has, nonetheless, abated the controversy surrounding the insanity defence and led to a
resolution of the medico/legal conflict.
At first it was unclear whether the Crown could accept the plea of diminished
responsibility where the psychiatric evidence was unanimous or whether the issue had
to be left to the jury. The early cases' indicate that the courts initially favoured the
second option' and insisted that the prosecution was obliged to probe the soundness
589 H.L.Deb.1956-7, Vol.201 p.1196
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of the psychiatric evidence in cross examinatioh 594
.
 Then in Cox', the Court of
Appeal approved the procedure whereby the plea of diminished responsibility could
be accepted at the discretion of the trial judge where the medical evidence was
uncontested. Now if at a diminished responsibility manslaughter trial there is
unanimous psychiatric evidence from both sides or uncontradicted medical testimony
(likely to come from the defence only)" that the defendant was of diminished
responsibility, either the case must not go to the jury or the trial judge must direct the
jury to find a manslaughter verdict under section 2 of the Homicide Act unless there
"be some evidence arising from other testimony or the circumstances of the case upon
which [the jury] can properly act" to convict of murder'.
Walker found that as long ago as 1964, there was no prosecution rebuttal of
the psychiatric evidence for the defence in 75% of section 2 manslaughter cases".
Dell's research has shown that for the period of 1976/1977, the plea not guilty to
murder but guilty to section 2 manslaughter was accepted by the prosecution in 86.5%
of such cases'; the result was that 80% of diminished responsibility cases were dealt
with by guilty pleas'. Thus, in the vast majority of diminished responsibility cases,
the prosecution and the court accord deference to the medical viewpoint of
abnormality of mind and impaired mental responsibility. Deference to the medical
viewpoint of abnormality of mind can also be seen in the wide array of abnormalities
covered by section 2, which the remainder of this chapter will be devoted to
discussing. The implications of the practice of yielding to the medical viewpoint of
substantially impaired mental responsibility will be analysed in Chapter Three.
There is no compulsion on the jury, despite medical concurrence, to find that
responsibility is diminished, since the jury has to reach its verdict on all the facts and
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596 S.Spencer "Homicide, Mental Abnormality and Offence" in Mentally Abnormal Offenders (Toronto,
1984) p.97
597 R v Vernage [1982] Crim.L.R.598 p.599
598 N.Walker op cit p.161
599 S.Dell Murder into Manslaughter (Oxford, 1984) p.26
600 ibid p.28
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circumstances of the case, not just the medical evidence 601. In R v Dix' it was argued
that by the same token upon which a jury could overturn medical evidence if there
was sufficient evidence to convict of murder, a jury could be asked to convict of
section 2 manslaughter without medical evidence if there was sufficient outside
evidence of substantial mental abnormality.
Shaw L.J., while finding counsel's argument attractive and that the terms of
section 2(1) of the Homicide Act, 1957 do not require that medical evidence be
adduced in support of a defence of diminished responsibility, nevertheless upheld the
trial judge's ruling that this subsection makes it a practical necessity'. Counsel's
argument it was ruled, could hold up, only if the parenthesis in the subsection
("whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind or any
inherent causes or induced by disease or injury") was descriptive of all forms of
abnormality of mind so that psychiatric evidence as to what sort was unnecessary'.
However, Lord Parker in Byrne' had made it clear that the defendant must show not
only the existence of abnormality of mind but also that it falls within the above
parenthesis and is substantial'. Shaw L.J's. view was that what emerges from Lord
Parker's statement is that scientific evidence of a medical kind "is essential" to
establish what is referred to in the above parenthesis'. Hence a section 2
manslaughter defence without psychiatric evidence seems impossible'.
The remainder of this Chapter will be dedicated to discussing those
abnormalities of mind which the psychiatric witnesses testify to and which lead to
diminished responsibility manslaughter verdicts'. In this manner I will outline the
parameters of the defence (which have taken a considerable length of time to be
settled), with reference to several criminal law principles and defences. This will
601 Walton v R [1978] 1 All E.R.542 p.543
602 [1982] 74 Cr.App.R.306
ibid p.311
604
605 [1960] 3 All E.R.1
606 ibid p.4
R v Dix [1982] 74 Cr.App.R.306 p.311
608
	 op cit p.96
609
	 an illustration of the medical conditions which typically give rise to diminished responsibility
verdicts see Power "Diminished Responsibility" (1967) 7 Med. Sci.& L.185 p.187
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reveal the evolution of a happy partnership between law and medicine on the issue of
diminished responsibility and the success of the defence in dealing with cases of
abnormality of mind which are regarded as falling outside the ambit of the
McNaghten Rules but which nevertheless merit some form of excuse.
2.4 DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY AND IRRESISTIBLE IMPULSE
The focus of this section is the plea of irresistible impulse which, as I have
shown in Chapter One, was frequently offered in cases of volitional and moral
insanity during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. After 1910, however, the
Court of Appeal came down heavy-handedly against any attempt to alter the
McNaghten Rules and pronounced very firmly that irresistible impulses due to
insanity would not be recognised by the English courts as a legal defence.
Contemporaneous with the steadfast opposition shown by the English courts, a
movement to recognise irresistible impulse as part of the test of insanity was initiated
in Irish law. This eventually culminated with approval by the Irish Supreme Court in
Doyle v Wicklow County Council', the shortcomings of which will be discussed
further in Chapter Three. In contrast with the Irish position from the 1930's, pleas of
irresistible impulse became less frequent in England, until eventually irresistible
impulse was no longer offered as evidence of insanity. That the judicial opposition to
irresistible impulse stemmed in large part from a conflict over the distribution of
power between the legal and medical professions emerges from a lecture delivered by
Lord Hewart in 1927 before the Medical Society of London where he said of the
defence of irresistible impulse
"If the law were relaxed in the way which has been suggested. .the
result might be to transfer to a section of the medical profession the
question whether a great number of ordinary criminals should be held
responsible to the law'''.
610 [1974] I.R.55
611 Excerpts of this lecture have been published by the Law Times (1927) Vol.164 p.384
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By the 1950's the medical categories of moral and volitional insanity had gone
out of vogue and been replaced by the "psychopathic personality". Similarities
between moral insanity and psychopathy can be discerned from the report of the
Royal Commission on the Law Relating to Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency
(1954-57), which described psychopaths as persons whose
"daily behaviour shows a want of social responsibility and of
consideration for others, of prudence and foresight and of ability to act
in their own best interests. Their persistent anti-social mode of conduct
may include inefficiency and lack of interest in any form of
occupation; pathological lying, swindling, and slandering; alcoholism
and drug addiction; sexual offences, and violent actions with little
motivation and an entire absence of self-restraint, which may go as far
as homicide. Punishment or the threat of punishment influences their
behaviour only momentarily, and its more lasting effect is to intensify
their vindictiveness and anti-social attitude"'.
It was unclear at first whether the psychopath (ie. the characteristic victim of
irresistible impulses') would be embraced by the diminished responsibility defence
in the absence of some other recognised form of abnormality, such as mental
subnormality (as in Matheson') or drunkenness (Di Duca) 615 . After all, psychopathy
is a personality disorder and the Homicide Act stressed abnormality of mind.
Furthermore, the Scottish defence of diminished responsibility had by now become
much more restrictive. In Carraher v H.M. Advocate' it was held by a Full Bench
that
612 Report and Minutes of Evidence, 8th day, p.287, quoted by Wooton Social Science and Social
Pathology (London, 1959) p.249
613 J.LI.J. Edwards "Social Defence and Control of the Dangerous Offender" [1968] C.L.P.23 p.48
instances this as one of the most frequently recorded symptoms of psychopathy.
614 (1958) Cr.App.R.145
615 (1959) Cr.App.R.167
616 [1946] J.C.108
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"the plea of diminished responsibility, which. .is anomalous in our law,
should not be extended or given wider scope than has hitherto been
accorded to it in the decisions"'
and that psychopathic personality disorder should henceforth, not be regarded as a
species of diminished responsibility'.
As early as 1909 Lord Guthrie in H.M. Advocate v Edmonstone619 had stated,
although obiter, that
"Nile law has never countenanced the idea that persons with a
diminished moral sense in consequence of having been brought up in
bad surroundings can be dealt with differently from others" 620 .
More recently Lord Cooper in H.M. Advocate v Braithwaite stated
"it will not suffice in law, for the purpose of this defence of diminished
responsibility merely to show that an accused person has a very short
temper, or is unusually excitable and lacking in self-control. The world
would be a very convenient place for criminals and a very dangerous
place for other people, if that were the law. It must be much more than
that"62'
whilst the Lord Justice-General in Caldwell v H.M. Advocate asserted that
"[e]vidence of ruthlessness, of callousness and of disregard for others
is evidence rather of a criminal disposition than of diminished
responsibility 11622.
n.......
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620 ibid p.224
621 [1945] J.C.55 pp.57 & 58
622 [1946] S.L.T.9
-121-
These words were still being quoted with approval in 1963 by Lord Wheatley
in the case of Burnett623 , a psychopathically hot-tempered man who murderously
attacked both his mistress and her husband when they showed signs of becoming
reconciled624.
It seemed likely that the English defence of diminished responsibility would
follow the course pre-ordained for it by the Scottish case-law. The Attorney General
had stipulated in the Parliamentary debates on the Homicide Bill, that the chosen
wording of section 2 was intended "to bring English law into line with the Scottish
doctrine, and not to go further than that" 625 . Spriggs626 gave the Court of Appeal its
first opportunity to settle the issue. There prosecuting counsel contended that because
the defendant had a high intelligence quotient he could not be suffering from an
abnormality of mind despite medical evidence that the defendant lacked ability to
control his emotions. In summing up, the judge gave no ruling as to these conflicting
submissions but simply left it to the jury to say whether they were satisfied that the
accused came within the statutory definition. It is quite likely that the jury were
influenced by prosecuting counsel's contention when they convicted the accused.
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal, pursuing a course of non-interference as regards the
terms of the Act, held that the trial judge had taken a proper course of action.
In Byrne the trial judge directed the jury as to the meaning of section 2 in
substantially the same terms as those urged by counsel for the prosecution in Spriggs;
that is, that difficulty or even inability of an accused person to exercise will-power to
control his physical acts could not amount to such abnormality of mind as
substantially impaired his mental responsibility. The accused was a sexual psychopath
who had strangled a young woman and then mutilated her body. On appeal, Lord
parker in the Court of Criminal Appeal ruled that "abnormality of mind" means
.......,
623 The Proceedings were reported only in the press
624 Details are given by N.Walker op cit p.156
625 H.C.deb 1956, Vol.561 p.321
626 [1958] 1 All E.R.300
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"a state of mind so different from that of ordinary human beings that
the reasonable man would term it abnormal. It appears to us to be wide
enough to cover the mind's activities in all its aspects, not only the
perception of physical acts and matters and the ability to form a
rational judgment as to whether an act is right or wrong, but also the
ability to exercise will-power to control physical acts in accordance
with that rational judgment. The expression "mental responsibility for
his acts" points to a consideration of the extent to which the accused's
mind is answerable for his physical acts which must include a
consideration of the extent of his ability to exercise will-power to
control his physical acts"627.
At last irresistible impulse was admitted into English law although via the
defence of diminished responsibility. This route has led to one important difference. It
is not necessary that the impulse on which the defendant acted should be found by the
jury to be irresistible; it is sufficient if the difficulty which the defendant experienced
in controlling it was substantially greater than would be experienced in like
circumstances by an ordinary man, not suffering from mental abnormali ty628.
 This
view has been approved in Simcox 629 and Lloyd6" The result in Byrne is in keeping
with the opinion of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (1949-53) which
found"' that
"since a psychopath would not ordinarily be held to suffer from a
disease of the mind, or. .from mental deficiency, it would not be open
to the courts to find them irresponsible, either under the McNaghten
Rules in their present form or if the law were amended in the way we
have suggested. .In our view, however, the available evidence justifies
621 [1960] 3 All E.R.1 p.4
628 Smith and Hogan (7th ed) (London, 1992) p.213
629 [1964] Crim.L.R.402 p.403
630 [1966] 1 All E.R.107 p.109
631 Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 1949-53 op cit para.401
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the conclusion that in many cases the responsibility of psychopaths can
properly be regarded as diminished" (emphasis added).
Aware of the philosophical conundrum on which the defence of irresistible
impulse had foundered, Lord Parker in Byrne acknowledged that
"there is no scientific measurement of the degree of difficulty which an
abnormal person finds in controlling his impulses. These problems,
which in the present state of medical knowledge are scientifically
insoluble, the jury can only approach in a broad, common-sense
wayti632.
Criticism on this ground quickly followed on the heels of Byrne, Lady
Wooton arguing that it is not possible to get inside another man's skin to assess the
strength of his impulses or his ability to have acted otherwise than as he did633.
Wooton is of the view that the state of a man's knowledge or intellect is much more
easily tested than the state of his will' but as Hart points out635
"a man's knowledge is surely as much, or as little, locked in his breast
as his capacity for self control. Questions about the latter indeed may
often be more difficult to answer than questions about a man's
knowledge; yet in favourable circumstances if we know a man well
and can trust what he says about his efforts or his struggles to control
himself we may have just as good ground for saying 'Well he just could
not do it though he tried' as we have for saying 'He didn't know that the
pistol was loaded'. And we sometimes may have good general evidence
that in certain conditions, eg. infancy or a clinically definable state,
such as depression after childbirth, human beings are unable or less
able than the normal adult to master certain impulses".
632 3 All E.R.1 p.5
633 Lady Wooton Crime and the Criminal Law (2nd ed) (London, 1981) p.78
634 Lady Wooton Social Science and Social Pathology, op cit p.230
635 H.L.A.Hart Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford ,1968) p.203
Hart asserts that the philosophical arguments pitch the case too high: they are
supposed to show that the question whether a man could have acted differently is in
principle unanswerable and not merely that in law courts we do not usually have clear
enough evidence'. In any event, the law's concern is with establishing "moral
certainty" and not metaphysical certainty 637 . The difficulties arise from the nature of
psychopathy which the Gowers Commission described as "one of the most obscure
and intractable problems we have to consider'''. Although they felt "that the concept
of psychopathic personality is a necessary and legitimate one"' they acknowledged
that "the question whether a psychopath should be regarded as criminally responsible
for his actions is one of great difficulty'1640.
This view is seconded by Lady Wooton who says that "the psychopath is a
critical case for those who would retain a distinction between the responsible and the
irresponsible..[and that]..the psychopath makes nonsense of every attempt to
distinguish the sick from the healthy delinquent by the presence or absence of a
psychiatric syndrome, or by symptoms of mental disorder which are independent of
his objectionable behaviour'''. Surely this is an argument in favour of dealing with
the psychopath via the defence of diminished responsibility which indicates reduced
culpability, as opposed to through the medium of the insanity defence which signifies
blamelessness and whose outcome is a technical acquittal. Further arguments in
favour of this course of action are firstly, the fact that most psychiatrists view
psychopathy as a personality disorder rather than as a mental illness and secondly, the
fact that the Butler Committee has taken the view that it is non-curable TM2
 and
therefore, that prison is a preferable receptacle to a mental hospital'.
_.-
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After a brief flurry of discussion following Byrne, criticism of the admission
of irresistible impulse waned. Over a century's conflict about the recognition of
irresistible impulse as a species of insanity ended with one judgment. The Homicide
Act and particularly the decision in Byrne appear to have effected a reconciliation
between the legal and psychiatric conceptions of insanity. Norrie describes the
acceptance of irresistible impulse as "an intellectual fudge between the legal and the
psychiatric categories'. The end result was "the partial acceptance of the psychiatric
concept with regard to murder through the 1957 Act, albeit on the law's terms"'.
2.5 DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY AND THE DEFENCE OF
AUTOMATISM
In Chapter One I have briefly dealt with the widening of the concept of disease
of the mind in the McNaghten Rules in the interests of public protection. This has
resulted in a restriction of the defence of automatism, which leads to an outright
acquittal in the case of unconscious involuntary acts not attributable to disease of the
mind within the Rules. The narrowing of the defence of automatism (to the point
where its application is very limited) is an issue which requires further consideration.
This will reinforce the unsatisfactory nature of the McNaghten Rules and the
usefulness of the diminished responsibility plea in avoiding the stigma of an insanity
label and indefinite incarceration (until recently the consequence of a finding of
insanity in England, still the consequence in Ireland) in those cases which were once
regarded as amounting to automatism.
The restriction of the defence of automatism began with R v Kemp' where
Lord Devlin ruled that arteriosclerosis (which in this case had not yet caused
degeneration of the brain cells) was a disease of the mind as disease of the mind was
not restricted to a disease of the brain, and insofar as the accused's condition affected
644 A. Norrie Crime, Reason and History: A Critical Introduction to Criminal Law (London, 1993)
p . 182
645 ibid
646 [ 1	 1956j 3 All E.R.249
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the ordinary mental faculties of "reason, memory and understanding"'. This case was
in marked contrast to the earlier approach of Barry J. in Charlson" who allowed the
jury to consider whether a brain tumour in the defendant caused a state of automatism,
after he had hit his son on the head with a hammer and thrown him out of a window
causing him serious injury.
Then in Bratty v A.G. for Northern Ireland' Lord Denning disclosed the
public protection role of the insanity defence, asserting that "any mental disorder
which has manifested itself in violence and is prone to recur is a disease of the mind.
At any rate it is the sort of disease for which a person should be detained in hospital
rather than be given an unqualified acquittal""°. It appeared likely from this dictum
that a mental condition would not qualify as McNaghten madness if it was not likely
to recur, but the Court of Appeal in Burgess' has stated that absence of the danger of
recurrence will not prevent a finding of disease of the mind within the McNaghten
Rules.
Another criterion for distinguishing automatism from insanity has emerged out
of the Court of Appeal decision in R v Quick and Paddison 652 There the first named
defendant was tried for assault occasioning actual bodily harm on a patient in the
hospital where he worked as a nurse. The trial judge ruled that his condition of
hypoglycaemia (brought on by food abstinence and alcohol following an injection of
insulin to treat his diabetes) could only support the defence of insanity and not
automatism. Presumably this is because Quick had previously suffered several
hypoglycaemic episodes, some of which had issued in violence. On appeal, the Court
of Appeal held that disease of the mind within the McNaghten Rules did not include a
malfunctioning of the mind of transitory effect caused by the application to the body
of some external factor such as violence, drugs, anaesthetics, alcohol, hypnotic
641 ibid p.253
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649 [1963] A.C.386
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influences or insulin and that accordingly, the issue of automatism should have been
left to the jury.
It should be noted that the Court of Appeal stated who were not to be treated
as suffering from disease of the mind and did not suggest that the converse of this
principle was an infallible pointer to those who were so suffering'''. "To say that the
presence of an external cause of mental trouble saves a man from the imputation of
madness does not imply that the absence of an external cause necessarily means that
he is mad'''.
2.5.1 Sleep-walking and epilepsy
However the Court of Appeal has recently confirmed in Burgess that there is
an internal/external cause doctrine by ruling that the defendant's sleep-walking
amounted to insanity because it arose from an internal cause and had manifested itself
in violence, although it was unlikely to recur in the form of serious violence.
Although the extension of disease of the mind to cover sleep-walking had been
anticipated', it is a difficult proposition to accept in view of the fact that for years
sleep-walking has been cited as a self-evident illustration of automatism. An example
is Stephen J. in Tolson's case' who asked " Can anyone doubt that a man who,
though he might be perfectly sane, committed what would otherwise be a crime in a
state of somnambulism would be entitled to be acquitted? And why is this? Simply
because he would not know what he was doing"". In Bratty both Lord Denning"'
and Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest" referred to sleep-walking as an example of
automatism.
653 Glanville Williams Textbook of the Criminal Law (2nd ed.) (London, 1983) pp.674 & 675
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Furthermore, a defence of automatism based on evidence of sleep-walking has
succeeded in several earlier English cases. In 1936 Stone was acquitted of an offence
against a girl who lived in his house, on the grounds that he was asleep'. In 1949 a
soldier, Price, attacked his corporal with a bayonet while awaking from a dream and
was acquitted661 . In 1951 Paltridge, who tried to strangle his wife and then hit her
with an axe while asleep, was acquitted after a mere ten minutes deliberation by the
jury662. More significantly, Sergeant Boshears was acquitted of the murder of a young
girl on the grounds of automatism caused by sleep-walking'. As late as 1978 Hlight8
was acquitted on the same grounds after she had risen in the night while still asleep, to
fetch a knife to peel potatoes and then stabbed her husband with it'.
Another objection to the decision in Burgess is that the fundamental
requirement that the defect of reason be caused by disease of the mind was not
satisfied. The defendant's consciousness and therefore his faculty of reason was
suspended when he fell asleep and hence his defect of reason was caused by sleep, a
natural condition, and not by sleep-walking which was classified as a pathological or
internal condition665 . This is the approach which was taken by the Ontario Court of
Appeal in R v Parks', approving the trial judge's ruling that "it would not seem
consonant with sound criminal law policy to force into the notion "disease of the
mind", and hence legal insanity, and the stigmatization and confinement associated
with a special verdict, a person who suffers from a sleep disorder whose behaviour
whilst in an awakened state is otherwise socially acceptable'.
Notwithstanding the English Court of Appeal's decision in Burgess, which
was decided in the interim between the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal and
that of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld Parks' acquittal on
660 Described by N.Walker op cit p.170
661 ibid p.170
662 ibid pp.170 & 171
663 The Times and The Guardian 18 Feb.1961
664 (1978) The Times 3 May 1978
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the grounds of automatisa1668,
 the majority following the Court of Appeal's line of
reasoning. The minority (consisting of LaForest and five concurring judges) was of
the opinion that somnambulism is a condition that is not well-suited to analysis under
either of the "continuing danger" or "internal cause" theories and that the court may
also have to look to certain additional policy considerations such as whether the
condition is easily feigned and whether the recognition of the condition as non-insane
automatism would open the floodgates. The minority found that none of these factors
suggested that somnambulism should be considered a disease of the mind and that
accordingly, there were no compelling policy factors to preclude a finding that the
accused's condition in this case was one of non-insane automatism.
It appears that the Court of Appeal may have sub silentio adopted this
internal/external cause distinction in the earlier case of R v Sullivan669 . There the
appellant, a man of blameless reputation, was charged with inflicting grievous bodily
harm in the final stage of recovering from a minor epileptic seizure. He pleaded guilty
to the lesser charge of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, after the trial judge
ruled that his condition amounted to insanity and not automatism. The Court of
Appeal conceded that an external factor such as a blow to the head causing concussion
or the administration of an anaesthetic for therapeutic purposes might warrant a
finding of automatism. However if, as in this case, there was impairment of the
defendant's faculties of reason, memory and understanding, it did not matter whether
this impairment was organic, as in epilepsy, or functional or permanent or transient
and intermittent provided that it subsisted at the time of the commission of the act.
As with sleep-walking, epilepsy was presumed for many years to be a
paradigmatic example of automatism. Barry J. in Charlson was of the view that a
criminal act committed by an epileptic would warrant an acquittal "because the
actions of an epileptic are automatic and unconscious and his will or consciousness is
not applied to what he is doingit670, while Lord Denning in Bratty described
n••n•.....
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automatism as "an act which is done by the muscles without any control by the mind,
such as a spasm, a reflex action or a convulsion"671.
In the course of this endeavour to protect the public, the courts have clearly
eschewed all logic in the classification of conditions as insane'. On a commonsense
understanding of the term insanity (and the Court of Appeal in Quick did, after all,
stress that the issue of insanity should be approached "in a cotnmonsense way"')
neither the epileptic nor the sleep-walker can be classified as insane.
The Canadian Court of Appeal in Parks' warned that "an appellate court
must guard against. .any temptation to eliminate or limit a defence recognized by law
because of the unsympathetic factual context in which the defence is presented for
review'''. Unfortunately this is not the approach which the English Court of Appeal
has taken and as a result, the defence of automatism has been whittled away almost to
the point of non-existence.
The test in Quick is capable of leading to very arbitrary results. Although
sleep-walking will be treated as a disease of the mind, if caused by eating cheese it
will qualify for the defence of automatism as cheese' would probably be considered
to be an external cause677 . Under the internal/external factor doctrine it matters
whether the accused's automatism was the result of a failure to take insulin or a failure
to take the proper amount'. Whilst the latter diabetic will receive an outright
acquittal, the former has, until recently, received automatic indefinite incarceration
and the stigma of an insanity label. Avoidance of this fate was obviously the primary
consideration of Sullivan and Quick, both of whom pleaded guilty after hearing that
his condition amounted to insanity.
671 [1963] A.C.386 p.409
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In the case of murder, diminished responsibility with its wide powers of
disposal has, since 1957, acted as a safeguard in these cases. Morris and Blom-
Cooper"' cite the cases of Brian George Candy680, William Reynolds', William 
Henry A1ernathy682, Rodney William Bailey' and Stanley Lister' as instances
where epileptics succeeded in raising the defence of diminished responsibility. The
sentence imposed in these cases varied from life imprisonment to a hospital order.
They also describe the case of Richard William Bryant (age 79), a Naval pensioner,
who strangled his wife with a dressing gown cord at home. They were devoted to each
other. On 23/3/1961 at Hampshire Assizes, Bryant was found not guilty of murder but
guilty of manslaughter under section 2, after doctors testified that he suffered from
arteriosclerosis. Mr Justice Elwes made a hospital order with restrictions for twelve
months under sections 60 and 65 of the Mental Health Act, 1959 685 . It is interesting to
compare the outcome of this case with that of Kemp whose arteriosclerosis led to a
finding of insanity (rather than automatism). The indefinite committal which
followed is the equivalent of a hospital order with restrictions without limit of time'.
Fortunately the situation has been ameliorated in England by the Criminal
Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act, 1991 which provides for
discretionary disposal of the criminally insane except in the case of offences carrying
a fixed penalty. The inapplicability of the 1991 Act to insane murderers however,
signifies a continuing need for the discretionary disposal consequences which
accompany the diminished responsibility defence, to protect the epileptic, the diabetic
and the sleep-walker' who kill, from the "double-edged acquittal"' which follows a
finding of insanity in the case of murder.
679,4 Calender of Murder: Criminal Homicide in England since 1957 (London, 1964)
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2.5.2 Psychological Blow
Whether a dissociative state resulting from a psychological blow can give rise
to a defence of automatism, has yet to be decided by the English Courts, although a
number of Canadian cases have accepted that a psychological blow may be viewed as
an external cause leading to an acquittal on the grounds of automatism 689 . However,
the Ontario Court of Appeal in Rabe?' has since held that a dissociative state arising
from a psychological blow is not an external cause for the purposes of automatism.
Holding that "the ordinary stresses and disappointments of life which are the common
lot of mankind do not constitute an external cause constituting an explanation for a
malfunctioning of the mind which takes it out of the category of a 'disease of the
mind', the Court of Appeal left open the question whether a dissociative state
resulting from an emotional shock that might be presumed to affect the average
normal person can amount to an external cause.
The facts of Rabey are of interest as an illustration of the circumstances that
can give rise to a dissociative state. The defendant, a university student who was
emotionally attached to the victim, discovered in a letter she had written that she
regarded him as a "nothing". The next day the defendant met the victim by chance and
hit her with a rock which he had taken from the geology lab to study. He then began
to choke her. A witness who saw the defendant shortly afterwards, described him as
very pale, sweating, glassy-eyed and as having a frightened expression. The defendant
testified that he could not remember striking the victim. A psychiatrist called by the
defence testified that the accused had entered into a complete dissociative state after
conversing with the victim, in which he was capable of performing physical actions
but without consciousness of such action. The dissociative state, which was
comparable to that produced by a physical blow, was caused by a psychological blow.
The psychiatrist testified that this was not a disease of the mind, that he could find no
evidence that the accused had suffered from any pathological condition and that there
was only a slight possibility of recurrence. The trial judge accepted the evidence of the
689 See R.D.Mackay "Non-Organic Automatism - Some Recent Developments" [1980] Crim.L.R.350
pp.353-355 for a summary of these decisions.
69054 C.C.C.3d.1
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defence psychiatrist and the defendant was acquitted. The Crown then successfully
appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal. The Canadian Supreme Court affirmed the
finding of the Court of Appeal.
The minority view that in the absence of psychiatric disorder, the possibility of
recurrence or the need for treatment, Rabey's dissociative state should not have been
branded with the label of insanity, has received support from academic
commentators"'. However, in view of the increasingly visible public protection role of
the insanity defence and the recent unsatisfactory developments with regard to sleep-
walking and epilepsy, it is likely that Rabey will be followed by the English Courts.
In the recent Crown Court decision of R v T 6", the defendant was acquitted on the
grounds of automatism of charges of robbery and actual bodily harm, after medical
evidence was led that being a victim of a rape three days prior to the offences had led
to post traumatic stress disorder in the defendant. The psychiatrist testified that at the
time of the offence she had entered a dissociative state and that the offences had been
committed during a psychogenic fugue so that she was not acting with a conscious
mind or will.
In deciding that the rape was an external cause for the purposes of automatism
the judge found that "such an incident could have an appalling effect on any young
woman, however well-balanced normally'''. The decision falls squarely within the
exceptional circumstances which would affect the average person, envisaged in
Rabey, but the availability or not of the defence of automatism where the dissociative
state is induced by the "ordinary stresses and disapointments of life" has yet to be
decided by the English Court of Appeal.
Although not described as "dissociation" similar states have, in the past, led to
successful diminished responsibility defences. Morris and Blom-Cooper recount the
cases of Rosalia Garofalo', Albert Houghtoo 695, Alec Taylor Lawrence96,
-
691 Glanville Williams op cit p.675; R.D.Mackay op cit p.359
692 [1990] Crim.L.R.256
693 ibid p.258
694 Morris and Blom-Cooper op cit p.51
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Edmund William Barber' and Reginald James Bruce698 where emotional stress
led to a successful diminished responsibility plea.
More recently in Eelel the terminology of dissociation was deployed' when a
36-year-old man was tried for shooting dead a family of three who had made his life a
living hell. The family, two of them with a history of mental trouble, were said to
have tormented neighbours for years with insults, arguments, late-night record playing
and banging on doors. Eeles was jailed for three years after a jury found him not
guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility'''.
The defence of diminished responsibility has, in these cases, bridged the gap
between a verdict of murder (resulting in either the death penalty or today, the
mandatory life sentence) and an insanity verdict (whose consequence until 1991 was
mandatory indefinite confinement). With the restriction of the defence of automatism
due to the expansion of "disease of the mind", the diminished responsibility defence
has availed those murderers who wished to avoid the stigma of an insanity verdict and
its inflexible disposal consequences. As the above cases illustrate, the wide disposal
consequences associated with diminished responsibility have permitted a more just
and humane outcome in cases where indeterminate hospitalisation might not be
perceived to be necessary or deserved. For this reason it may be concluded that
diminished responsibility has remedied several defects in the McNaghten Rules: Not
only abnormalities that fail to reach the standard of McNaghten madness have come
within the defence of diminished responsibility, but the defence has attracted
defendants who do fall within the Rules, as a result of its ability to respond more
accurately to their individual needs.
By giving expression to the medical viewpoint of epilepsy, hyperglycaemia
and dissociation (these are not regarded as amounting to medical insanity nor as
	--
695 ibid p.54
696 ibid p.60
697 ibid p.80
698 ibid p.128
699 Glanville Williams op cit p.674
700 See The Times 22 Nov 1978
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needing indefinite hospitalisation) it is tempting to infer the evolution of a happy
partnership between law and medicine, exemplified in the above cases. This has also
arisen because the defence is propitious to psychiatric testimony on almost any
abnormality of mind that might substantially impair responsibility. The defence's
potential as a forum for psychiatric testimony will now be addressed.
2.6 DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY AND PREMENSTRUAL TENSION
Unlike the United States practice of allowing premenstrual tension (P.M.T.) as
a complete defence to criminal charges, in English law P.M.T. is only relevant to
mitigation of sentence. In murder cases, where there is no discretion as to sentence,
P.M.T. has been held to amount to an abnormality of mind for the purpose of the
diminished responsibility defence. Treating the condition as a mental abnormality
which may lead to a diminished responsibility verdict if responsibility is substantially
impaired, has bridged the wide gulf between a conviction of murder and the defence
of insanity. It has also paved the way for the reception of medical evidence on
abnormalities of mind produced by bodily malfunctions and provided a just
disposition for the defendant whose abnormality has produced an alien character or
proclivities.
The premenstrual syndrome (P.M.S.), "a hormone deficiency disease'', has a
variety of symptoms including headache, breast swelling and tenderness, abdominal
bloating, weight gain, acne, asthma, constipation, cravings for sweet or salty foods,
tension, irritability, aggressiveness, lethargy, anxiety and depression', which occur in
the same phase in each menstrual cycle, followed by a symptom-free phase'. These
symptoms appear several days before the onset of menstruation and reach peak
intensity during the last four days of the premenstruation period or the first four days
701 Taylor and Dalton "Premenstrual Syndrome: A New Criminal Defense?" (1983) 19
Calif.W.L.Rev.269
702 R.A.Diliberto "Premenstrual Stress Syndrome Defence: Legal, Medical and Social Aspects" 33
Med.Trial Tech.Q.35I at p.352
703 Taylor and Dalton op cit pp.27I & 272
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of actual menstruation, the paramenstruum". Despite scepticism from the medical
profession on the grounds that its advocate Dr.Katharina Dalton has never subjected
her work to controlled studies', the evidence advanced in favour of the condition is
convincing.
As well as increased propensity to recidivism during the paramenstruum 706,
Dalton has discovered that psychiatric disabilities have been exacerbated by P.M.S..
An analysis of hospital admissions for acute psychiatric illness showed that 46% of
female patients were admitted during their paramenstruum. Women suffering from
P.M.T. constituted 53% of the attempted suicides, 47% of those admitted for acute
depression and 45% of those admitted for schizophrenia'''.
P.M.S. has now been accepted as being an abnormality of mind within section
2 of the Homicide Act, in three English cases. In R v Craddock', a woman of thirty
years stabbed to death a barmaid after a fight broke out in the pub where she worked.
She was convicted of manslaughter due to diminished responsibility brought on by
P.M.S., after medical evidence was tendered that her uncontrolled disruptive
behaviour which had resulted in thirty previous convictions, could be treated by daily
injections of progesterone. The case was set back to allow a period of treatment,
during which the defendant's behaviour improved considerably. Mr James Miskin,
Recorder of London, made a probation order of three years (the maximum possible),
with a condition that Craddock should receive such treatment as prescribed.
In R v English' a thirty seven year old woman was convicted of diminished
responsibility manslaughter owing to P.M.S., after she killed her lover by crushing
him against a lamp post with her car. English had no previous convictions and no
history of uncontrolled violence. Psychiatric evidence was offered to the effect that
P.M.S. follows from post natal depression in about ninety percent of cases. English
7" ibid p.272
705 Di Liberto op cit p.357
7" Taylor and Dalton op cit pp.274 & 275
7" ibid p.275
7" Reported in the Lancet [1981] 25 Nov.1238
709 ibid
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had suffered from this condition in 1966. The expert witnesses testified that the
defendant's sterilisation in 1971 had increased the severity of P.M.S.. P.M.S.
combined with a long period of food abstinence was apparently responsible for her
violent, irritable and impulsive behaviour. Dr.Katharina Dalton, who had also found
Craddock to be suffering from P.M.S., gave evidence that P.M.S. is a disease of the
body and therefore a disease of the mind because the upset bodily metabolism upsets
the mental processes. She was supported in this by Dr.Hamilton, a consultant
psychiatrist at Broadmoor. English was banned from driving for one year and given a
conditional discharge for a year. Her "treatment" was to see that she ate regularly and
avoided alcohol.
In 1988 the Court of Appeal substituted a verdict of manslaughter on the
grounds of diminished responsibility, after Dr.Dalton tendered evidence that the
defendant had been suffering from a conjunction of premenstrual tension and post-
natal depression when she had killed her mother'''.
A recent commentator has advocated treating P.M.S. as a condition justifying
an acquittal on the grounds of automatism 71 '. Because P.M.S. arises from a condition
internal to the sufferer this approach is unlikely to commend itself to the courts.
Nevertheless, he has proposed that there should be an acquittal on the grounds of
automatism where the effect of the state of disequilibrium is to create an alien
character or proclivities and he lists involuntary intoxication, post traumatic stress
disorder, battered woman's syndrome, severe pre-menstrual tension, hyperglycaemia,
hypoglycaemia and epilepsy, as conditions which should exclude liability on these
grounds'''. However, the law's position is that automatism is limited to unconscious
involuntary action and the recent decision of the House of Lords in Kingston' brings
home the necessity of disproving mens rea where an involuntary act is pleaded. The
diminished responsibility defence can be used, as it has been in the case of P.M.T., as
7113 R v Reynolds [1988] Crim.L.R.679
711 G.R.Sullivan "Involuntary Intoxication and Beyond" [1994] Crim.L.R.272 p.274
712 ibid
713 [1994] 3 All E.R.353. See further F.Boland "Involuntary Intoxication is Not a Defence" [1995] 4
Web J.C.L.Issues
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a medium for dealing with those cases where mens rea is present, sparing the
defendant from a verdict of murder and the mandatory life sentence.
The implications of treating P.M.S. as a species of automatism should be
obvious: If one is to classify any bodily disease where the metabolism upsets the
mental processes as meriting an acquittal on the ground of automatism then the
floodgates are likely to be opened. There are probably many cases where high
testosterone levels in men account for outbursts of violence. The implications of
P.M.T. as a defence are evident from Dalton's discovery that 49% of 156 newly
committed London prisoners had committed their crime in the paramenstruum (i.e.
four days before and the first four days of menstruation) 714 . As is evident from the
preceding discussion of the defence of automatism, the courts have been anxious to
impose constraints on the numbers who can plead it.
The feminist objection to recognition of P.M.T. as a legal excuse is that, while
on the surface, appearing to give recognition to the real and painful experience of an
individual woman, P.M.T. as a legal defence simply replicates traditional male
stereotypes of women as "victims of their biology"' and that the law is more
predisposed to explore psychiatric explanations for women's behaviour'.
Nonetheless, I am sure that most women would prefer to suffer the indignity of raising
P.M.T. in the hope of obtaining a manslaughter conviction under section 2, rather than
risk the mandatory life sentence which follows a conviction of murder.
Taylor and Dalton concede that science may never be able to say that a
criminal act was actually determined by an individual's hormonal condition rather
than merely influenced by it and that it is presently impossible to determine precisely,
to what degree conduct may be influenced by the premenstrual syndrome'''. This is
not a stumbling block to recognition of P.M.T. within the defence of diminished
714 Dalton and Taylor op cit p.274
715 David Fraser "Still Crazy After All These Years: A Critique of Diminished Responsibility" in
Stanley Yeo Partial Excuses to Murder (Sydney, 1991) p.122
716 Helena Kennedy Eve was Framed (London, 1992) p.104
717 Taylor and Dalton op cit pp.282 & 283
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responsibility, as diminished responsibility per se is a state of mind that reduces
liability to punishment. Admittedly, large numbers might have to be excused full
liability to punishment (Dalton estimates that the incidence of P.M.T. may be as high
as 40%718) but surely a diminished responsibility defence is more appropriate than an
acquittal on the grounds of automatism. Through a diminished responsibility verdict
treatment can be provided via a hospital order and if it is felt that there is some
measure of blameworthiness involved a prison sentence can be imposed to reflect that
level of culpability.
Allowing medical testimony on P.M.T. has paved the way for the reception of
medical evidence on bodily malfunctions which affect normal mental processes.
Despite a century's reluctance to listen to medical discoveries on insanity they are now
deferred to in the context of the diminished responsibility plea.
2.7 DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY AND PROVOCATION
The diminished responsibility defence has also stepped in to remedy the
limitations of the defence of provocation. It is not uncommon for the defence of
diminished responsibility to be combined with that of provocation. As the Criminal
Law Revision Committee has noted
"It is now possible for a defendant to set up a combined defence of
provocation and diminished responsibility, the practical effect being
that the jury may return a verdict of manslaughter if they take the view
that the defendant suffered from abnormality of mind and was
provoked. In practice this may mean that a conviction of murder will
be ruled out although the provocation was not such as would have
moved a person of normal mentality to
718 •
b •'id p.273
719 Working Paper on Offences Against the Person, (London, 1976)
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In theory, provocation and diminished responsibility are two separate and
distinct methods of reducing murder to manslaughter. Provocation requires a loss of
self-control in an ordinary person with a normal mind', while diminished
responsibility requires the accused to have been suffering from an abnormality of
mind. However, as Mackay has concluded'', neither juries nor trial judges seem to
have been unduly perturbed by the illogicality of the combined defence. His opinion is
that once expert evidence of mental abnormality, which manifests itself in inadequate
powers of control, emotional instability etc. is introduced, the jury cannot help but be
influenced by it in their assessment of both diminished responsibility and
provocation722 . In this way a defendant can receive the benefit of psychiatric evidence
that is denied to him when pleading provocation alone, in accordance with judgment
of the Court of Appeal in Turner723 . There the court excluded psychiatric testimony
on the defendant's likelihood to have been provoked on the basis that jurors do not
need expert witnesses to tell them how ordinary people who are not suffering from
any mental illness are likely to react to the stresses and strains of life. If the defendant
combines his plea of provocation with that of diminished responsibility, expert
evidence on the defendant's abnormality will throw light on the defendant's likelihood
to have been provoked. Furthermore, there seem to be indications that when the two
pleas are run concurrently the jury may be prepared to adopt a liberal attitude towards
each; perhaps reasoning that the alleged abnormality of mind renders a loss of self-
control more likely and by the same token, that an abnormality of mind partly
explicable through psychiatric testimony relating to frequent and severe provocative
incidents is equally acceptable to them 724 . This may ameliorate the position of battered
women, who often kill a violent or abusive partner after the provocative episode has
passed'. The rule in Duffy 726
 that the killing must result from a sudden and temporary
loss of self-control has frequently denied the defence of provocation to battered
720 The law presupposes normal powers of self-control
721 R.D.Mackay "Pleading Provocation and Diminished Responsibility Together" [1988] Crim.L.R 411
'122 The same view has been expressed by J.LI.J.Edwards in his article "Diminished Responsibility - A
withering Away of the Concept of Responsibility" in Mueller op cit p.327
723 R v Turner [1975] 1 Q.B.834
724 R.D.McKay "Pleading Provocation and Diminished Responsibility Together" op cit p.421
725 J.Horder Provocation and Responsibility (Oxford, 1992) p.188
726 [ 1 949]j 1 All E.R.932
-141-
women who have killed 727 . Despite the ruling of the Court of Appeal in Ahluwalia'
that sudden loss of self-control is no longer a fixed requirement of the provocation
defence but merely evidence of lack of premeditation, it seems that there is still a
presumption that the longer the delayed reaction to the provocation the more likely it
is that it was a revenge killing, rather than a killing under provocation. The combined
defence may, based on Mckay's analysis, make the defence of provocation more
credible where a woman suffering from a mental abnormality has killed her violent
partner after a period of time has elapsed.
Another advantage of the combined plea to the defendant who was provoked is
that it may well result in a more lenient outcome than a defence of provocation
alone" as the view of the Court of Appeal is that, in provocation cases, a term of
imprisonment is almost always necessary to expiate the offence'. Thus, combining a
provocation defence with the defence of diminished responsibility gives increased
flexibility to the courts in disposing of individuals who, for one reason or another, do
not appear to deserve the full rigour of the mandatory life sentence. It allows for
increased humanity in cases evoking sympathy and pity'' and enables the law to
reflect the moral judgment of the community.
-
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2.8 DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY AND INTOXICATION
When states of intoxication and diminished responsibility occur
concomitantly, the rules on diminished responsibility are swept aside and the policy
considerations that underlie the law on intoxication take precedence. These
considerations, as stated in the Law Commission's Consultation Paper on
Intoxication732, are that it would be "too dangerous, or too unjust, in terms of
unmerited acquittals or failure to control drunkards who threaten their fellow citizens,
to allow evidence of intoxication to be taken into account in determining mens rea".
In this section I will reveal the uncertain and varying application of the
diminished responsibility defence where intoxication is a factor, until the recent
decision of the Court of Appeal in Egan733 . Although the diminished responsibility
plea was frequently allowed in cases of drunkenness in nineteenth century Scotland,
often in the absence of any evident mental abnormality other than the state of
intoxication itself, this approach was abandoned in 1921 in favour of the rule in
Beard's734 case. This rule, which has been approved more recently in Majewski735,
allows intoxication to negate mens rea only in crimes requiring a specific intent.
The introduction of diminished responsibility into English law brought with it
a new challenge: how to deal with the offender who pleaded both diminished
responsibility and intoxication at the time of the offence. Was the Scottish approach to
be followed or could a more lenient formula be worked out? The decision to abandon
the principles of law on diminished responsibility in favour of the policy
considerations mentioned above is the focus of this section and is relevant to any
determination of whether the defence of diminished responsibility works well when
intoxication has contributed largely or in part.
--
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In Scotland following H.M. Advocate v Dingwal1736, an abnormal mental state
falling short of legal insanity which was induced by intoxication was capable of
giving rise to a verdict of diminished responsibility. There Lord Deas treated the
defendant's repeated attacks of delirium tremens as one of the relevant considerations
in allowing the jury to return a verdict of culpable homicide instead of murder.
Lord Deas took the same course of action in H.M. Advocate v Granger737
where the defendant was charged with the murder of a police constable while
suffering from delirium tremens, directing the jury that
"although the jury might not consider the panel in the present case to
have been insane, it did not follow that they must convict him of the
capital offence. He would say to them, as he said to the jury in
Dingwall's case at Aberdeen, that a weak or diseased state of mind, not
amounting to insanity, might competently form an element to be
considered in the question between murder and culpable homicide"738.
A succession of nineteenth century Scottish cases showed that henceforth,
intoxication by itself could reduce a verdict of murder to one of culpable homicide: In
H.M. Advocate v Margaret Roberts or Brown 739 an old woman was charged with
the murder of two infant grandchildren by placing them on a fire of live coals after
having taken a considerable quantity of alcohol. The medical evidence negatived the
defence of insanity. It was established that she was of intemperate habits and became
violent when intoxicated, although she was fond of her grandchildren. She told the
doctor who saw her after the occurrence that she thought something had entered the
house, and that she had struggled with it. Lord McLaren directed the jury that if they
were of opinion that the accused was watching the children with no evil intention, and
that under the influence of some momentary hallucination induced by drunkenness
she had placed the children on the fire, they were entitled to return a verdict of
736 (1867) 5 Irv.466
737 (1878) 4 Couper 86
738 ibid p.103
739 (1886) 1 White 103
-144-
culpable homicide. This they did (unanimously) and a sentence of ten years' penal
servitude was pronounced upon the accused.
However in the case of Thomas Ferguson', there was evidence of weakness
of mind caused by previous intemperance. The accused was, in fact, sober at the time
he had stabbed his wife. Although Lord Deas referred to Dingwall and to the principle
adumbrated therein, he pointed out that this was a much more difficult case to which
to apply that principle and law. Dingwall was habitually a much kinder husband than
the prisoner, and there was neither the deliberate preparation for the act, nor the
ferocity in its execution which the prisoner's act manifested here'. The jury duly
found the accused guilty of murder, although with a recommendation to mercy on
account of being a man of weak mind.
John McDonald' had killed his wife and another man by beating them with
a piece of wood and a piece of iron. The defence pleaded temporary insanity brought
on by alcoholism and further submitted that at the highest, the jury could only place
the crime within the category of culpable homicide. The Lord Justice Clerk held that
"while drunkenness is no excuse, yet if the means adopted were not of
themselves likely to lead to bad results, and if there was no malice
aforethought here, then the fact that the man was in a drunken state
may be considered in determining the question between murder and
culpable homicide. I should have had great difficulty in saying that, but
for the fact that I see from the full and clear citation of authorities
which we have had, that some of my brethren have taken that view in
some similar cases. I have some doubts whether or not it is consistent
with principle, but if you will keep clearly in view that drunkenness is
no excuse for what occurred here, then I am not inclined to set my own
opinion against that of the experienced Judges to whom I have referred,
and to debar you from considering whether a crime committed in this
740 H.M Advocate v Thomas Ferguson (1887) 4 Couper 552
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drunken state, without motive and without preconceived malice,
although murder, in the strict sense of the law, may not be viewed by
you as falling within the category of a case of aimless violence not
absolutely murderous"743.
Again in H.M. Advocate v David Kane 744, the jury were told by the same
Lord Justice Clerk that they could take the accused's intoxicated condition into
account in considering whether the killing of his wife was murder or culpable
homicide.
H.M. Advocate v John Graham 745 involved the trial of a defendant who had
shot his wife after a bout of drinking. Evidence was led of his devotion to her, that he
was a man of soft temperament and that he was subject at times to fits which left him
unconscious as a result of having been struck by lightning when a young man. The
Lord Justice Clerk left the issue of culpable homicide to the jury, illustrating the
comparisons with Dingwall's case.
In England the old and rigid rule that voluntary drunkenness cannot be taken
into account if it does not produce a state of insanity (albeit temporary 746), was
gradually relaxed in a series of cases spanning the nineteenth century, culminating
with D.P.P. v Beard. Here the House of Lords ruled that drunkenness is a defence to
crimes of specific intent only (as distinct from crimes of basic intent), provided it
prevents the accused from having that intent. Beard has since been followed in R v
Majewski. However, in the case of murder an alternative charge of manslaughter (a
crime of basic intent) will lie, to which intoxication is no defence.
The similarities between the Beard approach and the Scottish approach are so
striking that it is arguable that Beard was yet another case where diminished
responsibility was partially accepted in English law. One may look at the English
743 ibid pp.523 & 524
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approach to intoxication as creating a defence in cases of murder (a crime of specific
intent) which will result in a verdict of manslaughter (a basic intent crime) where the
accused was so intoxicated as to be incapable of forming the specific intent required
for murder. Beard was yet another example of judicial legislation intended to mitigate
the severity of the law on murder. However I have failed to treat this as a precursor to
the English defence of diminished responsibility as the "defence" component was not
limited to murder but to all crimes of specific intent. Furthermore, Beard involves
substantially more than simply whether the defendant had the specific intent required
for his crime. The major part of the law propounded in Beard is taken up with
constructing rules to ensure that the jury do not take intoxication into account in
determining whether the defendant had the mens rea required for crimes of basic
intent'.
In the early years of the twentieth century the Scottish defence of diminished
responsibility was restricted considerably, especially where intoxication formed part
of the defence and the English approach to intoxication, as stated in Beard, seems to
have found more favour with the Scottish judges.
In H.M. Advocate v Nicholas Page Campbell' the accused was charged
with the murder of his wife by beating her to death while in a state of intoxication.
The medical evidence was to the effect that he was not insane but that he had at one
time been injured in the head, and as a result he was abnormally susceptible to alcohol
and abnormally violent when under its influence. The defence contended that the
intoxicated condition of the accused at the time of the assault reduced the crime from
murder to culpable homicide. The Lord Justice Clerk, Scott Dickson, approving
D.P.P. v Beard as part of Scottish law, ruled that the accused was guilty of murder
unless at the time of the assault he was, owing to drunkenness, in such a condition that
he had not the intention and could not form the intention of doing serious injury to his
wife. The jury found the accused guilty of culpable homicide rather than murder and
he was sentenced to penal servitude for twelve years.
747 Intoxication and Criminal Liability Law Commission Consultation Paper No.127 op cit para.1.13
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The Scottish defence of diminished responsibility was restricted further in
H.M. Advocate v Savage'. The defendant was tried for the murder of a woman by
cutting her throat with a razor. Evidence was led on behalf of the accused that at one
time he had received an injury to his head and instances were given of his eccentric
conduct on several occasions. Evidence was also led to the effect that he was in the
habit of indulging to excess in alcohol and was constantly under its influence and that
at times he also drank methylated spirits and that when under their influence he was
violent and irresponsible. Witnesses also spoke of his being under the influence of
methylated spirits or alcohol on the night of the murder.
The Lord Justice-Clerk, Alness, first stated that the Scottish doctrine of
diminished responsibility must be applied with care and he then proceeded to delimit
its precise scope
"..there must be aberration or weakness of mind; that there must be
some form of mental unsoundness; that there must be a state of mind
which is bordering on, though not amounting to insanity; that there
must be a mind so affected that responsibility is diminished from full
responsibility to partial responsibility. .And I think one can see running
through the cases that there is implied. .that there must be some form of
mental disease." 750 .
Not surprisingly the jury unanimously found the accused guilty of capital
murder.
Beard and Campbell were approved some years later by Lord
Justice General Normand who ruled that the crime of murder is not reduced to the
crime of culpable homicide by the drunkenness of the accused, unless the drunkenness
749 [1923] J.C.49
750 ibid p.51
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is such as to render the accused incapable of forming the intent to kill or to do serious
injury at the time when the crime is committed'''.
Carraher v H.M. Advocate' concerned a psychopathic man
tried for murder by stabbing when drunk. The medical evidence stated that his
psychopathy would be aggravated when intoxicated. In this case it seems that
drunkenness was considered in isolation from the defendant's psychopathic
personality, rather than in association with it, and the defendant was convicted of
murder. On appeal, Lord Normand gave the same direction as he had given in
Kennedy. As neither psychopathic personality nor intoxication short of negativing
intention was sufficient to reduce a charge of murder to manslaughter, the defendant's
appeal was dismissed.
When diminished responsibility was introduced in England, therefore, it
seemed that intoxication would not afford a defence if Scottish law was followed. The
case of Di Duca 7" gave the Court of Appeal its first opportunity to settle the issue.
The defendant who was convicted of capital murder relied among other defences, on
that of diminished responsibility, the suggestion being that he was suffering from
abnormality of mind induced by "injury" within the meaning of 2(1) of the Homicide
Act 1957, namely the toxic effect of drink and that such abnormality so induced
substantially impaired his responsibility. After retirement, the jury returned and asked
the judge the following question: "if a man's mind is impaired by the effects of
alcohol, does the verdict come under that of manslaughter or murder?" The judge
thereupon gave them the well-recognised direction with regard to the effect of drink
on intent, without any reference to the effect of drink on diminished responsibility. On
appeal the Court of Appeal held that it is "very doubtful" if the transient effect of
drink, even if it does produce such a toxic effect on the brain, can amount to an
"injury" within section 2 and evaded coming to a definite decision by ruling that in
this case there was no evidence of abnormality of mind.
751 Kennedy v H.M Advocate [1944] J.C.171
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Not long after in R v Dowda11 754, Donovan J. stated that if a normal person got
drunk or drank to excess it would be no defence to say he lost his self-control or his
self-control was diminished. The section in the Homicide Act dealing with diminished
responsibility was not intended to be, nor was it, a charter for drunkards. He also
directed the jury that if they accepted that the defendant was suffering from an
abnormality of mind so that it substantially impaired his responsibility for the killing
then they should find him guilty of manslaughter instead of murder. Two doctors had
expressed the view that even if the defendant did not drink at all he would still suffer
from an abnormality of mind, and the jury duly found him guilty of manslaughter
under section 2.
Again in R v Clarke and King755, the Court of Appeal, although obiter,
asserted that their substitution of a manslaughter verdict
"must not be taken to be ruling that any abnormality of mind however
slight and producing however little impairment will constitute a
defence when that slight impairment is increased substantially by
drink: that was a matter which remained to be considered on another
occasion"756.
The first authoritative pronouncement on the law where diminished
responsibility and intoxication combine did not arrive until the decision of Fenton'
where five medical witnesses agreed that the defendant was suffering from an
abnormality of mind by virtue of his psychopathic personality, which had been
aggravated by drink on the night of the killings. The jury later disclosed in response to
an observation of the trial judge that they were unanimously of the view that the
killings would not have occurred if the appellant had not had so much to drink. The
judge, however, ruled that the effect of the alcohol consumed by the defendant was to
be ignored since the effect of the alcohol did not amount to an abnormality of mind
754 The Times 22 Jan.1960
755 [1962] Crim.L.R.836
756 ibid p.838
757 (1975) 61 Cr.App.R.261
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due to inherent causes. Accordingly, he directed the jury that they must convict of
murder if satisfied that the combined effect of the factors other than alcohol was
insufficient to amount to a substantial impairment in the mental responsibility of the
defendant.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that self-induced intoxication cannot of
itself produce an abnormality of mind due to inherent causes and that the trial judge
was not guilty of a misdirection when he told the jury to ignore the effect of alcohol. It
did, however, hold that a case may arise where the defendant proves such a craving
for drink or drugs as to produce in itself an abnormality of mind within the meaning
of section 2(1), sufficient to form the basis of a defence of diminished responsibility.
Undoubtedly, the court had in mind the case of the alcoholic who cannot resist
alcohol, as falling within the diminished responsibility defence. This issue was to
recur some years later in Tand_y758.
Not long afterwards Turnbull', charged with murder by stabbing, was
convicted of murder after the jury was directed that it was for them to decide,
weighing the evidence, which was the main factor for the killing, the defendant's
inherent defect of mind (due to psychopathy) or the effect of alcohol. This is an
entirely different direction to that given by the trial judge in Fenton since it requires a
causal connection between the defendant's abnormality of mind and the killing. This is
not a requirement of section 2 of the Homicide Act. On this view diminished
responsibility per se would no longer be an exculpatory state as it is where
intoxication is not in issue, unless the jury is satisfied that it caused the killing. The
trial judge also asked the jury "[Nave the defence satisfied you that it is more
probable than not that Turnbull would have acted as he had on this night even had he
not taken drink?" thus abandoning the requirement of causation and asking a question
which is by its very nature, unanswerable.
758 (1988) 87 Cr.App.R.45
759 (1977) 65 Cr.App.R.242
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On appeal it was held that the jury had been properly directed, but then the
Court of Appeal went on to hold that the defendant must show that his abnormality of
mind substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts and omissions
notwithstanding the effect of the alcohol in causing loss of self-control, which is the
direction that was given in Fenton. On this approach the jury would have to be
directed that the defence is made out only if the defendant has proved that he would
have been of diminished responsibility in the absence of intoxicants.
Disregarding evidence of intoxication when deciding the issue of diminished
responsibility gives expression to the principle underlying Beard and Majewski that a
person who voluntarily choses to take an intoxicant which causes him to cast off the
restraints of reason, conscience and volition should not afterwards be permitted to rely
on his self-induced incapacitation when harm is caused to others. The concern
underlying Turnbull and Fenton is that it would be only too easy for a defendant
both to claim and to succeed in a claim that his responsibility was diminished because
of intoxication760 . The result of giving effect to these policy considerations through
the medium of the diminished responsibility defence is that juries will have to be
directed to take intoxication into account for the purpose of deciding whether the
defendant had the specific intent required for murder (in accordance with Beard and
Majewski) and to exclude intoxication from consideration in deciding whether his
responsibility was diminished. This approach is both inconsistent and unprincipled as
it treats intoxication as relevant to one aspect of mens rea but not relevant to another
(that of diminished responsibility)'.
Further objections to the Fenton approach are the complexity that a
hypothetical issue of this nature creates and the accompanying substantial risk of
confusion and error on the jury's part. Although speaking of Majewski, the
observations of the Law Commission that "it is difficult to think that it operates in
760 F.Boland "Intoxication and Criminal Liability" (1996) 60 JCL 100 p.101
761 Insanity is sometimes treated as connoting absence of mens rea presumably because although mens
rea may be strictly present mens rea is viewed as requiring a guilty healthy mind. On this analysis
diminished responsibility also connotes absent mens rea.
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practice other than by its detailed rules being substantially ignored" 762
 and "[t]he
strong possibility is, therefore, that the Majewski rule works only because it is not
properly applied; and that juries deal with cases not by applying the full complexities
of the rule, and asking the hypothetical questions that it seems to demand, but by a
more simple approach" 763
 are reservations that apply with equal force to a combined
defence of intoxication and diminished responsibility. On a philosophical level one
may object on the ground that an inquiry into the subjective mental state of a
defendant can only be into his actual mental state and not into what that state might or
would have been in different circumstances'.
In Gittens765 the defendant who had been suffering from depression and had
taken alcohol and drugs, murdered his wife and then raped and murdered his step-
daughter. He sought to raise the defence of diminished responsibility. The jury were
directed that they must decide whether the substantial cause of the appellant's conduct
was due to abnormality of mind due to inherent causes or whether it was due to drink
or drugs. On appeal, defence counsel contended that that was not the problem which
the jury were required to decide under section 2(1) of the Homicide Act, 1957.
Doubting whether Turnbull went as far as asking the jury to decide what was the
substantial cause of the defendant's behaviour, the Court of Appeal held per curiam
that the direction approved in Turnbull, taken as a whole, was correct but was not a
direction which should be followed in the future. Instead the Court of Appeal
approved the approach in Fenton, saying that since abnormality of mind induced by
drink or drugs was not, generally speaking, due to inherent causes and was not,
therefore, within section 2(1), the jury should consider whether the combined effect of
other matters which did fall within the subsection amounted to such abnormality of
mind as substantially impaired the defendant's mental responsibility.
__.--
762 Intoxication and Criminal Liability, Consultation Paper No.127 op cit para.3.24
763 ibid para.4.6
764 ibid para.3.20
765 (1984) 79 Cr.App.R.272
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So far the decision appears straightforward but Professor Smith's commentary
on the case has added another layer of complexity to this area of the law when he
claimed that
"If the jury are to ignore the effect of drink or drugs they necessarily
have to answer a hypothetical question, or perhaps two such questions.
If the defendant had not taken drink and killed would he, because of
the inherent causes have been under diminished responsibility? It may
be, however that the jury will be of the opinion that, if the defendant
had not taken drink or drugs, he would not have killed at all. In that
case, it appears that the defence would not be open"7'.
He concludes that the two questions for the jury in logical sequence are
Have the defence satisfied you on the balance of probabilities that, if the defendant
had not taken drink-
(i) He would have killed as he in fact did? And
(ii) He would have been under diminished responsibility when he did so?'
The requirement that the defendant prove that he would have killed in the
absence of intoxicants formed no part of the ratio in Gittens. Presumably, it is the fact
that diminished responsibility only arises as a defence where there has been a killing
which has led Professor Smith to ask this question. Unfortunately, the true answer to
Professor Smith's hypothetical question can never be conclusively proved as this is a
situation which has never happened. Its result is that the risk of jury confusion is
compounded even further than under the Fenton approach768.
Admittedly the question may be relevant in the case of irresistible impulses, to
the issue of the defendant's abnormality of mind in the absence of intoxicants and an
inquiry into whether the defendant would have had an irresistible impulse - to kill had
766 [1984] Crim.L.R.553 p.554
767 ibid
768 F.Boland "Intoxication and Criminal Liability" op cit p.103
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he not taken drink or dru gs may shed light on his probable mental condition in the
absence of intoxicants769. However, in other cases such as mental illness or mental
retardation this question gives us no insight into the defendant's likely state of mind in
the absence of intoxicants and the jury is likely to answer it in the negative, denying
the defence of diminished responsibility to an otherwise abnormal defendant with
substantially impaired mental responsibility'". Professor Smith's approach may thus
involve the suspension of the diminished responsibility defence when a defendant
cannot prove to the satisfaction of the jury that he would have killed in the absence of
intoxicants771.
Nevertheless, Professor Smith's approach has been approved by the Court of
•Appeal in R v Atkinson ' '. In his commentary to this case Professor Smith
acknowledges that the task of the jury in answering two hypothetical questions is far
from simple and that the answers given must be somewhat speculative, but he
concludes that the present policy of the law of ignoring evidence of voluntary
intoxication renders hypothetical questions inevitable.
Professor Smith's commentary has arisen again for consideration in Egan.
There the trial judge invited the jury to consider whether
(1) Drink or abnormality was the cause of the killing
(2) Drink produced a disinhibiting effect upon the defendant which caused him to kill
when otherwise he might not have.
The defendant appealed inter alio on the ground that the judge erred in
directing the jury that if they thought no one could tell whether the murder would
have happened without the intoxication then the defendant had failed in his defence of
diminished responsibility. Defence counsel contended that the approval in Atkinson
of Professor J.C.Smith's commentary on Gittens was obiter and misguided and that
769 • •
and
770 See G.R.Sullivan "Intoxicants and Diminished Responsibility" [1994] Crim.L.R.156
771 F.Boland "Intoxication and Criminal Liability" op cit p.103
772 [1985] Crim.L.R.314
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his suggestions were irreconcilable with the ratio of Gittens itself, which was that the
issue for the jury was not one of choice between causes or substantial causes of the
killing but whether the abnormality of mind substantially impaired the defendant's
mental responsibility.
The Court of Appeal in Egan held that far from being obiter, Professor
Smith's questions were central to the court's decision in Atkinson. Furthermore, the
court felt that his questions were "most appropriate and ought to be applied
generally'''. The court held that there was no misdirection by the trial judge and
concluded that the judgments in Gittens and Atkinson should be regarded together as
"representing the high authority on the troublesome subject of diminished
responsibility where drink is a factor'''. Unfortunately, words such as these fail to
emphasise the responsibility of the law on intoxication for producing the present
unsatisfactory state of affairs and one may be forgiven for thinking that the blame lies
with the defence of diminished responsibility775.
In his commentary on Egan, Professor Smith concedes that a jury may find it
"particularly odd" that the defendant should have to prove that he would have
committed the offence if he had not been intoxicated. He attributes this "oddity" partly
to the fact that the onus of proving diminished responsibility is on the defendant and
to the law's refusal to take intoxication into account in determining whether a person's
responsibility is diminished although that intoxication may have diminished his
responsibility in fact. He also claims that whenever a jury is directed to ignore some
logically probative evidence of which it is aware, it is required to answer a
hypothetical question"'. Unfortunately, Professor Smith appears to have overlooked
the difficulties that arise from the situation where a defendant is clearly of diminished
responsibility in the absence of intoxicants but where he cannot prove that he would
have killed in the absence of drink and drugs, thus involving the suspension of the
773 (1992) 95 Cr.App.R.278 p.286
774 ibid p.288
775 F.Boland "Intoxication and Criminal Liability" op cit p.103
776 [1993] Crim.L.R.131 p.132
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diminished responsibility defence and the principle underlying it, that a man is less
blameworthy when his responsibility is diminished.
It appears from Tandy that in the case of abnormality of mind arising from
alcoholism alone, if the defendant has voluntarily chosen to take his first drink of the
day he cannot maintain that the resulting abnormality is due to disease. In support of
this view the trial judge asserted
"The choice [of the appellant whether to drink or not to drink on Wed
March 5 1986] may not have been easy but. .if it was there at all it is
fatal to this defence, because the law simply will not allow a drug-user,
whether the drug be alcohol or any other, to shelter behind the toxic
effects of the drug which he or she need not have used"' and later
"..but clearly she did take drink on March 5, and if she did that as a
matter of choice, she cannot say in law or in common sense that the
abnormality of mind which resulted was induced by disease'''.
The Court of Appeal approved this direction and stated that section 2(1) would
not be available unless the defendant was a "chronic alcoholic" either with gross
impairment of her judgment and emotional responses or where her drinking had
become involuntary so that she was no longer able to resist the impulse to drink.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court of Appeal noted that the defendant had chosen to
drink vodka rather than her customary drink of cinzano and that she had been able to
stop drinking although her supply of vodka was not exhausted.
McAuley describes as "suspect" the exclusion of individuals suffering from
abnormality of mind due to drinking, where the initial consumption was voluntary'''.
He argues that if the logic of the analogous insanity rule is that the defendant has a
good defence because his defect of reason was caused by a supervening illness, rather
777 (1988) 87 Cr.App.R.45 p.49
778 ibid
779 F.McAuley op cit p.164
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than the drinking that gave rise to the illness, it seems to follow that a Tandy-type
defendant, whose abnormality of mind was similarly induced, should have a good
defence of diminished responsibility notwithstanding the fact that the supervening
illness was brought on by the voluntary consumption of alcohol'''. Since it is clear
that a defendant who drinks in order to get himself into a state in which he knows he
will kill is guilty of murder if he kills in that state", McAuley submits that there is no
need for a special rule barring the defence in cases where the defendant's illness was
triggered by voluntary intoxication'. It appears harsh to exclude alcoholics like
Tandy since they will usually consume alcohol before withdrawal symptoms arise or
become distressing'. The alcoholic who waits until they became intolerable, leading
to involuntary drinking is arguably no less culpable and therefore no more entitled to a
diminished responsibility defence than the alcoholic who drinks before the onset of
withdrawal symptoms in order to avoid their effect.
The judgment of the Court of Appeal in Tandy sets a very high standard for a
diminished responsibility defendant to meet. As shown above, the psychopath is
entitled to a diminished responsibility defence if he had substantial difficulty
controlling his sadistic impulses. Why, therefore, should an alcoholic not be entitled
to a defence of diminished responsibility if he had substantial difficulty controlling his
impulse to drink?
The Criminal Law Revision Committee's 14th Report on Offences Against the
Person784 has recommended that "evidence of voluntary intoxication adduced in
relation to a defence should be treated in the same way as evidence of voluntary
intoxication adduced to negative the mental element", in order to rectify the
difficulties occasioned by the present law on intoxication. The C.L.R.C. was,
however, assuming the continued existence of the Majewski rule, so that by virtue of
their recommendation, intoxication could be taken into account in determining
780 ibid pp.164 & 165
781 ,4.G. for Northern Ireland v Gallagher [1963] A.C.340
782 F.McAuley op cit p.165
783 G.R.Sullivan "Intoxicants and Diminished Responsibility" op cit p.57
784 Criminal Law Revision Committee 14th Report Offences Against the Person Cmnd 7844 op cit
para.277
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whether the defendant was of diminished responsibility (which only applies to
murder, a crime of specific intent) but could not be taken into account in relation to
defences applying to an offence of basic intent. This would lead to unsatisfactory and
inconsistent results, thus perpetuating the difficulties which at present pervade the law
on intoxication and a preferable solution would be to follow the approach adopted by
the High Court of Australia in O'Connor' whereby evidence of intoxication is
treated like any other evidence in deciding whether a defendant had mens rea. A
logical extension of this principle would be to treat intoxication as part of the relevant
evidence in deciding the issue of diminished responsibility or any other criminal law
defence. The O'Connor approach which also applies in New Zealand, Hawaii and
Indiana has proved satisfactory and its application in Australia has shown that the
fears on which Majewski is based are unfounded'''. However, this would not alter the
Court of Appeal's requirement that an alcoholic defendant's initial consumption of
alcohol be involuntary.
Arguably, the Majewski principle filters out the most deserving cases of an
intoxication defence, and the assurance of a manslaughter conviction to those who kill
without specific intent has the same practical result as a successful plea of diminished
responsibility, making the criticisms voiced above are merely academic.
Theoretically, the difficulty which arises when hospitalisation is necessary may be
overcome by transfer to hospital from prison of those in need of psychiatric treatment.
In reality however, the waiting list is long and transfer may take years '''. Furthermore,
there are, undoubtedly, mentally abnormal murderers who, although intoxicated at the
time of the killing, are deserving of a defence of diminished responsibility and who do
have the specific intent required for murder when they kill.
The legal position of a defendant who is surreptitiously administered drink or
drugs and who kills while suffering from diminished responsibility due to a
combination of intoxicants and another abnormality of mind has yet to be settled. Will
785 (1980) 54 A.L.J.R.349
786 See The Law Commission Intoxication and Criminal Liability Consultation Paper No.127 op cit
?p.59-61
87 This is discussed further in section 3.10 below
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the defendant be required to prove that he would have killed in the absence of
intoxicants or will he have the slightly less onerous burden of proving that he would
have been of diminished responsibility without the influence of drink or drugs? The
recent decision of the House of Lords in Kingston which has signalled a return to
common law principles 788, suggests that the principle underlying the defence of
diminished responsibility will be given expression where involuntary intoxication has
contributed in part to the defendant's abnormality of mind.
Because of the Legislature's failure to delimit the scope of the defence of
diminished responsibility and the law's antagonism to evidence of intoxication, the
elucidation of the law where intoxication and diminished responsibility occur
concomitantly has been slow. The present position, requiring a defendant to prove that
he would have killed even in the absence of intoxicants and that he would have been
suffering from diminished responsibility regardless of their effect, is unsatisfactory for
its complexity and the impossible question which it asks the jury. The further
requirement in the case of alcoholism, that the initial consumption of alcohol be
involuntary, sets a very high standard for the defendant in a diminished responsibility
trial to meet and is inconsistent with the standard of control expected of the
psychopath. The problems discussed above arise from the nature of the present law on
intoxication and the law's antagonism to the defendant who mounts a defence based
on intoxication. These problems do not stem from any defect in the diminished
responsibility defence, which works well in cases where intoxication is not involved.
As the Majewski principle is accorded precedence where intoxication and diminished
responsibility occur together, whatever solution is adopted to remedy the difficulties
of a joint diminished responsibility/intoxication defence must have its origin in the
law of intoxication'''.
788 F.Boland "Involuntary Intoxication is Not a Defence" op cit
789 See F.Boland " Intoxication and Criminal Liability" op cit for a discussion of the Law Commission's
recent proposals for reform of this area of the law.
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2.9 CONCLUSION
The above discussion reveals that, despite its hasty introduction, the operation
of the diminished responsibility defence has been successful in all cases except where
intoxication and diminished responsibility combine - where its only failing is that it is
sacrificed to the supposed lesser evil of excluding evidence of intoxication or treating
a defendant under its effects more harshly. In the course of demonstrating the merits
of the defence, this Chapter has examined the diminished responsibility defence in
relation to the other criminal law defences of automatism, insanity and provocation. In
reality, however, the defence applies across a vast spectrum of human behaviour. "An
"abnormal state of despair" induced by the need to care for an imbecile child or by a
diagnosis of cancer in a beloved relative, leading in each case to a "mercy killing"; "a
reactive depressed state" associated with the breaking of an engagement or the
discovery of unfaithfulness in a spouse; "mixed emotions of depression,
disappointment or exasperation" causing a "lack of control" over the defendant's
actions in similar circumstances; inability to hold down a job; even an attempt at
suicide after the commission of the offence charged - all of these have been adduced
as at least contributory evidence of diminished responsibility'.
By remedying the limitations of the criminal law defences of automatism and
provocation, diminished responsibility has emerged as a vehicle for humanely dealing
with murderers when the circumstances surrounding the killing arouse strong feelings
of sympathy and the defendant is not felt to merit the mandatory life sentence and the
stigma of a murder conviction. The defence has also alleviated the pressure on the
criminal law to recognise conditions like P.M.T. as exculpatory excuses resulting in
an outright acquittal. There are clear limits to the law's ability to recognise social and
emotional pressures without denying its own rationale as a punitive mechanism
relying on individual responsibility'''. By hiving off the likes of infanticide, killing
during domestic strife and mercy killing into a category of crime with a less severe
penalty than for murder and by presenting the issue in medical terms, the law has been
-
7" Lady Wooton "Diminished Responsibility: a Layman's View" (1960) 76 L.Q.R.224 p.229
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able to maintain a Punitive stance to the social problem, laced with an unthreatening
show of compassion792.
The defence has also remedied several shortcomings of the McNaghten Rules.
Its discretionary disposal consequences which provide a vehicle for responding to the
individual defendant's needs has meant that defendants have chosen to plead
diminished responsibility over insanity in order to avoid mandatory indefinite
hospitalisation. The defence has also dealt with abnormalities of mind which failed to
meet the standard of McNaghten madness and which would otherwise have led to the
mandatory life sentence (or capital punishment) because of the law's failure to
recognise the abnormality in question as an excusing condition.
The recognition of irresistible impulses as a species of diminished
responsibility has ended over a century of controversy over the McNaghten Rules and
resolved the medico/legal conflict that pervaded discussions of the insanity defence.
The resolution of this conflict stems from the deference that the diminished
responsibility defence shows to the medical viewpoint of abnormality of mind. The
psychiatrist's view is accepted in the 80% or so cases where the judge accepts the
medical testimony outright and the case does not go to trial. In the remaining 20% of
cases the defence has emerged as a forum for psychiatric testimony which is given
greater credence than previously under the Rules. At the same time the court retains
its seisin of the case'. In exceptional circumstances the case may still be sent to trial
despite unanimous psychiatric evidence of mental abnormality'". Dell found that
1.5% of cases went to trial because the judge or prosecution thought it appropriate for
the issue to be decided by a jury, even though the medical evidence was unanimously
in favour of a diminished responsibility finding'. The result has been the emergence
of the legal and medical professions from a state of cold war to an entente cordiale.
Satisfaction with the diminished responsibility defence has been such that it has
792 ibid
793 ibid p.190
794 An example is the case of Peter Sutcliffe discussed in H.A.Prins "Diminished Responsibility and the
Sutcliffe Case: Legal, Psychiatric and Social Aspects (A 'Layman's' View)" (1983) 23 Med, Sci & L.17
795 S.Dell Murder into Manslaughter op cit p.26
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entirely usurped the McNaghten Rules. Figures for 1993 show that while one
homicide defendant was found insane, fifty three were found guilty of diminished
responsibility manslaughter796 . This has led to almost a disappearance of the old
McNaghten debate. As Hart has commented
"the change made by the introduction of diminished responsibility was
both meagre and half-hearted. Nonetheless it marked the end of an era
in the criticism of the law concerning the criminal responsibility of the
mentally abnormal"797.
796 Criminal Statistics, 1993, table 4.2
797 H.L.A. Hart op cit p.193
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CHAPTER THREE
THE IRISH POSITION ON INSANITY
"The impossibility of guaranteeing that a new rule will always be
infallible cannot justify continued adherence to an outmoded standard,
sorely at variance with enlightened medical and legal scholarship'''.
3.1 THE MCNAGHTEN RULES AND IRRESISTIBLE IMPULSE
The success of the English diminished responsibility defence in abating the
controversy over the insanity defence and resolving the medico-legal conflict raises
the question of its necessity in Irish law. The obvious starting point is the Irish
insanity defence, whose controversial nature has surpassed that of its English
counterpart. In this Chapter I will examine the evolution of the insanity defence in
Ireland to encompass both the McNaghten Rules and a modified form of the defence
of irresistible impulse, whose origins have been discussed in Chapter One. After
tracing the Irish constitutional developments which the metamorphosis of the insanity
defence mirrored, I will focus on its unsatisfactory and controversial nature. Particular
emphasis will be placed on its questionable constitutionality and its failure to conform
with the European Convention on Human Rights.
In recent years there have been several calls, in particular from the Judiciary,
for a diminished responsibility defence in Ireland. Having illustrated the increased
weight of opinion in favour of an Irish defence of diminished responsibility, I will
examine the failure of both Judiciary and Legislature to provide for this defence. After
looking at several justifications for a defence of diminished responsibility,
philosophical and other, I will conclude by examining how an Irish diminished
responsibility defence can improve on its English counterpart. This involves a
consideration of its wording and other procedural matters including disposal.
798 US v Freeman (1966) 357 F.2d.606 p.624
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Following independence in 1922, it was uncertain to what extent Ireland was
bound by the McNaghten Rules. The Act of Union, 1800 had established the House of
Lords in Westminster as the lawful forum for final appeals from Ireland. The Rules
were laid down not long after in 1843. In Chapter One I have looked at the challenge
which was mounted to the McNaghten Rules from the 1850's and onwards by the
notion of impulsive insanity. By the first decade of this century the notion of
irresistible impulse had shaken the previously firm foundation of the Rules. Despite
the acceptance of irresistible impulse in several English Court of Appeal decisions,
the House of Lords had remained silent on the issue. Whether the Rules were binding
on the Irish courts by virtue of the doctrine of stare decisis, or whether they were free
to adopt irresistible impulse (which had yet to be rejected by the English Court of
Appeal in a series of cases spanning the years 1921-1936), had yet to be decided by
the Irish courts.
It was not until 1933 however, that irresistible impulse first arose for
consideration in the Irish courts'. The jury returned a special verdict on a homicide
charge although Sullivan P. categorically rejected that irresistible impulse was a
defence in Irish Law.
The same issue arose again in A.G. v O'Brien'. O'Brien had shot and killed
his sister-in-law's husband in the presence of witnesses. At his trial he claimed that he
had no recollection of anything that had happened at the relevant time and medical
evidence was tendered to this effect. He was convicted of murder and appealed on the
ground that the trial judge had erred in law by not putting the defence of irresistible
impulse to the jury.
After discussing the McNaghten Rules, the fact that the questions submitted to
the judges were limited to delusions and the dissatisfaction of both legal and medical
professions with their application to the whole field of insanity, Kennedy C.J. in the
..n......
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Court of Criminal Appeal considered Article 28 of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen's
Digest of the Criminal Law, where he stated
"No act is a crime if the person who does it is at the time when it is done prevented
(either by defective mental power or) by any disease affecting his mind
(a) from knowing the nature and quality of his act or
(b) from knowing that the act is wrong; (or
(c) from controlling his own conduct, unless the absence of the power of control has
been produced by his own default)
"But an act may be a crime although the mind of a person who does it is affected by
disease, if such disease does not in fact produce upon his mind one or other of the
effects above mentioned in reference to that act".
Despite the presence of a footnote where Sir James states that the parts of the
article bracketed are doubtful and the recent body of judicial authority in England
which weighed against recognition of irresistible impulse as a defence, Kennedy C.J.
held
"we have not here an occasion to decide the question whether in law, if
established in fact, irresistible impulse affords a defence to a criminal
charge. The determination of that question must remain for a suitable
occasion".
In the course of his judgment Kennedy C.J. recognised the confines of the
Judiciary who can only ascertain and declare the law as it is and he stipulated that
change in the law could only come from the "Legislature competent to alter or adapt it
in the light of the latest science and of the conditions of the time in which we live" 802 .
Although Kennedy C.J. commented that the evidence for the defence was
directed substantially towards satisfying the conditions of the Rule in MeNaghten's
sol ibid p.272
802 ibid p.271
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case he did not approve MeNaghten as part of Irish law. In this manner O'Brien left
open the possibility of change by leaving the status of the defence of irresistible
impulse uncertain.
O'Brien was followed shortly afterwards by A.G. v Patrick Boylan'.
Boylan who slit his girlfriend's throat, appeared to know both the nature and quality of
his act and its legal wrongness from words spoken just after the incident: "I have cut
her throat. Leave me alone, I want to get in to kiss her before she dies" and " I know
what I done, I will swing for it". In his statement to the police Boylan claimed to
remember nothing from just prior to the incident. At his trial he claimed that his
memory loss included the period of detention in custody and accordingly, the above
statement to the police.
Three medical witnesses testified that a brain injury which the defendant had
sustained six years before could have diminished his power of control when combined
with alcohol and emotional stress. One witness felt that these factors could prevent
him from knowing what he was doing (ie. the nature and quality of his act) and
another felt that these would prevent him from knowing that what he was doing was
wrong. That the medical evidence was vague and unconvincing is obvious from the
question asked by the trial judge, O'Byrne J., to one of the medical witnesses:-
"As I understand your evidence, Doctor, and please correct me if I am
wrong, it amounts entirely to this: the man at the time he did the act
may have known what he was doing, or he may not, and he may have
known it was wrong, or he may not, and I am not in a position to tell
you one way or the other?"
The Doctor's answer was "yes"'.
Not surprisingly, the accused was found guilty and sentenced to death. Boylan
applied to the Court of Criminal Appeal for leave to appeal, contending inter alia that
803 [1937] I.R.449
804 ibid pp.459 & 460
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the trial judge had misdirected the jury by telling them that in considering if the
prisoner was insane at the time of committing the act, they had only to determine if he
knew the nature and quality of the act and that the act was wrong. The accused also
contended that the trial judge should have told the jury that if they were satisfied that
by reason of mental disease Boylan was prevented from controlling his actions, that
would establish insanity even if the accused knew the nature and quality of his act and
knew that he was doing wrong.
Sullivan C.J., speaking on behalf of the Court of Criminal Appeal, held that
there was no evidence from which the jury could have found that the accused was
incapable of controlling his act and that no such evidence could be given by him if it
was true, as he alleged, that he had forgotten everything relating to the murder. In so
deciding, the court declined to express any opinion on the question whether, if
irresistible impulse had been established, it would afford any defence to the charge.
Sullivan C.J. commented that if the jury had accepted the evidence of
Dr.Rutherford they would have held that the accused did not know what he was doing,
and they would have found that he was "insane" as defined by the judge in his charge.
If they accepted Dr.Coyne's theory they would also have found that he was insane, as
Dr.Coyne stated that if the accused was mildly confused that would not prevent him
from knowing what he was doing, but that it would definitely prevent him from
knowing that what he was doing was wrong. Nonetheless, the Chief Justice did not
explicitly approve McNaghten as part of Irish law.
A flurry of constitutional law cases followed the decision in Boylan and these
throw some light on the status of the McNaghten Rules in Ireland. In the first of these,
Exham v Beamish', Gavan Duffy J. suggested that only those decisions which had
been accepted as being part of Irish law before 1922 were binding on Irish judges by
virtue of the doctrine of stare decisis. The number of years which had elapsed
between the McNaghten decision and independence makes it likely that the Rules had
been adopted as part of Irish law in at least some pre-1922 decision and so would
8 °5 [1939] I.R.336
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satisfy Gavan Duffy J's. requirement. Gavan Duffy J. then provided for an exception
to the principle of precedent "[i]f, before the Treaty, a particular law was administered
in a way so repugnant to the common sense of our citizens as to make the law look
ridiculous" 806 . In such circumstances, he noted,
"it is not in the public interest that we should repeat the mistake. Our
new High Court must mould its own cursus curiae; in so doing I hold
that it is free, indeed bound, to decline to treat any such absurdity in
the machinery of administration as having been imposed on it as part
of the law of the land".
Any impetus that this dictum might have provided for declining to follow or
altering the McNaghten Rules was dealt a blow by the Supreme Court judgments of
Maguire C.J. and Black J. in Boylan v Dublin Corporation" where they considered
all pre-1922 decisions to be binding. This view was taken soon afterwards by
Murnaghan J. in Minister for Finance and A.G. v O 'Brien" These two decisions
are likely to have provided final confirmation that the McNaghten Rules were the test
of insanity in Irish law.
Another attempt to establish irresistible impulse as part of Irish law was made
in The People (A.G.) v Micheal Manning" where the accused was convicted of
murdering a sixty five year old woman by stuffing grass in her mouth in the course of
an unsuccessful attempt at rape upon her. Evidence was given that he had consumed
about eight and a half pints of stout prior to the incident. In the absence of medical
evidence of insanity, the trial judge directed the jury that it was difficult to see on
what evidence they could bring in a special verdict of guilty but insane within the
McNaghten Rules. When the jury retired, counsel for the accused made several
objections to the charge and requested the judge to recall the jury and tell them that
806 ibid p.349
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irresistible impulse was a possible defence. This the trial judge refused to do and the
jury found the accused guilty of murder.
The accused applied to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal on the ground
inter alia that the judge erred in law in not leaving the defence of irresistible impulse
to the jury. Maguire J., speaking on behalf of Haugh and Dixon JJ., held that the
insanity defence was put clearly and adequately by the trial judge to the jury and that
"there was no evidence on which this defence (if it is a defence in law)
could have been left to the jury. .The determination of the question
whether or not this defence is available in law must be left, as it was in
the case of A.G. v 0' Brien..for a suitable occasion if and when it
arises"' I.
In The People (A.G.) v Vincent McGrath' the accused was convicted of
murder in the Central Criminal Court before Budd J. and a jury. He had walked up to
the deceased and struck a blow on his head with his fist, in which he held a gimlet.
One medical witness expressed the opinion that the defendant was suffering
from mental disease as a result of which, at the time he did the act, he passed from his
conscious mind under control to his subconscious mind not under control and that the
defendant did not know the nature and quality of the act. The second witness felt that
the accused knew the nature and quality of his act but did not know that what he was
doing was legally wrong. Controversy later arose from his words "What was in his
mind God only knows. I don't know. .It was a momentary impulsive act not backed by
reason for control or discrimination" and from his description of the act as "an insane
or irresistible thing".
On appeal against his conviction for murder, the Court of Criminal Appeal
noted that the trial judge had allowed the jury to consider irresistible impulse to the
811 ibid pp.158 & 159
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same extent as that expressed by Lord Tucker in A.G. for South Australia v
Brown', i.e. as evidence of insanity within the McNaghten Rules, but they declined
to approve Brown as they had not been called on to do so. The court asserted that
neither of the mental specialists examined had expressed the opinion that the accused
acted on an uncontrollable impulse and that there was no evidence upon which the
jury would be entitled to consider irresistible impulse per se in this case.
Once again the Court of Criminal Appeal had evaded the issue but it appeared
that the Legislature might at last take action when the Programme of Law Reform
presented in 1962 promised a review of the McNaghten Rules.
"It has been suggested that the rules, which were laid down in 1843,
require to be modified in the light of improved knowledge of mental
disorders. This is an exceedingly complex matter and may require
investigation by an expert committee. It may be that it will be found on
investigation that the present rules, defective though they are, do in fact
operate or are made to operate so as to cause no injustice to accused
persons relying on insanity as a defence, and that more harm than good
would be done by amending them; but at any rate the matter is
important enough to deserve thorough examination1"14.
However the restriction of the death penalty for murder by the Criminal Justice
Act, 1964, removed the sense of urgency and no expert committee was appointed'''.
In 1965 in the State (Quinn) v Ryan', the Supreme Court broke with the
tradition of stare decisis by declaring unconstitutional, a statutory provision which it
had previously declared constitutional in the case of the State (Duggan) v 
In the course of his judgment (in which the other members of the court concurred),
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Walsh J. rejected the proposition that the Supreme Court, in interpreting the
Constitution of 1937, would be bound to follow previous decisions, stating
"this Court is the creation of the Constitution and is not in any sense
the successor in Ireland of the House of Lords. .1 reject the submission
that because upon the foundation of the State our Courts took over an
English legal system and the Common Law that the Courts must be
deemed to have adopted and should now adopt an approach to
Constitutional questions conditioned by English judicial methods and
English legal training which despite their undoubted excellence were
not fashioned for interpreting written constitutions or reviewing the
constitutionality of legislation".
Then in A.G. and Another v Ryan's Car Hire Co. Ltd' the Supreme Court
extended their more liberal approach beyond the confines of constitutional issues
which a strict interpretation of The State (Quinn) v Ryan suggested820. Kingsmill
Moore asserted
"It seems clear that there can be no legal obligation on this Court to
accept "stare decisis" as a rule binding upon it just because the House
of Lords accepted it. .A decision which is only purported to affect the
House of Lords could not, by virtue of Article 73 of the Constitution of
1922, have been carried over into our law so as to bind the Supreme
Court set up by that constitution; and if that Supreme Court in fact
adopted the rule (as it would seem to have done..) any such
determination could only bind that Court and would not under Art 50
of our present Constitution be binding on the new Supreme Court
created by Art 34,4 of our present Constitution and the Courts
(Establishment and Constitution) Act, 1961"821.
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The learned judge was of the opinion that an approach less rigid than that of
the House of Lords was more appropriate for the Irish Supreme Court:
"In my opinion the rigid rule of stare decisis must in a Court of
ultimate resort give place to a more elastic formula. Where such a
Court is clearly of opinion that an earlier decision was erroneous it
should be at liberty to refuse to follow it, at all events in exceptional
cases" 822.
The above decisions untied the Court's hands which had previously been
bound by the doctrine of stare decisis and allowed it to depart from precedent where
there are "exceptional" and "compelling" reasons. However the Irish Supreme Court
was not ready to utilize its newly acquired powers when a revision of the McNaghten
Rules arose again for consideration in People (A.G.) v Michael McGlynn 823 . Here the
accused was charged with several offences, including the possession of a firearm with
intent to endanger life, possession of firearms without holding a firearm licence,
breaking and entering a garage and stealing petrol and entering a dwelling-house and
stealing a shotgun and other articles therein.
The only witness called for the defence was a psychiatrist who tendered
evidence that the accused was suffering from schizophrenia at the time of the
commission of the alleged offences and that his responsibility for his acts was thereby
diminished. Counsel for the defence asked the trial judge to rule that in the present
state of medical science the McNaghten Rules are not a proper statement of the law
and that there is now in law a defence known as diminished responsibility. He also
requested the judge to adopt in lieu of McNaghten, the following formula, worked out
the American Law Institute and approved of by the U.S. Federal Court of Appeals in
Egpple v Freeman viz:-
—
822 ibid
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"A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial
capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law"824.
The President of the Circuit Court stated a case for the consideration of the
Supreme Court pursuant to section 16 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1947, at the
conclusion of the evidence for the defence and before counsel had addressed the jury.
The President was inclined to the view that decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeal
and the rulings and practice of the Central Criminal Court bound him to hold that the
McNaghten Rules stated fully the legal principles at present applicable to the defence
of the accused, but he added that if he did not feel so bound he would charge the jury
to the effect that the law is in harmony with modern medical science and in general on
the principles adumbrated in the Freeman Case.
The Supreme Court raised two preliminary points to their consideration of the
question put before them: Firstly, the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court judge to state
the case and secondly, such jurisdiction, once the case was given in charge of the jury.
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court found a way to evade consideration of the
issue by stating that the Circuit Court judge had no jurisdiction to state the case once
the prisoner had been given in charge of the jury. It then ceased to be "a matter
pending before a Circuit Court Judge" as referred to in section 16 of the Courts of
Justice Act, 1947.
That Irish lawyers were more impressed by the American attempts to
reformulate the insanity defence at this time than by developments in English law, is
evident from McGlynn where, although diminished responsibility was raised by the
defence, the trial judge did not refer this issue to the Supreme Court, preferring
instead to concentrate on the proposed reformulation of the insanity defence along the
lines of that contained in the American Model Penal Code. This decision is just one of
824 Quoted ibid p.236
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many instances where English precedent was repudiated in favour of American
jurisprudence, reflecting the emergence of Irish nationalism as a legal ideology825.
This was fuelled by the desire of the Irish Judiciary to release the Irish legal system
from the state of almost servile dependency on English judicial developments, into
which it had lapsed since independence'. The beginnings of this ideology can be
seen as far back as Gavan Duffy J's. dictum in Exham v Beamish and it reached its
high water mark during the 1960's with the judgment of Walsh J. in State (Quinn) v
Ryan who, rejecting the rigid doctrine of stare decisis, said
"In this State one would have expected that if the approach of any
Court of final appeal of another State was to have been held up as an
example for this Court to follow it would more appropriately have been
the Supreme Court of the United States rather than the House of
Lords""7.
However, it was not until the end of the 1960's that a reformulation of the Irish
insanity defence was adopted by an Irish judge, when Henchy J. accepted a control
test as part of Irish law in The People (A.G.) v Hay es828. Hayes, who was charged
with the murder of his wife, was not professionally represented. Submissions were
made to the trial judge by counsel on behalf of the Attorney General, as to the form in
which the issue of insanity should be left to the jury. Henchy J. acknowledged the
shortcomings of the McNaghten Rules, saying
"In the normal case, tried in accordance with the McNaghten rules, the
test is solely one of knowledge; did he know the nature and quality of
his act or did he know that the act was wrong? The rules do not take
into account the capacity of a man on the basis of his knowledge to act
or to refrain from acting and I believe it to be correct psychiatric
science to accept that certain serious mental diseases such as paranoia
825 See generally G.W.Hogan "Irish Nationalism as a Legal Ideology" (1986) 75 Studies 528
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or schizophrenia, in certain cases enable a man to understand the
morality or immorality of his act or the legality or illegality of it, or the
nature and quality of it, but nevertheless prevent him from exercising a
free volition as to whether he should or should not do that act"829.
He went on to hold that
"if it is open to the jury to say, as say they must, on the evidence that
this man understood the nature and quality of his act, and understood
its wrongfulness, morally and legally, but that nevertheless he was
debarred from refraining from assaulting his wife fatally because of a
defect of reason due to his mental illness, it seems to me that it would
be unjust, in the circumstances of this case, not to allow the jury to
consider the case on those grounds""°.
This however, was a decision of the High Court, departing from established
authority which only the Supreme Court was entitled to do. Supreme Court
confirmation was required before irresistible impulse could be considered to be part of
Irish Law.
The following year in the case of James Coughlan"' Kennedy J. in the
Central Criminal Court gave as his view that the issue for the jury in any case where
the plea of insanity was relied on was the following - "Was the act caused by disease
of the mind?". He proposed to leave that broader issue to the jury, while stating by
way of example of acts caused by disease of the mind which exempted from criminal
responsibility, the three cases cited by Sir James Stephen - where the accused didn't
know the nature and quality of his act, its wrongness or was prevented by defective
mental power or by any disease affecting his mind from controlling his own conduct,
unless the absence of the power of control was produced by his own default'''.
829 Quoted in Doyle v Wicklow County Council [1974] I.R.55 p.71
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Coughlan had attacked a twelve-year-old boy and his eight-year-old sister while they
were walking beside a stream, had knocked them into the river and had held the boy
under the water until he drowned. Coughlan had suffered from schizophrenia since he
was a child.
Here Kenny J. went a step further in his decision than Henchy J. had in Hayes,
as this criterion does not necessarily confine the defence of insanity within the bounds
of the three tests laid down by Sir James Stephen, but recognizes the possibility of a
valid defence of insanity being raised, even in a case which doesn't appear to fall
strictly within the Stephen formula833 . Not surprisingly, the jury returned a verdict of
guilty but insane after an absence of only ten minutes.
There does not appear to be any recorded case in which Coughlan has been
approved834 and in A.G. v McDonagh 835 Gannon J. told the jury that
"if it be established by evidence to your satisfaction that at the time of
committing the act the will of the accused was so defective that he was
unable to control his actions and that such defect of will was due to
mental illness the proper verdict would be guilty but insane"836.
The accused, a butcher, had an argument with a neighbour outside his house.
He went into his own house, went up to his bedroom and took a butcher's knife from
the top of his wardrobe, came out again and stabbed his neighbour, killing him
instantly. A psychiatrist gave evidence for the defence that at the time of the killing
the accused was responding to auditory delusions in a psychotic state. So powerful
and so intense was the pressure on his mind that he did not have control over his
volition. Gannon J., having dealt with the McNaghten Rules, charged the jury in the
above terms. After retiring to consider their verdict, the jury returned to court and
asked to be furnished with a copy of the McNaghten Rules. This was given to them
........
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and they retired again. The jury returned a second time to ask a question about the law
applicable where the will is defective through mental illness, and Gannon J. repeated
the passage quoted above. The jury retired and came back with a verdict of guilty but
insane.
It was Henchy J's. dictum which the Supreme Court opted to approve in Doyle
v Wicklow County Council'''. The applicant applied to the respondents for
compensation under the criminal injury code, after a seventeen year old set fire to his
abattoir. At the hearing of the application in the Circuit Court it was established that
the youth had caused the damage deliberately with the intention of damaging or
destroying the applicant's abattoir. The issue was whether the boy had been capable of
forming the requisite "malicious intention" because of his alleged insanity.
The medical evidence given was to the effect that the boy 0., was suffering
from a mental disorder which led him to believe that he shouldn't be charged or
punished for setting the fire, although he knew his act was one forbidden by society or
contrary to law. His reason for this belief was his love of animals, the killing of which
he was very much opposed to. Dr.Noel Browne, the defendant's medical witness, was
of the opinion that 0. believed his act was right and that the doing of that act showed
that O's. judgment was distorted and he was emotionally disturbed, and to that extent
he could not be called sane, and he needed psychiatric treatment and detention.
The Circuit Court stated a case to the Supreme Court asking, inter alia:-
Where on the trial of an application for compensation for criminal injury, there is
evidence of the insanity of the person who caused the damage at the time he did so,
should the judge determine the issue of insanity as an issue of fact solely on the
evidence offered, or should he in addition apply the principles laid down in
McNaghten's case.
The Supreme Court ruled that the judge, in determining such issue of insanity,
should apply the standards or rules appropriate to a criminal trial and that
837 [1974] I.R.55
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"the McNaghten Rules do not provide the sole or exclusive test for
determining the sanity or insanity of an accused. The questions put to
the judges were limited to the effect of insane delusions and I would
agree with the opinion expressed by the Court of Criminal Appeal in
AG v O'Brien that the opinions given by the judges must be read with
the like specific limitation"838.
This appears to have been a sub silentio rejection of R v Windle839 which held
that the McNaghten Rules govern the entire law of insanity, not just instances of
insane delusion840 .
Griffin J., speaking on behalf of the Supreme Court, then approved Hayes as
the correct test to be applied by the Circuit Court judges in determining whether the
act was malicious or not. He noted that a civil case was not the most appropriate
circumstance in which to consider the application of rules which have been widely
applied in criminal trials for upwards of 130 years but that the enactment of the
Criminal Justice Act, 1964 (abolishing the death penalty with certain exceptions)
made it less likely that the Supreme Court would be required to consider the
McNaghten Rules in a criminal appeal.
It is noteworthy that nowhere in the Supreme Court judgment is there any
mention of the requirement of an impulse. This is in keeping with the
recommendation of the Gowers Commission that
"If. .the M'Naghten Rules are to be extended by the addition of a third
limb to meet the case of insanity affecting not the reason but the will, it
is important that this should be formulated not merely in terms of
inability to resist an impulse, but in wider terms, which will allow the
court to take account of those cases where an insane person cominits a
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crime after a long period of brooding and reflection or is gradually
carried towards it without any real attempt to resist this tendency'''.
The Court approved Henchy J's. test verbatim that certain
"serious mental diseases such as paranoia or schizophrenia, in certain
cases enable a man to understand the morality or immorality of his act
or the legality or illegality of it, or the nature and quality of it, but
nevertheless prevent him from exercising a free volition as to whether
he should or should not do that act".
and that insanity should be made out where a defendant
"understood the nature and quality of his act and understood its
wrongfulness, morally and legally, but..nevertheless..was debarred
from refraining from [committing the act] because of a defect of
reason, due to his mental illness".
It is not entirely clear whether the control test is to be interpreted literally or
liberally. McAuley asserts that a literal stance may have been taken by the Supreme
Court, as evidenced by Griffin J's. opinion, although obiter, that a satisfactory defence
of insanity had not been made out in Doyle". His opinion is that the judge's
misgivings appear to have stemmed from the fact that the claim that the boy was
unable to control his behaviour was not easy to reconcile with the uncontested
evidence that he was determined to burn down the abattoir'''. McAuley points out that
the fact that a defendant was determined to do something does not entail and may
exclude the conclusion that he was unable to refrain from doing the act, under a literal
interpretation of the control test 846 . This approach may result in depressives, drug
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addicts and even schizophrenics (the very offenders envisaged by Henchy J.) being
held responsible if there is any evidence of planning or purposive action involved847.
The writer's view however, is that the fact that a defendant was determined to
do something does not preclude the conclusion that his act was uncontrollable'.
although it may show that his act was not impulsive'. This should not lessen the
success prospects of an insanity plea which uses the control test, as nowhere in the
Supreme Court judgment does it mention the requirement of an uncontrollable
"impulse'''. My view is that the Irish defence of volitional insanity may indeed be
very wide. This view is given weight by the obiter of Finlay C.J. in the Supreme
Court decision of D.P.P. v Mahon?' where he observed that the appellant in the
English Court of Appeal decision R v Byrne', a sexual psychopath who suffered
from violent perverted sexual desires which he found difficult or impossible to
control, if tried in accordance with the law of Ireland on the same facts, would have
been properly found to be not guilty by reason of insanity. This statement suggests
that substantial difficulty in controlling one's acts, as opposed to an inability, will lead
to a successful plea of volitional insanity.
On the assumption that McNaghten is limited to cases of delusion since
Doyle, its harshness is greatly alleviated by its narrower application than in England
and there is no danger that "disease of the mind" will be interpreted, as in England, to
include epileptics, diabetics in a state of hyperglycaemia and sleep-walkers. However
it remains a very narrow test of insanity in terms of its foundation on a test of
knowledge which excludes true understanding, of wrongness which excludes the
accused's appreciation of wrongness and of nature and quality which means no more
than the physical nature of the act. Similarly, McNaghten requires the Irish courts to
excuse some delusions but not those which would not excuse a sane man (which the
accused is not).
-
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In most cases of insanity, therefore, the control test is the criterion of
responsibility. This leaves open the possibility of an insanity defence for the
psychopath in Irish law. In Chapter Two' I have discussed the preferable approach of
the English courts in treating psychopathy as a species of diminished responsibility
and the view of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (1949-53), that the
responsibility of the psychopath can be regarded as diminished rather than obliterated.
Given that psychiatry views psychopathy as a personality disorder rather than as a
mental illness and that the Butler Committee has taken the view that it is a non-
curable condition' and therefore, that prison is a preferable receptacle to a mental
hospital', it can hardly be said that the insanity defence, whose consequence in
Ireland is mandatory indefinite committal to the State Mental Hospital, is the most
appropriate method of dealing with the psychopath. An acquittal for the psychopath is
likely to be far more controversial than judicial recognition of reduced culpability.
Nor can it be said that psychiatrists have any special competence in answering
the philosophical conundrum which is posed by the Irish insanity defence: Was the
accused debarred from refraining from committing the act because of a defect of
reason due to mental illness?. The very existence of the control test places defence
psychiatrists under considerable pressure to tailor their evidence to it', an objection
which has been repeatedly levelled at the McNaghten Rules.
A liberal interpretation of the Irish control test, requiring merely substantial
difficulty in the control of acts, may make the application of the Irish insanity defence
very wide. That the Irish courts might follow the English approach and interpret
"mental illness" to cover epilepsy, hyperglycaemia and sleepwalking remains a
constant threat. Add to this the effect of the Court of Appeal's ruling in People (A.G.) 
v Messitt" 7 , which held that where evidence of insanity is available to the prosecution
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and the defence does not choose to raise the issue, the prosecution are under an
obligation to do so themselves, and the true scope of Irish insanity defence becomes
evident. As there has been no amending legislation to the insanity verdict akin to the
English Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act, 1964, it is likely that there is still no right
of appeal from an acquittal on the ground of insanity, in the Irish courts'.
The regime of compulsory hospitalisation is equally open to objection. As
McAuley points out', given that preventive detention is such a drastic measure, trial
judges should be given a discretionary power to order the immediate release of
insanity acquittees, with or without conditions. The writer's view is that unnecessary
hospitalisation will serve no purpose and is a waste of public resources.
The problem is exacerbated by the unsatisfactory procedure for release of
those found "guilty but insane" from detention, once cured of their mental affliction.
In People (D.P.P.) v Patrick Ellis' O'Hanlon J. in the Central Criminal Court placed
the burden of deciding their release on the Government, on the grounds that this was
not a decision which came under the umbrella of "law and justice". Soon after in
People (D.P.P.) v Neilan" Keane J. in the same court replaced this function on the
Judiciary. Then the Supreme Court in D.P.P. v John Gallagher' ruled that release
following a finding of insanity is an Executive function. What is of interest in this
case is the submission to the contrary by the Attorney General, which suggests that
neither the courts nor the Government wished to have this function vested in them.
The Government is not obliged to carry out a review of detention in cases
where the detainee has not sought one". As a result, in Ellis it was two years before a
review was carried out despite abundant evidence of his sanity'.
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In such politically sensitive cases as these, the Government is bound to be
extra sensitive to the danger of arousing public condemnation when approaching the
question of release from custody. Several features of the Gallagher case have aroused
the suspicion that the failure to release the detainee was motivated more by a concern
to ensure that defendants of this type are seen not to be able to escape their just deserts
by means of the insanity plea than by a dispassionate assessment of his state of mental
health'. Firstly, an advisory committee set up by the Minister for Justice in January
1994 made recommendations, which, if implemented, might have been expected to
result in Gallagher's early release'. As Barron J. noted in the High Court in
December 1994, the State had by then not responded adequately to the
recommendations of the committee'. Secondly, in March of this year the Inspector of
Mental Hospitals (Dr.Dermot Walsh) exercised his powers under subsection 6 of the
Mental Treatment Act, 1945, which allows him to carry out an inspection of the
Central Mental Hospital whenever and as often as he sees fit and permits him to make
a report to the Minister for Justice on the "general character and conduct" of an inmate
whom he believes has recovered'''. The report to the Minister which stated that John
Gallagher had now "recovered" was later withdrawn'''.
By the end of the 1980's it had become standard practice for the hospital
authorities to seek and for the courts to recommend, the release of patients after four
to five years (previously the average period of detention stood at seven years)"°. This
state of affairs is remarkable in view of the fact that research has shown that very few
insanity acquittees are severely psychotic by the time of trial, that insanity acquittees
generally do not require lengthy committals on mental health grounds and that many
of them could be treated on an outpatient basis'''. McAuley attributes the reduced
average period of detention in some part to the operation of an informal system of
"sentencing" discounts on the grounds of mental disorder rather than to the existence
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of a programme designed to ensure that preventive detention does not exceed the
necessary therapeutic minimum872.
In the last term of 1989 a verdict of "guilty but insane" was sought by the
defence in four trials on indictment out of seven and achieved in three". The
increased incidence of the special verdict" makes the need for reform of this area of
the law a matter of urgency. Reform of the insanity defence was proposed in 1978 by
the Interdepartmental Committee on Mentally Ill and Maladjusted Persons which
reported under the chairmanship of the now Supreme Court Judge, Mr Justice
Henchy. Its Third Interim Report entitled Treatment and Care of Persons Suffering
from Mental Disorder who Appear before the Courts on Criminal Charges, stated that
because of the law on insanity as stated in Doyle "many persons are dealt with by the
courts as "normal" offenders who are either not responsible (or not fully responsible)
for the conduct charged against them"". This statement, which echoes that of the
Butler Committee, is a surprising allegation given the broadness of the Irish control
test.
After considering the various formulae in different jurisdictions, the
Committee opted for the following tripartite test of insanity, which asks:
1) Did the accused commit the act or omission charged?
2) if so, was he suffering at the time from mental disorder (as defined)? and
3) if so, was it such that he should not be found guilty of the offence?'
If these three conditions were satisfied the jury should return a verdict of not
guilty by reason of mental disorder.
872 ibid p.128
-
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The Committee felt that their test which has not the detail or particularity of
some of the other formulations, has the merit of concentrating the decision on
whether, having regard to the nature and effect of the particular mental disorder, the
accused should be held to be outside the range of legal responsibility.
"Mental Disorder" was defined"' as mental illness or mental handicap but as
not including violent personality disorder. From this, it is tempting to infer
dissatisfaction on the part of the author of the Irish control test, with the applicability
of his test to the psychopath878.
The failure to attribute a legal meaning to mental illness suggests that it is a
term which will be given meaning by the psychiatric profession. This division of
labour between the expert witnesses and the jury is likely to prove unsatisfactory
given the experience of the New Hampshire rule, the recommendation of the Royal
Commission on Capital Punishment (1949-1953), and the Durham Rule, discussed in
Chapter One. With no standard by which to judge the medical evidence, no measure
of the necessary effect of mental illness, the burden on the jury is likely to prove too
heavy and it will choose to heed the evidence of the expert with the greatest
credentials or better presentation skills. If the jury performs its task conscientiously
the warning of the D.C. Court of Appeals in Brawner, which rejected this approach,
is worth heeding. There the court was of the view that
"an instruction overtly cast in terms of "justice" cannot feasibly be
restricted to the ambit of what may properly be taken into account but
will splash with unconfinable and malign consequences'.
The court continued
"The thrust of a rule that..invites the jury..[to]..do what to them seems
just, is to focus on what seems "just" as to the particular individual.
877 ibid p.15
878 F.Boland "Diminished Responsibility as a Defence in Irish Law" op cit
879 471 F2d 969 (1974) p.987
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Under the centuries-long pull of the Judeo-Christian ethic, this is likely
to suggest a call for understanding and forgiveness of those who have
committed crimes against society but plead the influence of passionate
and perhaps justified grievances against that society, perhaps
grievances not wholly lacking in merit. .The judgment of a court of law
must further justice to the community, and safeguard it, against
undercutting and evasion from overconcern for the individual. What
this reflects is not the rigidity of retributive justice. .but awareness how
justice in the broad may be undermined by an excess of compassion as
well as passion. Justice to the community includes penalties needed to
cope with disobedience by those capable of control, undergirding a
social environment that broadly inhibits behavior destructive of the
common good. An open society requires mutual respect and regard and
mutually reinforcing relationships among its citizens, and its ideals of
justice must safeguard the vast majority who responsibly shoulder the
burdens implicit in its ordered liberty. Still another aspect of justice is
the requirement for rules of conduct that establish reasonably
generality, neutrality and constancy. This concept is neither static nor
absolute, but it would be sapped by a rule that invites an ad hoc
redefinition of the "just" with each new case'.
The difficulties inherent in this reformulated insanity defence are greatly
alleviated, however, by the Henchy Committee's additional recommendation of a
defence of diminished responsibility, thus ensuring that only the most meritorious
cases would be dealt with by way of the insanity defence 881 . Persons with a lesser
degree of mental disorder would be likely to plead diminished responsibility,
guaranteeing that the new insanity defence would be less controversial than if it stood
alone.
880 •
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Mr McAuley believes"' that although the Henchy Committee's report has
never been enacted"' the product rule may actually be part of Irish Law since
Coughlan, where Kennedy J. gave as his view that the appropriate test was - "Was the
act caused by disease of the mind?. I submit that this is unlikely to be the case in view
of the fact that the Supreme Court did not approve it when it had the opportunity to do
so in Doyle. Also there is no reported case of a jury having been directed along the
lines of the principle adumbrated in Coughla n884
D.P.P. v Penny Ann Dorricotts", decided in the Central Criminal Court on
3/2/1982, shows that the control test is firmly entrenched in Irish law. There Finlay J.
asked the jury to consider as the third proposition (the first two being the McNaghten
Rules) whether the accused, at the time of the act, was suffering from a disease of the
mind which prevented her from exercising a free volition. The defendant was
suffering from insane delusions.
More recently, &anr,or yrtin was found guilty of murder after his plea of
insanity, based on evidence of post-traumatic stress disorder, occasioned while
serving as a soldier in the Lebanon' s', was rejected by the jury. Mr Justice Lynch
asked the jury "At the time when the accused. .killed the deceased. .was he acting under
the influence of an irresistible impulse caused by a defect of reason due to mental
illness which debarred him from refraining from killing her?" 887 . Given that the
irresistible impulse test is more stringent than the control test and that irresistible
impulse has no place in Irish law, the propriety of the judge's direction is open to
question.
Rather than constituting an appendix to the Rules, the control test has emerged
in Irish law as McNaghten's successor in all cases except delusion. In recent years the
882 F.McAuley op cit p.13
883 Pace McAuley the Henchy test is not strictly speaking a product test but a "justly responsible" test
similar to the recommendation of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 1949-53, subsequently
adopted as the test of insanity in Rhode Island.
884 F.McAuley op cit p.14
885
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Supreme Court's decision in Doyle has come under attack, most notably by Irish
judges. Speaking of the detention and release of those found guilty but insane in Irish
law, O'Hanlon J. in Ellis commented
"..the problem has been compounded by developments in the law as to
insanity as a defence to a criminal charge, which have taken place in
this jurisdiction in the last quarter-century or so" 888 .
Despite some approbation of the Henchy Committee's attempt to reformulate
the Irish insanity defence 889, its recommendation on the wording of the insanity
defence has been subjected to virtually no critical scrutiny. This criticism is equally
open to the adoption of the control test by the Irish judges, who blindly followed the
American expedient, and whose defects have only become obvious with the passage
of time890 . The defects inherent in the Irish control test and in the Henchy's
Committee's proposed alternative underscore the futility of attempting to palliate the
controversy over the McNaghten Rules by devising a reformulation of the insanity
defence891 . I will now address the constitutional considerations involved in Ireland's
insanity defence, which add yet another dimension to its unsatisfactory nature.
3.2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ISSUES
The extent to which indefinite detention under the Trial of Lunatics Act, 1883
and the Supreme Court decision of Doyle are inconsistent with the Irish Constitution
is the subject of this section. The discussion is intended to add extra emphasis to the
unsatisfactory nature of the law on insanity in Ireland.
-
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3.2.1 The Trial of Lunatics Act, 1883
The starting point to any discussion of England's legislative legacy is Article
73 of the Constitution of Saorstat Eireann, which provided that pre-1922 legislation
was part of Irish law only to the extent that it was in conformity with the Constitution
of 1922. This principle is now enshrined in Article 50 of the Constitution of 1937.
The Trial of Lunatics Act, 1883 which governs the detention and release of
insanity acquittees in Ireland does not have the benefit of the presumption of
constitutionality enjoyed by post-1937 legislation. If this piece of legislation is to
stand then it must conform with the provisions of the Constitution. I will now look
firstly, at its conformity with the right to liberty under Article 40.4.1 and then, with
the unenumerated rights derived from Articles 40.3.1 and 40.3.2.
3.2.1.1 The Right to Liberty
The right to liberty as specified in Article 40.4.1 lays down that
"No citizen shall be deprived of his personal liberty save in accordance
with law".
In State (Royle) v Governor of Mountjoy Prison"' Henchy J. offered the
following vague explanation of the phrase "in accordance with law"
"The expression is a compendious one and is designed to cover these
basic legal principles and procedures which are so essential for the
preservation of personal liberty under our Constitution that departure
from them renders a detention unjustifiable in the eyes of the law. To
enumerate them in advance would not be feasible and, in any case, an
attempt to do so would only tend to diminish the constitutional
guarantee. The effect of that guarantee is that unless the High Court
—
892 [1974] I.R.259
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(or, on appeal, the Supreme Court) is satisfied that the detention in
question is in accordance with the law, the detained person is entitled
to an unqualified release from that detention. It is the circumstances of
the particular case that will usually determine whether or not a
detention is in accordance with the law"893.
Further guidance as to one such principle "so essential for the preservation of
personal liberty. .that departure. .renders a detention unjustifiable in the eyes of the
law" may be derived from the obiter dictum of Finlay C.J. in People (D.P.P.) v 
O'Mahony8"
"Under our law a person found not guilty by reason of insanity can
only be detained so long as the court is satisfied that his mental
condition persists in a form and to the extent that his detention in an
appropriate institution is necessary for the protection of himself or of
others" (emphasis added).
Unfortunately Finlay C.J's optimism has not been borne out by the experience
of the defendants Ellis and Gallagher. Replacing the function of deciding release on
the Judiciary in People (D.P.P.) v Neilan, Keane J. offered further guidance on the
principles that must be adhered to in the name of safeguarding the liberty of the
individual"'
"[The 1883 Act] does not carry with it, of course, the presumption of
constitutionality, but if in truth it remains part of our law it can only be
because of its conformity with the Constitution. It it is so consistent,
then it must be capable of being construed so as to require that the
executive will not detain a person in the position of the defendant in an
arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable manner"(emphasis added).
893 ibid p.269
894 [1986] I.L.R.M.244 p.249
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He continued
"The person whose liberty is now in issue is a citizen innocent of any
crime. If his continued detention is no longer required by
considerations of the public welfare or of his own safety, he is entitled
to be set free, not as a matter of privilege or concession, but because
his being set at liberty is necessary to protect and vindicate his right to
liberty under the Constitution"896.
Keane J. found that the further detention of the defendant would not be
justified in law, on the grounds that he had made a complete recovery and was no
longer a danger to the public or to himself He then proceeded to strike down section
2(2) of the 1883 Act, which vests release in the Lord Lieutenant (whose functions are
now exercised by the Minister for Justice), as being inconsistent with the provisions
of the Constitution and with the exclusive exercise by the courts of a judicial function.
Unfortunately, he did not specify that the 1883 Act might be in violation of the right
to liberty. Accordingly, this is not an issue which was taken up by the Supreme Court
in Gallagher when it held that it is for the Minister for Justice to decide if and when a
detained person should be released, as part of "the executive's role in caring for
society and the protection of the common good". The Supreme Court held that in so
deciding, the Minister must use fair and constitutional procedures and they then took
consolation from the fact that the Minister's decision may be the subject of judicial
review so as to ensure compliance with such procedures.
In this manner the Supreme Court has pledged itself to safeguarding the right
to liberty of the insanity acquittee. However, if legally uninformed the acquittee will
be unaware of the possibility of judicial review and like Ellis and possibly Gallagher
may be confined for longer than is required in the interests of public or his own safety.
Following an order by O'Hanlon J. in November 1994 that Gallagher be produced
before the High Court and that the grounds of his detention be clarifier!, Barron J.
896 ibid p.287
897 ( 1 99 1 ) 1 I.R.3I p.37
898 Irish Times 30 Nov.1994
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merely reiterated that it is for the Government to decide if Gallagher should be
released899 . Hence the decision in Gallagher provides a less than adequate safeguard
and the 1883 Act remains in breach of the constitutional right to liberty of the insanity
acquittee900.
3.2.1.2 Unenumerated Rights
In Articles 40.3.1 and 40.3.2 further guarantees are made to protect the
personal rights of citizens. Subsection 1 provides
"The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable,
by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen"
while subsection 2 states that
"The State shall, in particular, by its laws protect as best it may from
unjust attack and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate the life,
person, good name, and property rights of every citizen"
Whether or not these provisions contain a constitutional guarantee against
cruel and unusual punishment (as found in the eighth amendment of the United States
Constitution) which might invalidate the 1883 Act, will now be addressed.
In Ryan v A.G."' O'Dalaigh in the Supreme Court agreed with Kenny J. that
the personal rights mentioned in Article 40.3.1 are not exhausted by the enumeration
of "life, person, good name and property rights", as is shown by the use of the words
"in particular" in Article 40.3.2, nor by the more detached treatment of specific rights
in the subsequent sections of the article. In particular, there existed a right to bodily
integrity. The Supreme Court declined to attempt to make a list of all the rights which
899 Irish Times 17 Dec.1994
900 F.Boland "Insanity, the Constitution, and the European Convention on Human Rights"forthcoming
(1996) 47 N.I.L.Q.
901 [1965] I.R.294
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may properly fall within the category of "personal rights" because of the difficult and
unnecessary nature of the task in the instant case.
Further unspecified rights which have been held to exist under Articles 40.3.1
and 40.3.29" are
1. The right to dispose of and withdraw one's labour and the right not to belong to a
trade unionm.
2. The right to earn one's livelihood'.
3. The right to workm.
4. The right to litigate claims'.
5. The right to prepare for and follow a chosen career'.
6. The right to consult and be represented by a lawyer when charged with a serious
criminal offence908 .
7. The right to be assisted by the State if one's health is in jeopardy'''.
8. The right to marry'.
9. The right to free movement within the State".
10. The right to medical aid or assistance'.
11. The right to travel outside the State"
12. The right of a mother to the custody and control of the upbringing of her child (a
right not enjoyed by the mother of an illegitimate child).914
13. The right of a child to be reared with due regard to its welfare, religious and
moral, intellectual, physical and social.'
902 The first nine rights are dealt with in the same manner as R.F.V.Heuston "Personal Rights Under the
Irish Constitution" (1976) 11 Iriur.205 p.220
903 Educational Co. of Ireland v Fitzpatrick [1961] I.R.345
904 Murtagh Properties Ltd. v Cleary [1972] I.R.330 p.336
905 Murphy v Stewart [1973] I.R.97
996 Macauley v Minister for Posts and Telegraphs [1966] I.R.345; Murtagh Properties Ltd v Cleary
[1972] I.R.330
992 Landers v A.G. (1975) 109 I.L.T.R.1
998 The State (Healy) v Donoghue [1976] I.R.325
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-194-
14. The right to life'.
15. The right to a minimum standard of basic material conditions to foster and protect
one's dignity and freedom as a human person'.
16. The right to procreate children within marriage'.
17. The right to fairness of procedures, incorporating the right of fair trial by a jury
unprejudiced by pre-trial publicity'.
In creating personal rights under Articles 40.3.1 and 40.3.2 the courts have
resorted to three tests 92° - firstly, rights derived from the Christian and democratic
nature of the State' secondly, rights derived from natural laW922 and thirdly, rights
that "inhere in the individual personality of the citizen in his capacity as a vital human
component of the social, political and moral order posited by the Constitution"923.
All of these tests can be invoked in favour of a constitutional guarantee against
cruel and unusual punishment which, if recognised, would render unconstitutional the
indefinite committal of insanity acquittees, terminable only at the caprice of a
Government Minister. It should be remembered that those incarcerated under section
2(2) of the Trial of Lunatics Act have been acquitted by reason of insanity of any
criminal offence.
This spate of discovering rights, which reached its zenith in the 1970's, has
abated somewhat. Nonetheless, rights continue to be identified from time to time924.
As one commentator has remarked
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"The experience of both [United States and Irish] Courts suggests that,
whatever the doctrinal formulation, rights regarded as sufficiently basic
and important will be found to merit judicial recognition and
protection" 925 .
As the Irish courts have frequently reached the same conclusions as the
American courts on the same questions 926, it is likely that they would do so again, if
called upon to create a guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment927.
The Trial of Lunatics Act, 1883 was enacted during a period when locking the
insane up and throwing away the key was by common consent ignored. Our evolution
from a society which dealt with all social outcasts by hiding them away from view9"
to a more caring community, less preoccupied with social stigma, has only happened
in recent years. The State (Healy) v Dono Igiu_e29 makes clear that the Constitution
can be adapted to meet this social change and provides support for a guarantee against
the cruel and unusual punishment of indefinite incarceration:
"The preamble to the Constitution records that the people "seeking to
promote the common good, with due observance of prudence, justice
and charity, so that the dignity and freedom of the individual may be
assured, true social order attained, the unity of our country restored,
and concord established with other nations, do hereby adopt, enact and
give to ourselves this Constitution." In my view, this preamble makes
it clear that rights given by the Constitution must be considered in
accordance with concepts of prudence, justice and charity which may
gradually change or develop as society changes and develops, and
which fall to be interpreted from time to time in accordance with
prevailing ideas. The preamble envisages a Constitution which can
.._....•
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absorb or be adapted to such changes. In other words, the Constitution
did not seek to impose for all time the ideas prevalent or accepted with
regard to these virtues at the time of its enactment" 930 .
This view had earlier been taken by Walsh J. in McGee v A.G. when he said
that "no interpretation of the Constitution is intended to be final for all time" 931 .
The common view is that the constitution must be adapted to changing
circumstances if it is to retain its normative character. One commentator has stated
"In practice in any country at any time the constitution will have this
valuable normative character to the extent to which it embodies and
reflects the traditions, culture and standards of the people of that
country" 932 .
If the Irish Constitution is to command this respect, it will have to adapt to the
more enlightened attitude of the Irish to the mentally ill today. A guarantee against
cruel and unusual punishment would reflect this recently dawned enlightenment.
3.2.2 Doyle v Wicklow Co.Council
In this section I will focus on the extent to which the Supreme Court's decision
in Doyle is in conformity with the Constitution, in particular, with the separation of
powers guarantee in Article 6.1, and Article 15.2.1 which states
The sole and exclusive power of making laws for the State is hereby vested in the
Oireachtas: no other legislative authority has power to make laws for the State
By the 1950's with the emergence of Irish nationalism as a legal ideology,
discussed above, it was becoming clear that the Irish Constitution was to take
930 ibid p.347
931 [1974] I.R.284 p.319
932 B.Chubb op cit p.6
197-
precedence over common law principles. The first to expound this view was Gavin
Duffy J. in Re Tilson Infanta933 . On appeal, Murnaghan J. in the Supreme Court
endorsed this view with the words
"The Constitution states fundamental principles, and, however these
principles may have been reached, when they are enshrined in the
Constitution they become, and are, the fundamental law of the State.
Previously existing law and principles are of no force in the State
unless they derive efficacy from article 50 of the Constitution..The
archaic law of England rapidly disintegrating under modern conditions
need not be a guide for the fundamental principles of a modern state. It
is not a proper method of construing a new constitution of a modern
state to make an approach in the light of legal survivals of an earlier
law'''.
Then in State (Browne) v Feran 935 Walsh J., repudiating the old common law
rule against appeal by the prosecution from a successful habeas corpus application,
pronounced unequivocally that "Nile Constitution is the basic and fundamental law of
the State and must be construed as such" 936 . The decision in Browne led to a
willingness to subject common law principles to constitutional scrutiny and signalled
a profound break with the pre-existing common law way of thinking'''. The
flourishing of judicial review during and since this decade was not inhibited by
concerns about whether the exercise of this power was a great usurpation of the
Legislature's function by the Judiciary'''. As a result the courts began to be seen as the
place to which those with a grievance or a cause could resort when the politicians
would not act'''. For a decade or so from the middle sixties it fell to the courts to
introduce up-dating reforms in the highly visible area of civil liberties and the judges
........,
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were praised for having the courage to do what the politicians were failing to do or
could be prevented by pressure from doing940 . The situation developed whereby many
politicians, particularly the conservatives in the rank and file of the parliamentary
parties, felt that changes requiring legislation, constitutional and other, which would
be politically hazardous were best left to the increasingly active and innovative
courts'. As Denis Coughlan, the political correspondent of the Irish Times, noted
"The role of the Supreme Court as the guardian of the
Constitution. .massaged the political cowardice of politicians in the past
and encouraged them to avoid their legislative responsibility.
The comfortable conviction grew up that legislation on difficult and
dangerous social issues could await the imprimateur of the Supreme
Court and that direct Constitutional reform should be avoided942."
Patrick MacEntee, Chairman of the Bar Council and advocate for the
defendant in People (D.P.P.) v O'Mahony, where it was argued before the Supreme
Court that diminished responsibility was part of Irish law, commented shortly
afterwards
"I conclude that the legislature has been disposed to vacate certain
areas of their legislative functions where unpopular decisions were for
one reason or another unavoidable"943.
MacEntee pointed out that in two recent cases the Supreme Court "had been
led into areas of policy-making and legislation" for it had by these decisions
"substantially amended the Extradition Act of 1965'." He continued
9" ibid
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942 The Irish Times 29 Dec.1987
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"not alone did the court substantially change the law without reference
to the Oireachtas, but neither House complained - on the contrary
everyone seemed pleased that the Supreme Court had grasped the
nettle and obviated the need for debate or decisions in Oireachtas na
hEireann."
Despite the enormous potential and impetus for constitutional challenge,
neither Doyle nor the 1883 Act has been subjected to judicial review. This should be
viewed in light of the scarcity of constitutional pronouncements (until recent years) on
criminal law issues (compared, for example, with an abundance of such
pronouncements on the law of evidence). Whether this is due to the failure on the part
of advocates to raise constitutional law issues in criminal law cases or to a reticence
on the part of the Irish Judiciary to entertain them, is uncertain. Nonetheless the
potential is there and all that remains is for someone to take up the challenge.
However the Supreme Court has not always been deterred by the lack of
constitutional challenge in the arena of criminal law and in the absence of legislative
reform it has substantially altered the common law defences of self-defence' and
No doubt it was the Legislature's inertia which prompted the Supreme Court in
Doyle to legislate judicially for a control test. Whilst we may sympathise with the
Judiciary who were compelled to apply the unsatisfactory and anachronistic test of
insanity embodied in the Rules, the propriety of this move is questionable as being in
breach of the separation of powers guarantee enshrined in Article 6 of the
Constitution. Aware of the impropriety of judicial legislation on the insanity defence,
Kennedy C.J. in A.G. v O'Brien commented that change in the law could only come
from the "Legislature competent to alter or adapt it in the light of the latest science
and of the conditions of the time in which we live'.
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The implications of the Supreme Court's criminal law decisions are far
reaching. Unlike the elected parliamentarians the Judiciary is not publicly
accountable. The practical effect of limiting removal from office to the grounds of
"stated misbehaviour or incapacity" is that there is no sanction for an erring judge"'
and the only constraints on the Irish Judiciary are those which they impose on
themselves. It is also well known that the members of the Supreme Court have, in the
past, been chosen from supporters of the governing political party 949 . Hence "the taint
of suspicion" 95° of Government influence and of the use of the Supreme Court to effect
controversial changes when the Government has wished to retain public confidence. It
is difficult to avoid a conclusion along these lines in light of the satisfaction of both
Houses of Parliament with the Supreme Court's action on issues like the Extradition
Act.
In Maher v A.G.' the court stated that the usurpation by the Judiciary of an
exclusively legislative function is no less unconstitutional than the usurpation by the
Legislature of an exclusively judicial function and that "[t]he right to choose and
formulate legislative policy is vested exclusively by the Constitution in the national
parliament" 952 . Clearly there are some judges who have been vigilant in their respect
of Article 15.2.1. Thus O'Hanlon J. in Ellis has commented
"With hindsight, having regard to the problems arising in the present
case and in other similar cases, one might conclude that any departure
from the strict requirements of the McNaughton Rules would be better
affected by legislation, as happened in England with the passing of the
Homicide Act, 1957'3•
948 D.G.Morgan Irish Times 2 Mar.1995
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Although O'Hanlon appears to be approving the English solution to the
McNaghten dilemma, this statement carries an implicit reservation about the propriety
of the Supreme Court's manoeuvre in Doyle. No doubt with this in mind the Supreme
Court in The People (D.P.P.) v O'Mahony declined to accept the English defence of
diminished responsibility as part of Irish law, saying that the Homicide Act, 1957 was
an attempt by the Legislature to liberalise or ameliorate the McNaghten Rules in
England and was not merely declaratory of a common law principle. Doyle has not
been subjected to judicial review but if it were it is doubtful that the decision could
withstand the challenge to its constitutionality.
The constitutional validity of both the 1883 Act and the decision in Doyle is
therefore questionable, the former for being in breach of the right to liberty and a
possible guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment; the latter for infringing on
the law-making jurisdiction of the Legislature. As yet, however, no one has taken up
the challenge posed by their questionable constitutionality. The European Convention
on Human Rights provides a further guarantee against infringement of liberty against
which I will now test the control test and the 1883 Act.
3.3 INSANITY AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The Irish insanity defence and the mandatory committal of acquittees may also
be in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights'. In this section I will
examine the compatibility of compulsory hospitalisation with Article 5(1)(e) of the
European Convention. I will also examine the compatibility the Minister's
discretionary powers of release with Article 5(4) of the Convention.
Article 5(1) provides
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of
his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure Prescribed
by law:
954 F.Boland "Insanity, the Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights" op cit
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..(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious
diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants..
As regards the requirement of "lawfulness" in (e), the European Court of
Human Rights in Winterwerp v the Netherlands' has said that this means that "no
one may be confined as 'a person of unsound mind' in the absence of medical evidence
establishing that his mental state is such as to justify his compulsory
hospitalisation'', and that "the mental disorder must be of a kind or degree
warranting compulsory confinement'''.
The decision in Ellis which reveals the consensus of the psychiatrists at the
State Mental Hospital that the defendant had been sane since the first moment that he
came into their care, shows that the ambit of the Irish insanity defence may lead to a
finding of insanity and mandatory committal in the case of defendants whose mental
state may not warrant compulsory hospitalisation.
The procedure governing release of insanity acquittees may also be in breach
of the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 5(4) of which provides that
Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take
proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a
court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful
In X v United Kingdom' the European Court of Human Rights held that the
most important characteristic of a court under Article 5(4) is "independence of the
executive and of the parties to the case" 959 . For this reason they found the vesting in
the Home Secretary of the discretion to order release from hospital, by the Mental
Health Act, 1959, to be in breach of Article 5(4).
955 (1979) 2 E.H.R.R.387
956 ibid para.39
951 ibid
958 4 E.H.R.R.188
959 ibid para.53
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The decision in X v United Kingdom raises the obvious question of whether
the Supreme Court's decision in Gallagher to replace this function on the Minister for
Justice is in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The European Court of Human Rights noted that "the remedy of habeas corpus
can on occasions constitute an effective check against arbitrariness. .and may be
regarded as adequate, for the purposes of Article 5(4) for emergency measures'''.
However in this case they felt the English habeas corpus procedure to be
insufficiently wide. The English procedure required a determination that the decision
of the executive was not made in bad faith or capriciously or for a wrongful purpose
and that it was supported by sufficient evidence and was not one which no reasonable
person could have reached in the circumstances. The Court stipulated that Article 5(4)
requires a judicial procedure which has the remit to examine whether the Home
Secretary is entitled, on the evidence available to him, to form a judgment that the
mental disorder persists and that a continuation of compulsory confinement is
necessary in the interests of public safety.
From X v U.K. it emerges that, in order to comply with Article 5(4), the Irish
habeas corpus procedure will have to involve much more than a determination of
whether the Minister for Justice has exceeded her powers: the Irish courts will have to
be empowered to determine whether any fundamental rights under the Convention
have been infringed and will have to be permitted to substitute their own decision for
the Minister's in appropriate cases. However it is tempting to infer a lack of the
required independence from the deference shown by Barron J. to the Government's
discretion when Gallagher was brought before the High Court in December 1994 961 .
The decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Winterwerp that
Article 5(4) does not require that persons committed should themselves take the
initiative in obtaining legal representation before having recourse to a court962,
960 ibid para.58
961 Irish Times 17 Dec.1994
962 (1979) 2 E.H.R.R.387 para.66
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suggests that the right of recourse to a court should not be dependent upon the
patient's taking the initiative to apply' and that periodic review of detention is
required under Article 5(4). As McAuley points out' the Irish Government is not
obliged to carry out a review where the detainee has not sought one. Thus in Ellis it
was two years before a review was carried out at the defendant's request
notwithstanding the abundance of medical evidence of his sanity'.
The likelihood, therefore, is that both the Supreme Court decision of
Gallagher and Ellis and the Trial of Lunatics Act, 1883 are in breach of the
Convention in several respects and it may well be that a decision of the European
Court of Human Rights will be the last straw which prompts the long-awaited
legislative action on the law of insanity'.
3.4 DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY AS A DEFENCE IN IRISH LAW
Aware of the impossibility of satisfactorily reformulating the insanity defence,
a defence of diminished responsibility has from time to time commended itself to Irish
lawyers, judges and academic commentators. Support for a diminished responsibility
defence in Irish law has been slowly gathering momentum since the late 1970's. In
this section I will trace the origins of this movement in the early years of the Irish Free
State and its curtailment during the 1950's by the American influence, stemming from
the emergence of nationalism as an ideology among the Judiciary. I will proceed to
examine the more recent resurgence of opinion favourable to an Irish defence of
diminished responsibility and will attempt to rationalise why neither Judiciary nor
Legislature has acted to implement the defence of diminished responsibility in Irish
law despite a climate which is more than favourable to its introduction.
963 L.Gostin "Human Rights, Judicial Review and the Mentally Disordered Offender" [1982]
Crim.L.R.779 p.792
964 F.McAuley op cit p.121
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The first case in which a reduced sentence on the grounds of a lesser degree of
insanity than McNaghten madness arose for judicial determination was A.G. v
O'Shea967 . The accused was tried for murdering a dairy maid whose body had been
found six days afkr her disappearance, practically nude from the waist down,
concealed in a clump of furze. The medical evidence disclosed a wound on the head
which probably caused death and that the deceased had been violated immediately
before and immediately after death. The defendant abstained at the trial from making
a case of insanity.
The accused was found guilty of murder but the jury added a rider to their
verdict of guilt namely "unpremeditated crime committed during a period of mental
abnormality and recommend that special consideration be given to this factor."
The trial judge refused a certificate that the case was a fit one for appeal and
the accused applied to the Court of Criminal Appeal for leave to appeal on the
grounds of misdirection. The grounds of the application were, inter alia, that the trial
judge should not have accepted from the jury as their verdict, the verdict which they
handed in; that the said verdict was not a verdict of guilty of murder but a verdict of
"Not guilty of murder" and that the judgment and sentence pronounced were not in
accordance with law.
The judgment of the Court of Appeal was delivered by Kennedy C.J. who held
that the verdict was complete in itself and separate from the rider and that the rider in
the present case did not contain anything which constituted a qualification of the
crime of murder or which would reduce it to manslaughter. With regard to the
statement in the rider that the crime was committed "during a period of mental
abnormality" the court was equally clear that no modification of the verdict of guilty
of murder was to be found there. Abnormality was not in law insanity, which would
relieve the individual of the consequences of his crime.
967 [1931] I.R.728
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As in England at this time, Irish women who murdered their children were
always spared from the death penalty by its commutation 968 . The Infanticide Act, 1949
brought the law into line with the practice in these cases. The English Infanticide Act,
1938 is the model for the Irish legislation 969, section 1 of which provides
(1) On the preliminary investigation by the District Court of a charge against a woman
for the murder of her child, being a child under the age of twelve months, the Justice
may if he thinks proper, alter the charge to one of infanticide and send her forward for
trial on that charge.
(2) Where upon the trial of a woman for the murder of her child, being a child under
the age of twelve months, the jury are satisfied that she is guilty of infanticide, they
shall return a verdict of infanticide.
(3) A woman shall be guilty of felony named infanticide if -
(a) by any wilful act or omission she causes the death of her child being a child under
the age of twelve months,
(b) the circumstances are such that but for this section the act or omission would have
amounted to murder
(c) at the time of the act or omission the balance of her mind was disturbed by reason
of her not having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child or by
reason of the effect of lactation consequent upon the birth of the child -
and may for that offence be tried and punished as for manslaughter.
Unlike the English defence of infanticide, in Ireland infanticide may be
charged from the outset and must be considered by the jury where it has been raised as
an issue, with the burden on the prosecution to disprove beyond reasonable doubt the
evidence which supports it'. Unlike the Irish defence of infanticide, its English
counterpart was the creation of the Judiciary. However both may be regarded as a
968 P.Charleton Offences Against the Person (Dublin,1992) p.189
969 ibid
970 ibid p.190
-207-
concession to the Scottish practice of reducing murder to manslaughter on evidence of
mental unsoundness and the effect of the Infanticide Act, 1949 is that the adoption of
a full diminished responsibility defence in Ireland is just a short step away.
In 1955 The People (A.G.) v Micheal Manning' showed that the time was
not ripe for the adoption of a full defence of diminished responsibility when the trial
judge reasserted, although obiter, as the issue was not expressly raised by the defence,
that abnormality is not a defence.
For several years the issue of diminished responsibility in Irish law lay
dormant. This may be attributed to the influence which the American courts were
exerting on Irish law from the late 1950's onwards. No doubt Irish lawyers were more
impressed by the American attempts to reformulate the insanity defence than by
developments in English law. This is evident in the case of McGlynn' where,
although diminished responsibility was raised by the defence, the trial judge did not
refer this issue to the Supreme Court, preferring instead to concentrate on the
proposed reformulation of the insanity defence along the lines of that contained in the
American Model Penal Code.
Developments in the law on insanity from this time onwards mirrored those in
the United States with a product test laid down in Coughlan and a control test
emerging from Hayes. I have discussed above the emergence of nationalism as an
ideology among the Irish Judiciary' and their desire to release the Irish legal system
from the state of almost servile dependency on English judicial developments into
which it had lapsed since independence'. Recent years, however, have seen a halt to
this trend and as one commentator has noted
"geography and history will continue to ensure that the British
connection will always be an important factor in Irish life. The British
971 Supra f.n.810
972 Supra f.n.823
973 See generally G.W.Hogan "Irish Nationalism as a Legal Ideology" op cit
974 ibid p.532
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and the Irish are more closely connected with each other than either is
to any other group"975.
By 1978 when it had become obvious that the Irish insanity defence was
unsatisfactory, the Third Interim Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on
Mentally Ill and Maladjusted Persons looked to English law and proposed the
introduction of the defence of diminished responsibility into the Irish legal system'.
The Committee limited its proposal to offences carrying fixed mandatory sentences,
noting that where there is discretion as to sentence the judge is usually able to give
effect in one way or another to different degrees of guilt produced by factors such as
diminished responsibility'.
In the case of capital murder and murder it was proposed that the jury could
find an accused guilty of manslaughter on the ground of diminished responsibility if
the accused satisfied them that, at the time of the alleged offence, he was suffering
from mental disorder which, while not such as to justify a finding of not guilty by
reason of mental disorder, was such as to diminish substantially his responsibility for
the act or omission charged'''. The Committee recommended that such persons be
punished as for manslaughter (i.e. a maximum sentence of penal servitude for life), or
be committed to a designated centre until further order, or be ordered to be released
subject to such conditions as the judge may impose'.
As regards treason, the Committee recommended that where the accused was
suffering at the time from diminished responsibility, he would be found guilty of
treason reduced by diminished responsibility and dealt with as if he had been found
guilty of manslaughter on the ground of diminished responsibility"°.
975 B.Chubb op cit p.10
976 Treatment and Care of Persons Suffering from Mental Disorder who Appear Before the Courts on
Criminal Charges op cit p.5 para.9
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The Committee followed its recommendations with a draft bill but no such
legislation was enacted. As with many other areas of possibly controversial social
reform (discussed above) it is likely that the Legislature was leaving the introduction
of diminished responsibility to the increasingly innovative and active Judiciary"' who
had recently altered the insanity defence in Hayes and might do so again. However it
was some years before a defence of diminished responsibility was argued before the
Irish Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court's opportunity came with the People (D.P.P.) v Joseph 
O'Mahony' which was an attempt to introduce the defence of diminished
responsibility into Irish Law via the courts. The accused was charged with murder
(strangulation committed in the course of a burglary) in the Central Criminal Court.
The medical evidence tendered was to the effect that the accused was a borderline
mental defective or borderline below average intelligence individual and by reason of
his history (orphaned from an early age) and upbringing (limited attendance at school)
when involved in a violent situation he suffered from a condition of psychotic
intensity which prevented him from stopping or withdrawing from violent acts.
Counsel for the accused stated that he had specific instructions not to raise the
issue of insanity and the trial judge, Costello J., decided he should not leave the issue
to the jury. Instead he left to the jury the issue as to whether they were satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt, having regard to medical and other evidence, that the
accused was capable of forming the intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm, and
directed them that if they were not so satisfied, their verdict should be not guilty of
murder but guilty of manslaughter. Counsel for the accused urged the trial judge to
permit the jury to consider a defence of diminished responsibility along the lines of
the following formula:-
"Where a person kills or is party to the killing of another, he shall not
be convicted of murder if there is medical or other evidence that he was
981 B.Chubb op cit p.123
982 [1986] I.L.R.M.244
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suffering from a form of mental disorder, consisting of mental illness,
arrested or incomplete development of mind, psychopathic disorder or
any other disorder or disability of mind and if, in the opinion of the
jury, the mental disorder was such as to be an extenuating circumstance
which ought to reduce the offence to manslaughter".
The accused was convicted of murder and appealed to the Supreme Court on
the ground that the trial judge erred in law in refusing to permit the jury to consider a
defence of diminished responsibility.
The Supreme Court held, dismissing the appeal, that the passing of the English
Homicide Act, 1957 was an attempt by the English Legislature to liberalise or
ameliorate the very rigid definition of insanity, applicable in the law of England,
which involved following the McNaghten Rules without expansion or extension and it
was, therefore, not merely declaratory of a common law principle. The Supreme Court
noted defence counsel's failure to refer the court to any decision of any criminal court,
whether in England prior to the 1957 Act or in Ireland at any time, in which a defence
of diminished responsibility had been allowed to go to a jury.
The court ruled that if it were established, as a matter of probability, that due
to an abnormality of mind consisting of a psychotic condition, the appellant had been
unable to control himself and to desist from carrying out the acts of violence leading
to the death of the deceased, he would also have been entitled to a special verdict, as
would the appellant in R v Byrne who suffered from perverted violent desires which
he found it difficult or impossible to control. The Supreme Court felt that, there could
not exist side by side with what was now the law on insanity in Ireland, a defence of
diminished responsibility which would, in effect, leave an accused and his advisers
the choice whether to seek to have him branded as a criminal or whether to seek on
the same facts, the more humane and in a sense lenient decision that he was not guilty
by reason of insanity.
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The Supreme Court did not explain why a diminished responsibility defence
could not co-exist with the insanity defence although possibly it felt that since the
insanity defence was wide enough to encompass those who fall within the diminished
responsibility defence in English law, diminished responsibility was not needed in
Ireland. It failed to note, however, that in English law mentally ill offenders now often
have the choice of pleading insanity or diminished responsibility due to the widened
meaning of "disease of the mind" within the McNaghten Rules. An alternative
interpretation is that the Supreme Court's reasoning was an implicit expression of
dissatisfaction with the control test and a call for a legislative overhall of the entire
law of insanity.
The Supreme Court's unwillingness to legislate judicially for a diminished
responsibility defence is interesting in light of the control test, judicially legislated for
in Doyle. The Scottish defence of diminished responsibility is also particularly
instructive as "a classic example of judge-made law" 983 . One possibility is that a
differently constituted Supreme Court, aware of former mistakes, was unwilling to
make itself a target for recriminations if its manoeuvre subsequently turned out to be
unsatisfactory. It is also possible that a differently constituted Supreme Court was
simply vigilant in respecting the separation of powers guarantee in the Irish
Constitution.
The increased support for a diminished responsibility defence amongst the
Judiciary has been coupled with pleas to the Oireachtas to introduce the defence.
O'Hanlon J. in Ellis has commented
"With hindsight, having regard to the problems arising in the present
case and in other similar cases, one might conclude that any departure
from the strict requirements of the McNaughton Rules would be better
effected by legislation, as happened in England with the passing of the
Homicide Act, 1957..1 consider that the present application, which has
983 J.LI.Edwards "Diminished Responsibility: A Withering Away of the Concept of Criminal
Responsibility" in G.O.Mueller Essays in Criminal Science (London, 1961) p.302
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produced psychiatric evidence to the effect that the applicant is not
now, and never was at any time since he was first ordered to be kept in
custody as a criminal lunatic, suffering from any disease of the mind,
highlights the necessity for the Oireachtas to examine as a matter of
real urgency whether legislation is now needed to define the nature and
scope of the plea of insanity and, possibly, of diminished
responsibility, as a defence in criminal trials's'.
It appears therefore, that legislation is the only remaining avenue by way of
which diminished responsibility may be introduced into Irish law.
For four years successive Irish governments have been pledging their
commitment to amend the law on insanity and to introduce diminished responsibility.
In a debate in Dail Eireann prompted by the Supreme Court judgment in Gallagher,
Deputy Pat McCartan, referring to the Henchy Committee report, commented "It is a
remarkable condemnation of this House that that report has sat on the shelves for so
long and that the legal quagmire that the Government now find themselves in has been
allowed to generate when solutions were there".
Mr.N.Treacy, Minister of State at the Department of Justice, responded by
assuring Dail Eireann's' that legislation to amend the law relating to criminal insanity
was at "an advanced stage of preparation". Mr.Treacy assured the House that certain
issues were being examined by the Fine Fail/Progressive Democrats Government in
the context of the legislation, which included the definition of criminal insanity and
the possibility of introducing the concept of "guilty but with diminished
responsibility". No such legislation followed.
In December 1992 the Labour and Democratic Left parties included reform of-
the law on insanity in their policy programme' s' but in June 1994, a Progressive
984 [1990] 2 I.R.291 p.295
985 1r.P.Deb.,1991, Vol.405 p.286
986 ibid p.287
987 Irish Times 10 Dec.1992
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Democrats bill to change the criminal law on insanity was opposed by the Fine
Fail/Labour Government. The Minister for Justice, Mrs Geoghegan Quinn, said that
she would bring forward a Government bill to deal with insanity, diminished
responsibility, procL lures for releasing persons found insane and appeals against
determination of insanity988 . Although this legislation was part of the autumn
legislative programme for 1994 989, Fine Fail and Labour have failed to honour their
commitment.
Recently, the new Fine Gael/Labour/Democratic Left Government has echoed
earlier statements about legislating in the area of criminal insanity. In April of this
year a spokeswoman for the Department of Justice commented that work on a piece of
legislation which would be called the Criminal Law (Insanity) Bill was "well
advanced"'. In response to a question in Parliament in May, the Minister for Justice
responded that
"Proposals for the amendment and updating of our criminal insanity
laws are at an advanced stage of preparation in my Department. I will
bring forward suitable legislation in this area as soon as possible" 991 .
In August 1995 the status quo remains unaltered and a diminished
responsibility for Ireland remains barely out of reach. Diminished responsibility is the
only realistic solution to the problems posed by reformulating the insanity defence. A
defence of diminished responsibility for Irish law can also be justified on a
philosophical level and I will now look at this to reinforce the suitability of
diminished responsibility, as a solution to the problems inherent in the insanity
defence.
988 Irish Times 23 Jun.1994
989 Irish Times 25 Jun.1994
99° Irish Times 26 Apr.1995
991 Ir.P.Deb.,1995 p.31
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3.5 FURTHER ARGUMENTS FOR A DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY
DEFENCE IN IRISH LAW
In the course of this thesis I have established that diminished responsibility is
the only solution to the medico/legal and moral controversy surrounding the insanity
defence. Some further philosophical considerations militate in favour of a diminished
responsibility defence in Irish law which I will now discuss under two mutually
reinforcing headings, (a) the individualisation of excusing conditions and (b) partial
excuses.
3.5.1 The Individualisation of Excusing Conditions
The first angle that requires consideration is whether or not there is a place in
the Irish legal system for legally recognised excuses for criminal behaviour.
Traditionally the Common Law's "fidelity to rules" 992 has made it loathe to consider
the peculiarities of particular offenders' with a view to excusing criminal conduct.
Even insanity is often treated not as an excuse, but as a jurisdictional challenge to the
court - something akin to the defence of infancy 994 . The defence of diminished
responsibility is therefore an anomaly, focusing as it does on each individual
defendant's abnormality, albeit with reference to a standard - that of substantially
impaired responsibility995.
The common law's aversion to excusing conditions is coupled with the felt
indispensability of the reasonable man standard, which provides a substitute for
inquiries about the actor's character and culpability 996 . As Fletcher points out' a
system willing to assess character and culpability has no need for reasonable men
whilst a system afraid to look squarely at the character and culpability of the
992 G.P. Fletcher "The Individualization of Excusing Conditions" (1974) 47 S.Calif.L.Rev.1269 p.1305
993 ibid p.1300
994 ibid p.1272
995 F.Boland "Diminished Responsibility as a Defence in Irish Law" op cit
996 ibid p.1290
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defendant must do so indirectly, by relying on standards like "the person of reasonable
firmness".
In recent years, Irish law has shown increased deference to individualised
excusing conditions, by dispensing with the reasonable man test in the defence of
provocation"' and by reducing murder to manslaughter in the case of excessive self-
defence999 . By focusing on the particular situation of the defendant the Irish courts
express "compassion for one of our kind caught in a maelstrom of circumstances'''.
The Irish approach has brought individualised determinations of culpability, normally
recognised in the extra-legal domains of sentencing, pardoning, arresting and
choosing to prosecute', within the law. The effect is to provide a public and visible
forum for the process of individualised assessment, which is infinitely preferable to
leaving a maximum array of problems to be resolved in semi-secret administrative
processes'.
Even advocates of excuses may be opposed to partial excuses, however.
Although the judicial climate in Ireland is favourable to the recognition of
individualised excusing conditions, partial excuses (in particular diminished
responsibility) as a "concession to human frailty", require independent examination.
3.5.2 Partial Excuses
Opponents of partial excuses base their argument on the assertion that an
accused is either guilty or not guilty and there is no third alternative: "[t]o say that we
are less willing to blame. .a man if he does something wrong surely does not mean:
"we are willing to blame him less, if he does something wrong.'"
998 People (D.P.P.) v Sean MacEoin [1978] I.R.27
999 People (Attorney General) v Dwyer [1972] I.R.416
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In similar vein Lord Justice General Normand in Kirkwood v H.M.
Advocate" attacked the doctrine of diminished responsibility, saying
"The defence of impaired responsibility is somewhat inconsistent with
the basic doctrine of our criminal law that a man, if sane, is responsible
for his acts, and if not sane is not responsible".
This argument carries some weight to the extent that "impaired" or
"diminished" mental capacity carries the implication that it is unfair to blame or
punish the offender at all. However as Gordon' and Wasik' note, if
"responsibility" is replaced by the phrase "liability to punishment", the plausibility of
the above argument tends to disappear. This is what the English Legislature intended
by "mental responsibility" in section and it is unfortunate that they did not
express themselves more clearly. This replacement reveals more clearly the
relationship which exists between legal and moral ascriptions of responsibility in the
context of serious criminal offences'. In moral responsibility there is certainly
gradation in the efficacy of various excuses, and it may be that some take a form akin
to partial excuses
"because it always has to be remembered that few excuses get us out of
it completely; the average excuse, in a poor situation, gets us only out
of the fire into the frying pan".
Uniacke takes the same stance, saying
"the question of an agent's responsibility for a particular act or effect of
an act need not be 'either-or'; and because acts can be voluntary to a
degree, and agents more or less responsible, some excuses can lessen,
	 —
1 °°4 1939 J.C.36 p.40
1005 G.H.Gordon Criminal Law (2nd ed) (Edinburgh, 1978) p.381
1006 M.Wasik "Partial Excuses in the Criminal Law" (1982) 45 M.L.R.516 p.517
1007 Discussed below, section 3.7
1 °438 M.Wasik op cit p.517
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without eliminating, the agent's culpability. In the case of any partial
excuse, we regard the agent as blameworthy for the wrongful conduct,
but less so, given this excuse, than we would judge him to be without
the excuse, all else being equal'''.
Partial excuses also have a more practical justification. In a situation where the
greater offence is made out in law but the jury feels that it is morally inappropriate to
convict, the existence of a partial excuse prevents them convicting of the full offence
or acquitting "perversely" when neither reflects their true finding 1011.
 The more serious
the offence charged the greater the pressure to avoid convicting of an offence
involving undeserved moral stigma'''. Hence on a moral level this middle verdict
may be regarded as more meaningful since it seeks to relate the offence of which the
defendant has been convicted more closely to his moral culpability
ioi,
. That the
diminished responsibility defence enables the jury to give expression to their true
feelings about an accused's culpability has been illustrated vividly by an Irish jury at
the trial for murder of two young Limerick women in 1994'''. After Johnson J. had
told the jury that there was no concept of diminished responsibility in Irish law, the
jury retired to consider their verdict and returned saying they had a problem with the
inapplicability of diminished responsibility and the state of the accused's mind. The
defendants had suspected their victim of witnessing the beating up (leading to the
death) of their father and lover. The jury duly found the defendants guilty of murder,
after which Johnson J. said that he had no alternative but to impose the mandatory
sentence of life imprisonment.
Since the judge's deliberations on sentence must start from the declared
verdict, it is important that this should not mislead him as to the jury's view of the
case'''. If further questioning of the jury by the judge is to be ruled out because of its
1010 S.Uniacke "What are Partial Excuses to Murder?" in Stanley Meng Heong Yeo Partial Excuses to
Murder (Sydney, 1991) p.11
11311 M.Wasik op cit p.520
1012 ibid.531
1013 ibid p.520
1014 Irish Times 24 Mar.1994
11315 M.Wasik op cit p.520
-2 18-
implications in terms of time and money, then linking the verdict as closely as
possible to the defendant's culpability is the best that can be attained'''.
Wasik justifies the recognition of partial excuses by imagining a "scale of
excuse", running downwards from excusing conditions through partial excuses to
mitigating excuses'''. Excuses towards the higher end of the scale are those where
maximum moral pressure for exculpation outweighs reasons of policy and practicality
for not permitting the excuse (e.g. automatism) 1 ° 18 . Those towards the lower end of the
scale, while they may be morally significant, are outweighed by practical and policy
considerations (e.g. a general excusing condition of good motive)' 0 ' 9. He claims that
partial excuses fall into the centre of this range and exhibit a fine balance between
rival considerations'''. Some criminal excuses are so morally and legally significant
that they must be considered prior to the verdict'''. These are excuses towards the
higher end of the "scale of excuses" where maximum exculpatory power outweighs
considerations of policy and expedience for not admitting the excuse as an excusing
condition'. To transfer these issues to the sentencing stage, as some would do,
would sacrifice individual culpability to social policy 1023. On the other hand some
excuses, towards the lower end of the scale may properly be dealt with just by the
sentencer'.
A further consideration militating in favour of a partial defence of diminished
responsibility or any other partial excuse, is the need for the law to maintain the
community's respect by grading its condemnation according to the moral turpitude of
the offender as the community evaluates ir 1 °25 • As psychological abnormality bears on
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moral turpitude, considerations of public respect for the law require an investigation
into whether the defendant was less responsible owing to his mental affliction'''.
The decision to reduce murder to manslaughter in the case of excessive self-
defence shows that Ireland's judicial climate is favourable to the reception of partial
excuses. A diminished responsibility defence for Irish law can be justified on several
levels. Firstly, it may be viewed as an answer to the impossibility of satisfactorily
reformulating the insanity defence. Because the insanity plea is premised on full or
absent responsibility it fails to deal with those offenders who are medically insane but
partially responsible for their actions. In this manner it would resolve the long-
standing medico-legal conflict over the insanity defence.
The wide dispositional consequences attached to the defence would provide a
solution to the questionable reconcilability of Irish insanity law with the Irish
Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights, by leaving the insanity
defence to deal with those offenders whose disorder warrants treatment and custody.
Finally, it would provide a means of focusing on the particular situation of a mentally
disordered offender and excusing conduct that is less blameworthy than that of a
normal criminal defendant.
Diminished responsibility would remedy several defects in the Infanticide Act,
1949, by providing a humane disposal firstly, for the woman who is mentally
disturbed following childbirth but who kills an older child or somebody else's.
Secondly, it would deal compassionately with the same woman who kills her child
when it has passed one year of age. Thirdly, a defence of diminished responsibility
would extend the compassion granted to women after childbirth to fathers or other
relatives suffering from abnormality of mind. Diminished responsibility now has a
considerable following in Ireland'''. As one recent Irish commentator has pointed out
1026 ibid
1027
eg."Guilty but Insane" Verdict Clarified (1991) 9 I.L.T.53; F.McAuley op cit p.92
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"the defence of diminished responsibility stricto sensu represents the
best, and certainly the most realistic, solution to the problem posed by
the sane but mentally partially impaired defendant; and
consequently. .the real question is not whether but in what form, it
should be introduced in Ireland?"°28.
3.6. THE WORDING OF AN IRISH DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY
DEFENCE
The remainder of this Chapter will concentrate on the appropriate form of an
Irish diminished responsibility defence. By drawing on the English experience, I will
lay down some guidelines which it is suggested that the Irish Legislature should
follow in formulating the defence. These will not be limited to its wording but will
also involve the procedural matters of burden of proof, charges and disposal.
3.6.1 Abnormality of Mind
Section 2(1) of the Homicide Act provides
Where a person kills or is a party to the killing of another, he shall not be convicted of
murder if he was suffering from such abnormality of mind (whether arising from a
condition of arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent causes or
induced by disease or injury) as substantially impaired his mental responsibility for
his acts or omissions in doing or being a party to the killing.
Despite the parenthesis in section 2, the meaning of "abnormality of mind"
caused considerable confusion during the early years of the defence. This uncertainty,
which also applied to the meaning of substantially impaired mental responsibility,
discussed below, may be attributed to hasty legislation and inadequate debate by
Government supporters who were largely ignorant of the issue that they were voting
-
1028 F.McAuley op cit p.179
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on. Had the parliamentarians taken the time, they could have exposed the uncertainty
of the defence's terms and agreed on its limits, incorporating them within section 2.
In Spriggs 102^ the prosecution contended that "mind" meant "intelligence" and
that a psychopath with a high intelligence quotient could not, therefore, be suffering
from an abnormality of mind. Since the judge was determined not to offer his own
interpretation of the section l"° he did not warn the jury against this one and no doubt
the jury were influenced by prosecuting counsel's contention when they found
Spriggs guilty of capital murder.
The following exchange which is reported to have occurred during the hearing
of R v Walden'"' by the Court of Criminal Appeal, illustrates the difficulty which
faced judges in the early years of the defencel":
Hilberry: "suppose the jury ask what they are to understand by abnormality of mind. If
the judge can't tell them we are getting very near to trial by doctor. What on earth does
'substantially impaired his mental responsibility' mean? Does anyone know?"
Counsel: "No except for the medical men."
It was not until Byrne's case that the Court of Appeal at last delivered a
considered interpretation'''. There the meaning of "abnormality of mind" was
clarified by Lord Parker who held that it meant
"a state of mind so different from that of ordinary human beings that
the reasonable man would term it abnormal. It appears to us to be wide
enough to cover the mind's activities in all its aspects, not only the
perception of physical acts and matters and the ability to form a
, 	
1029 [1958] 42 Cr.App.R.69
1030 N.Walker Crime and Insanity in England Vol.1 (Edinburgh, 1968) p.154
1031 (1959) 43 Cr.App.R.201
1 °32 R.F.Sparks op cit p.14, fn.12
1033 N.Walker op cit p.154
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rational judgment as to whether an act is right or wrong, but also the
ability to exercise will-power to control physical acts in accordance
with that rational judgment'''.
What kinds of causes are "inherent", what kinds of trauma will count as
"injury", and what is meant by "disease" are not exactly questions which are easy or
assured of a confident judicial answer, however'''. Variations in the weight given to
the parenthetic limitation on "abnormality of mind" have been able to continue
throughout the history of the section because of the courts' failure to elucidate the
meaning of the parenthesis'''.
As late as 1975, the Butler Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders
described "abnormality of mind" as "an extremely imprecise phrase", even as limited
by the parenthesis and defined by the Court of Appeal in Byrne' ' . They found that
evidence is often stretched due to the humanity of the medical profession so that
psychopathic personality, reactive depressions and dissociated states are testified to be
due to "inherent causes" within the section'. Although some psychiatrists have used
section 2 creatively, it seems that others have been less aware of the section's potential
for flexible reading'" 9 . Thus the fate of a number of people charged with murder since
1957, has turned on the robustness and sophistication of their expert witness'.
Ambitious witnesses, like Dr.Katherina Dalton who has testified to the
existence of P.M.T. in a number of killings, have widened the ambit of the defence
and permitted a more humane outcome in deserving circumstances. According
deference to the medical view of abnormality of mind has led to the evolution of a
happy partnership between the legal and medical professions on the issue of
diminished responsibility. This is exemplified by the general practice of accepting the
1034 [1960] 3 All E.R.1 p.4
l °35 E.Griew "The Future of Diminished Responsibility" [1988] Crim.L.R.75 p.77
1036 ibid p.78
1031 Report of the (Butler) Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders Cmnd 6244 op cit para.19.5
1 °38 ib id
1039 E.Griew op cit p.79
1040 ibid
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plea of guilty to diminished responsibility manslaughter, where unanimous medical
evidence is forthcoming (80% of diminished responsibility cases') thus saving a
considerable amount of court time and expense and avoiding unnecessary distress to
the defendant and relatives of the deceased.
Although the Butler Committee's preference was for abolition of the
mandatory life sentence and the defence of diminished responsibility'', in the event
of retention of the mandatory life sentence they wished to keep section 2 in its
essentials (emphasis added) but with an improvement in the wording'. In this
respect they proposed the substitution of "abnormality of mind (whether due to
arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease
or injury)" with the requirement of medical or other evidence that the defendant was,
at the time of the act, suffering from a form of mental disorder, as defined in section 4
of the Mental Health Act, 1959''.
Section 4(1) of the Mental Health Act, 1959 provides
"In this Act "mental disorder" means mental illness, arrested or
incomplete development of mind, psychopathic disorder, and any other
disorder or disability of mind; and "mentally disordered" shall be
construed accordingly".
The Criminal Law Revision Committee in its Fourteenth Report Offences
Against the Person, expressed the reservation that the Butler Committee's rewording
would be to some extent restrictive and would exclude some offenders who are at
present regarded by the courts as falling within section 2, namely, the case of the
depressed father who kills a severely handicapped subnormal child or a morbidly
jealous person who kills his or her spouse'. In this matter they consulted the medical
1041 S.Dell Murder into Manslaughter (Oxford, 1984) p.28
1042 Report of the (Butler) Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders Cmnd 6244 op cit para.19.14
1043 ibid para.19.17
1044 ibid
1045 Criminal Law Revision Committee 14th Report Offences Against the Person Cmnd 7844 (London,
1980) para.92
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advisers to the Department of Health and Social Security who felt that the proposed
rewording would not exclude the kind of cases they had in mine'. Their proposed
rewording of the diminished responsibility defence did not, therefore, alter the
requirement of a mental disorder within the meaning of section 4 of the Mental Health
Act, 1959.
The Butler Committee said that its proposed re-wording "would. .not
materially alter the practical effect of the section"'. However, "any other disorder or
disability of mind" in section 4(1) of the Mental Health Act 1959 is extremely wide
and like mental disorder, has no limiting parenthesis akin to section 2 of the Homicide
Act, 1957' 048 . It is therefore possible that some psychiatrists might be emboldened to
identify transient disorders of mind for the purpose of diminished responsibility
defences, that because of anxious respect for the language of the parenthesis, they
would not formerly have felt able to advance as relevant''. Some prosecutors and
judges might feel similarly liberated'''. However, given that according the medical
profession autonomy in the working of section 2 has proved satisfactory, it should not
be assumed that this change in the wording of the diminished responsibility defence
would lead to an unsavoury redefinition of the boundary between murder and
manslaughter by medical witnesses. It might, however, lead to inconsistency in the
operation of the defence.
The Butler Committee thought that a state of intoxication, if not expressly
excluded, would be a mental disorder within the 1959 Mental Health Act for the
purpose of their revised insanity defence'. However, they made no attempt to
exclude this state from the ambit of the new diminished responsibility defence'.
This would widen the diminished responsibility defence considerably. As a result,
Clause 54 of the Draft Criminal Code Bill expressly excludes intoxication from the
_.---
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ambit of the defence. However, it has done this by adopting the Fenton approach.
Even if the intoxicant combined with a pre-existing abnormality of mind to produce
substantially impaired responsibility, the jury would have to be directed to ignore the
effect of the intoxication and to ask if the defendant would have been of diminished
responsibility in the absence of intoxicants.
The requirement of "medical or other evidence" of a mental disorder within
section 4(1) of the Mental Health Act, 1959 may mean that medical evidence would
not always be necessary'. This would threaten to undermine the medical profession's
automony in the working of the diminished responsibility defence.
The Butler Committee was concerned to reconcile the meaning of mental
abnormality with the meaning of mental disorder in civil committal procedures. As
the Irish law on civil committal is also in need of reform, no help can be obtained
from the Irish Mental Treatment Act, 1945, which provides no definition of mental
disorder but leaves the doctor to apply his own subjective criteria as to who should
and who should not be committed'''. Recent government proposals for reform of the
1945 Act have also failed to provide a definition of mental disorder. Hence, a
definition of abnormality of mind for the purpose of a diminished responsibility
defence, will provide a challenge for the Irish Legislature when it finally decides to
act.
When devising an Irish defence of diminished responsibility a definition of
mental disorder that the Irish psychiatric profession is familiar with would save all the
confusion that followed in the wake of the Homicide Act, 1957. If it is made clear that
the meaning of mental disorder/abnormality of mind is a medical question, it will not
be necessary for the Judiciary to give it meaning as they were forced to do in England
in the early years of the defence. This would also allow the medical profession
considerable autonomy in the working of the defence. However, in the absence of a
definition of mental disorder in the 1945 Act, the Irish Legislature will have to
1053 ibid p.80
1054 The Irish Press 29 Sept.1986
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consider two options: Firstly, giving doctors testifying as to diminished responsibility
the same latitude as they enjoy under civil committal procedure or secondly,
providing a definition of mental disorder. If they chose the second, the best alternative
is to follow Butler's proposal on the requisite disorder subject to the exclusion of
intoxication per se rather than when combined with another abnormality of mind'''.
There should also be a requirement of medical evidence in relation to any mental
disorder tendered as evidence of diminished responsibility.
3.6.2 Substantially Impaired Mental Responsibility
The above phrase has led to a wealth of academic commentary, most of which
has done nothing to elucidate its meaning. Lady Wooton has suggested three possible
alternative meanings 1"6 : (i) Irresponsible, in the sense of antisocial or reprehensible
behaviour; (ii) Irresponsive, in the sense that the individual does not respond to the
stimuli of reward and punishment in the same way as a normal individual; and (iii)
Diminished responsibility to resist temptation or, conversely, excessive sensibility to
temptations not felt by others to be overwhelming; and in consequence, diminished
responsibility in the eyes of God and Man.
Wooton dismisses (ii) as too sophisticated for the ordinary juryman and (i),
which would mean labelling all criminals as irresponsible and would obliterate the
very distinction that section 2 requires us to draw'''. If (iii) is correct, she says,
impaired responsibility becomes the counterpart of uncontrollable impulse'. Her
view is similar to that of Professor Hart who suggests that "mental responsibility" in
section 2 refers to the defendant's "capacity to control his actions" 1 "9; it is "the name
or description of a psychological condition'''. Elsewhere however, he refers to the
capacities of "understanding" and of "reasoning" as well as "of control of conduct"
--
1055 The difficulties inherent in this approach to a combined defence of intoxication and diminished
ponsibility have been discussed above in section 2.res
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and expresses the view that a person's responsibility for his actions in the sense of
such "complex psychological characteristics. .may intelligibly be held to be
diminished or impaired"'°6'.
Griew however, believes that "Capacity to control actions" is too restricted a
translation of "mental responsibility" and that an amalgam of capacities or
"psychological characteristics" is, as an alternative translation, too uncertain to be
convincing 1062.
 Moreover, such an interpretation does not fit the language of the
section''.
Walker insists' that it does not make sense to paraphrase "mental
responsibility" as accountability or answerability, since in our usage, it is the
individual as a whole, not his "mind" which is accountable or answerable. Sparks is
also of the view that mental responsibility does not mean anwerability or liability to
punishment. In view of the marginal note to section 2 which says "persons who suffer
from diminished responsibility", he notes'' that
"liability to punishment is not, as abnormality of mind is, something
which people are said to suffer from; nor would they be said to suffer
because that liability to punishment was impaired".
Instead, Walker's view is that "mental responsibility" is used as if
responsibility were a quality of mind and is something which can be "impaired", a
word which modern usage applies to intelligence, memory, hearing and sight 1066 . In
this view Walker has McAuley's concurrence:
"s2 appears to be based on the latter-day Scots assumption that
diminished or impaired mental responsibility is a specific
1 °61 ibid pp.227-228	
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psychopathological state, and not just a convenient label for the
disparate psychological factors that might limit a defendant's legal
accountability for his actions, much less a procedural device for
obviating the need to impose a fixed penalty in murder cases'''.
Neither Walker nor McAuley suggests that the "concept" he finds in section 2
corresponds to any reality 1068. Rather, in order to make sense of the section, they refer
to "a creature that does not exist'''.
The problem is that section 2 is elliptical "almost to the point of nonsense'''.
If as suggested by Griew l °71 , the irreconcilable words "impaired. .mental" and
"responsibility" are forced apart, the section begins to make sense: He had an
abnormality of mind (of appropriate origin). This had a substantial adverse effect
upon one or more relevant functions or capacities (of perception, judgment, feeling,
control)'°72 . In the context of the case this justifies the view that culpability is
substantially reduced. The outcome is diminished liability: manslaughter'''. Its
elliptical nature explains the confusion in the House of Commons during the debates
on the Homicide Bill and such expressions of discomfort as: "the Bill is just as far
from clear to many of us who have been considering it for that considerable length of
time"
If the words are compacted together in a different form we end up with: his
abnormality of mind is of such consequence in the context of this offence, that his
legal liability for it ought to be reduced'''. This is almost identical to what the judges
who gave evidence to the Butler Committee, gleaned from the section:
1067 F.McAuley op cit p.159; See also P.Arenella "The Diminished Capacity and Diminished
Responsibility Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed Marriage" (1977) 77 Columbia L.Rev.827 p.850
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"the defendant has shown recognisably abnormal mental symptoms
and. .in all the circumstances it would not be right to regard his act as
murder in the ordinary sense"; so "it is open to the jury to bring in a
verdict of m, nslaughter"w".
Pace Glanville Williams, who asserts that it would make no sense to talk
about substantial impairment of legal responsibility, because legal responsibility in the
sense of liability to conviction either exists or does not'', we are not talking about
liability to conviction but liability to be convicted of manslaughter rather than murder.
If "mental responsibility" is a legal or a moral question then it follows that
substantially impaired mental responsibility is for the jury to determine. This is what
the Court of Appeal decided in Byrne. However, under the Homicide Act the jury is
provided with no criterion for determining whether or not responsibility is
substantially impaired.
Glanville Williams foresaw in the early years of the defence that
"a refusal of the expert to express an opinion that mental abnormality
has substantially impaired the accused's mental responsibility may
have the unintended effect of leading the jury to suppose that the expert
believes mental responsibility to be unimpaired'°"."
The difficulty of the jury's task explains the courts' indulgent attitude to
medical testimony on the issue of substantially impaired mental responsibility. This
attitude was highlighted in the relatively recent Court of Appeal decision of
Campbell where it was said that there was no prima facie evidence of diminished
responsibility because the psychiatric witness "never addressed himself in his
evidence to the final matter which would have to be proved by the defence. .namely
1076 Report of the (Butler) Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders Cmnd 6244 op cit para 19.4
1077 Textbook of the Criminal Law (2nd ed) (London, 1983) p.686
1078 Glanville Williams "Diminished Responsibility" (1961) 1 Med.Sci & L.41 p.48
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that the abnormality of mind was such as substantially to impair the mental
responsibility of the appellant for his acts"1"9.
Hence Spencer says that it is "wise" for psychiatrists to offer an opinion on
substantially impaired mental responsibility in their medical report'''. Neustatter
advises fellow psychiatrists to express an opinion on diminished responsibility in their
preliminary report "as that is what counsel wants' s '. Similarly, Power recommends
that when a doctor is issuing a psychiatric report indicating that, in his opinion,
diminished responsibility is applicable to the accused, the specific form of mental
disorder should be described and the words "abnormality of mind as substantially to
impair his mental responsibility for his acts in doing the killing" should be written in
fulii082.
According to Dell"' defence counsel will not raise section 2 unless they have
received the green light on its moral aspects from one and preferably two
psychiatrists. Her study revealed not one case in which the defence lawyers were
without a pre-trial report in which a psychiatrist said he thought responsibility was
substantially diminishee" .
 So in practice, it is the doctors who decide whether the
defence can be attempted`°". It is also the doctors who decide whether the defence
will succeed in the 80% of diminished responsibility cases where the medical
evidence of diminished responsibility is unanimous and the court accepts the plea.
And it is the doctors who dictate the success of the defence in those cases that reach
the courts, by their undoubted influence on the jury's conclusion when they testify on
the ultimate issue of substantially impaired mental responsibility. The amicable
partnership between judge and expert witness in diminished responsibility cases,
coupled with the arduous task which the jury would otherwise face, explains the
1079 (1987) 84 Cr.App.R.255 p.259
1080 s.Spencer Homicide, Mental Abnormality and Offence in Mentally Abnormal Offenders (Toronto,
19S4) P.99
1081 "Psychiatric Aspects of Diminished Responsibility in Murder" (1960) 28 Medico-Legal Journal 92
11931082 D.J.Power "Diminished Responsibility" (1967) 7 Med.Sci & L.185 p.185
1083 S.Dell "The Mandatory Sentence and Section 2" (1986) 12 Journal of Med.Ethics 28 p.30
1084 ibid
1085 ibid
-231-
failure of the courts to differentiate the role of the expert witness from that of the
i ury 1086.
Undoubtedly the "nonsensical quality of the statutory language"' has created
difficulty for the psychiatrist. The Butler Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders
came down harshly on "Mental Responsibility", "a phrase not to be found elsewhere
in any statute", which "has created difficulty both for doctors and for jurors"1"8.
Several medical witnesses had pointed out to the Committee that the difficulty is
made worse by the use of the word "substantial"°". Similarly, Dell has found that
"although the presence or absence of mental responsibility is not a medical matter,
doctors grapple with it" 1090
Rather than devoting their attention exclusively to rewording the requirement
of substantially impaired mental responsibility, the Butler Committee opted to
reinforce the line between expert witness and jury. Deciding that it is either a concept
of law or of morality rather than a clinical fact relating to the defendant, they found it
"odd" that psychiatrists should be asked and agree to testify as to legal or moral
responsibility, and even more surprising that courts are prepared to hear that
testimony'''. As said above, in the event of retention of the mandatory life sentence
they wished to keep section 2 in its essentials (emphasis added) but with an
improvement in the wording. The wording they proposed l °92
 was
"Where a person kills or is party to the killing of another he shall not
be convicted of murder if there is medical or other evidence that he was
suffering from a form of mental disorder as defined in s4 of the Mental
Health Act 1959 and if, in the opinion of the jury, the mental disorder
1086 E.Griew "The Future of Diminished Responsibility" op cit p.86
1087 ibid p.87
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was such as to be an extenuating circumstance which ought to reduce
the offence to manslaughter".
The Butler Committee felt that the omission of the reference to impairment of
mental responsibility would in theory, slightly widen the defence, but they felt that
this would not matter as the judge could still impose the life sentence where he felt
that this was justified l°". This is the wording which was proposed for the diminished
responsibility defence advocated before the Irish Supreme Court in People (D.P.P.) v
Mahony.
The Criminal Law Revision Committee, when reporting in 1980, agreed that
the wording of section 2 is unsatisfactory 1094. However they expressed the reservation
that the Butler Committee's rewording may in one respect be too lax'. Seeing as the
judge would have to give some guidance to the jury as to what extenuating
circumstances ought to reduce the offence, and in practice that means that the mental
disorder has to be substantial enough to reduce the offence to manslaughter, they
considered that the definition should be tightened up so as to include that ingredient
upon which the jury would have to be directed, which would give them the necessary
guidance'''. Hence they suggested that "the mental disorder [should be] such as to be
a substantial enough reason to reduce the offence to manslaughter'''. Whether this
would provide adequate guidance for a jury deciding a diminished responsibility case,
will be discussed further below.
However a flaw in the wording is the words "in the opinion of the jury". Dell
has found that 86.5% of diminished responsibility defences are accepted outright by
the Crown and that only 20% reach theuryi 1098. Some provision allowing the judge to
decide if the mental disorder is "a substantial enough reason to reduce the offence to
1093 ibid
1094 Report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee 14th Report Offences Against the Person op cit
para.92
1095 ibid para.93
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1097 ibid
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manslaughter! ,
 is therefore necessary'° 99 . This has been embodied in Clause 56 of the
Draft Criminal Code Bill:
(1) A person who, but for this section, would be guilty of murder is not guilty of
murder if, at the time of his act, he is suffering from such abnormality as is a
substantial enough reason to reduce his offence to manslaughter.
(2) In this section "mental abnormality" means mental illness, arrested or incomplete
development of mind, psychopathic disorder, and any other disorder or disability of
mind, except intoxication
(3) Where a person suffering from mental abnormality is also intoxicated, this section
applies only where it would apply if he were not intoxicated.
The Butler Committee's reformulation has the effect of bringing "into sharper
focus" the "true functions of the judge, the expert witness and the jury in the criminal
trial'''. The jury would have to decide if the offence should be reduced to
manslaughter, a task akin to that suggested by the Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment in 1953 in relation to the insanity defence and which was rejected by the
D.C. Court of Appeals in U.S. v Browner'''. Although the Butler reformulation has
manifested a far superior mastery of the English language than the draftsmen of 1957,
Griew has predicted that judges, having to operate the law in the revised form, would
quickly become embarrassed by a difficulty in it that has, up to now, been kept
partially concealed by the working of the section"' - its failure to provide adequate
guidance for the jury. As it stands, section 2 is so badly worded that it can be made to
work - and to work better than its framers intended'''.
The writer's opinion is that an Irish diminished responsibility defence should
be phrased in terms which allow the medical witnesses to express a conclusion on the
issue of impaired or diminished responsibility or whether the disorder should reduce
1099 ibid p.817
1100 E.Griew "The Future of Diminished Responsibility" op cit p.84
Imo See section 1.3, above.
Hu ;bid p.86
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the offence to manslaughter. A definition precluding such testimony would place an
inordinate burden on the jury and medical testimony to this effect would have to be
allowed in order to facilitate the operation of the defence. This is an objection which
may be levied at the Henchy Committee's proposed wording of an Irish defence of
diminished responsibility. Their test provided that, if the accused satisfied the jury
that at the time of the alleged offence he was suffering from mental disorder which,
while not such as to justify a finding of not guilty by reason of mental disorder, was
such as to diminish substantially his responsibility for the act or omission charged, the
jury might find him guilty of manslaughter on the ground of diminished
responsibility'''. The wording of the Henchy Committee's test suggests that the jury
would have to be directed on the degree of mental disorder that would exempt from
responsibility before they could consider the issue of impaired responsibility. The
complex nature of this test would be likely to cause considerable confusion.
The Law Commission's reformulation is to be preferred to that of Butler
because of its failure to limit the expert's role. For this reason it would be a helpful
model for the Irish legislature, in the absence of a definition of mental disorder under
Irish civil commitment legislation, and subject to the requirement of medical evidence
and the treatment of intoxication as part of the relevant evidence in deciding the issue
of diminished responsibility
3.7 BURDEN OF PROOF
A few issues remain to be considered, which lie within the Legislature's power
to deal with when legislating for a diminished responsibility defence. The first is the
placement of the burden of proving diminished responsibility. Like the defendant
pleading insanity, a diminished responsibility defendant must satisfy the jury that he
1104 Third Interim Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Mentally Ill and Maladjusted Persons
Treatment and Care of Persons Suffering from Mental Disorder who Appear Before the Courts on
Criminal Charges op cit p.5, para 9.
1105 F.Boland "Intoxication and Criminal Liability" op cit
1105.
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was suffering from diminished responsibility on a balance of probability 1106 .
 The
Butler Committee recommended placing the burden of proving that the defendant did
the act (or made the omission) with the requisite state of mind, on the prosecution 1107.
As with other defences in the criminal law, the Committee felt that the only burden
resting on the defendant in diminished responsibility cases (and insanity cases) should
be that of adducing evidence to raise the issue". The rationale behind the
Committee's proposal seems to have been the perceived anomaly of the issue of
burden of proof in relation to the defences of insanity and diminished
responsibility 1109.
The Criminal Law Revision Committee also felt that the defence of
diminished responsibility should fall under the general rule regarding burden of
proof". They pointed out that it is "unusual" for the burden of proof to be placed on
the defendant, in serious charges in relation to his state of mind". They also felt that,
however happy lawyers may be with the difference between being sure and being
satisfied on the balance of probabilities (adding "if indeed any are"), juries are
probably confused by these subtleties and by the different placing of the burden of
proof for different offences'''. The Criminal Law Revision Committee expressed their
confidence in the judges to ensure that defences which have no proper basis on the
evidence are withdrawn from the jury 1113.
The writer's view is that when legislating, the Dail should avail of the
opportunity to introduce consistency in the criminal law by placing the burden of
proof on the prosecution in relation to diminished responsibility and insanity. This
approach has already been taken in the Infanticide Act, 1949. By placing the burden
of proof on the prosecution McNaghten's ghost will finally have been laid to rest.
1106 McNaghten's case is the origin of this unsatisfactory practice.
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1108 ibid
1109 See ibid paras.18.39-18.41
Ill ° Criminal Law Revision Committee 14th Report Offences Against the Person Cmnd 7844-op cit
para.94
1111 ibid
" 12 ibid
1113 ibid
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3.8 CHARGES OF MANSLAUGHTER BY REASON OF DIMINISHED
RESPONSIBILITY
As mentioned earlier, on a charge of murder, a plea of guilty to manslaugnter
on the grounds of diminished responsibility may be accepted by the court. This
happens in about 80% of cases". The Butler Committee recommended in addition,
that it should be possible, where the prosecution are in possession of evidence
indicating that a defence under the section can be made out, for them to charge
manslaughter in the first instance rather than murder'''. By way of example they
instanced as appropriate for this procedure, the case where a woman has killed her
child in tragic circumstances'', the case either falling outside the offence of
infanticide (because the child is over the specified age) or that offence having been
abolished in accordance with their recommendation to this effect'. The Committee
stipulated that the prosecution would be likely to adopt this course only when it is
clear that the defence were agreeable to it. If the defence wished to resist evidence of
mental disorder the charge should be murder as now". A similar recommendation,
although in relation to the insanity defence, had been made in 1956 by the Heald
Committee". Although proposing the introduction of the defence of diminished
responsibility into English law, they did not advocate the use of this procedure in
relation to it.
The Criminal Law Revision Committee have endorsed the Butler Committee's
recommendation, being of the opinion that the mental condition of a disturbed person
is not likely to be improved by having a charge of murder outstanding 1120. They also
felt that it cannot be right that charges should be proferred in the most solemn way
known to the law, i.e. on indictment, when the prosecution know that there is a
11la S.Dell "Diminished Responsibility Reconsidered" op cit p.811
MS Report of the (Butler Committee) on Mentally Abnormal Offenders Cmnd.6244 op cit para 19.19
1116 •	 •ibid
1117 •	 •ibid para.19.26
1118 •
b •iid para 19.19
H19 Report of the (Heald) Committee Some Suggestions for the Reform of the Law Relating to Murder
in England (London, 1956) p.17
1120	 •Criminal Law Revision Committee 14th Report Offences Against the Person Cmnd 7844 op cit
para.95
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defence to the charge which is likely to succeed'''. In this the Criminal Law Revision
Committee had the support of the Law Society, the Association of Chief Police
Officers, the Metropolitan Police Solicitor, the Women's National Commission and
the National Council of Women in Great Britain. The Senate of the Inns of Court and
the Bar also approved of this recommendation but expressed the reservation (which
the Committee had already appreciated) that implementing the suggestion would not
be easy 1122. They gave no indication, however, that operating the suggestion would
present any difficulty.
Charges of diminished responsibility manslaughter would be a welcome
addition when the Irish Legislature decides to act. At present the prosecution can
charge a woman with infanticide under the Infanticide Act, 1949. By sparing the
defendant from the anxiety of having a trial for murder pending and from the anguish
of appearing in court on a murder charge, it would give expression to the foundation
of humanity on which the defence is based. Only cases where the medical evidence
was contested by the prosecution would be tried as murder. Thus valuable court time
and expense would be saved as judges would no longer have to hear protracted
medical testimony on the issue of diminished responsibility before deciding whether
or not to accept the plea or to leave it for jury determination.
3.9 SENTENCING OF DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY MURDERERS
Any genuine commitment on the Government's part to introducing the
diminished responsibility defence into Irish Law must be accompanied by an equal
commitment to providing the resources that are needed to deal with a diminished
responsibility population. In 1992 Dr.Charles Smith, director of the Central Mental
Hospital in Dundrum, told a conference of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, of a
waiting list at Dundrum which prisoners with psychiatric illness had to join and of a
widespread belief that, within the local prison system, levels of illness were higher
1121 •	 •ibld
1122 •
b •lId
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than ever before" 23 . This suggests an insufficient number of beds at Dundrum and that
without a commitment to providing adequate psychiatric facilities, defendants
convicted of diminished responsibility manslaughter will end up in already
overcrowded prisons (the only alternative) which provide less than adequate
psychiatric care'''. A report in the Irish Medical News in 1993 revealed that over 100
Irish prisoners suffering from mental illness are not receiving proper treatment 1125.
Diminished responsibility murderers, by virtue of having their condition diagnosed
before sentence (unlike many sentenced prisoners whose illness goes undiagnosed' 126)
are therefore, likely to swell the waiting list at Dundrum, adding to the delay in
receiving treatment.
Dell and Smith's survey of men convicted of section 2 manslaughter between
1966 and 1977, illustrates the pitfalls into which a well meaning but short-sighted
government may fall'''. While in the late sixties two thirds went to hospital and one
third to prison, by the end of the seventies the reverse was occurring 1128.
 In the nineties
a large proportion of diminished responsibility murderers are still sent to prison"' - in
1992 42.5% of men convicted of section 2 manslaughter received prison sentences,
while 47.5% went to hospital'. Viewing 1990, 1991 and 1992 together, prison
sentences have given to 40% of section 2 men compared with hospitals orders which
have been given to only 52%"3'.
1123 P.O'Morain "Prisoners with Mental Ilness Join Waiting List" Irish Times 27 Jul.1992
1124 See for eg.the discussion of Mountjoy jail by V.Browne "Hundreds of Citizens Sentenced to
squalor" Irish Times 7 Jun.1995
1125 Irish Times 28 Jun.1993
1126 V.Browne "Prisoners Degraded Instead of Helped at Mountjoy" Irish Times 14 Jun 1995 says that
it is not known to what extent there are several prisoners in Mountjoy at any given time who are
gravely mentally ill
1127 S.Dell and A.Smith "Changes in the Sentencing of Diminished Responsibility Homicides" (1983)
142 Br.J.Psychiat.20
1128 ibid
1129 P.Fennell "Diversion of Mentally Disordered Offenders from Custody" [1991] Crim.L.R.333 p.335
has stated that the changes in definitions and criteria of mental disorder relevant to detention under the
Mental Health Act 1983 have not led to a fall in the number of patients described as mentally
disordered and detainable under mental health legislation.
113° Criminal Statistics, 1992, Table 4.9
WI ibid
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By 1974, the English Government's lack of foresight lead the Butler
Committee to express astonishment and shock at the overcrowding in the special
hospitals, especially at Broadmoor'''. Against this background of serious
overcrowding, the Department of Health and Social Security (D.H.S.S.) was insisting
that the special hospitals should admit only patients needing maximum security'''.
Previously it had been the settled practice to accept into these hospitals every offender
who the courts wished to send'. Eventually prison doctors did not wait to be refused
special hospital beds but stopped asking for them" and once the doctors stopped
making recommendations, the judges had to stop making orders'''.
Until 1959, most National Health Service (N.H.S.) mental hospitals had
locked wards and offender patients who were a problem of management and needed
some degree of security were easily accommodated'''. The nursing and medical staff
had a long tradition of caring for them and had acquired considerable skill, and they
found few patients too violent, threatening, or dangerous to cope with"". However by
the 1970's, the N.H.S. hospitals were refusing to accept a number of mentally
disordered offenders on various grounds, including the one that the patients, whilst
not so dangerous as to require special hospitals, were too difficult or dangerous to be
managed in a modern psychiatric hospital, with its emphasis on informality and
freedom for the patient'. Dell found that the less secure N.H.S. hospitals were not
asked to take her sample of diminished responsibility offenders by the prison medical
officers' due to their increased reluctance to accept offenders on hospital orders"
1132 Interim Report of the (Butler) Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders Cmnd 5698 (London,
1974) para.4
1133 S.Dell Murder into Manslaughter op cit p.28
"34 ibid
1135 S.Dell and A.Smith "Changes in the Sentencing of Diminished Responsibility Homicides" op cit
p.30
136 ibid p.33
1137 R.Bluglass "Regional Secure Units and Interim Security for Psychiatric Patients" (1978) B.M.J.489
p.489
1138 ibid
1139 M.Faulk "Mentally Disordered in an Interim Regional Medium Secure Unit" [1979] Critn.L.R.686
p.686
114° S.Dell and A.Smith "Changes in the Sentencing of Diminished Responsibility Homicides" op cit
p.30
1141 S.Dell Murder into Manslaughter op cit p.18
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and to a possible reluctance on the part of reporting doctors to place section 2
offenders in open hospitals with no security at all'''.
As a result of the lack of secure facilities for section 2 murderers, prison
doctors came increasingly to rely on the one institution that could not refuse these
offenders: prison'''. This was accompanied by a growth in "non-hospital treatment
thinking" among the reporting psychiatrists'''. Dell's analysis showed an 18%
increase in the number of court reports between 1966 and 1977 that referred to the
availability of the transfer procedure from prison to mental hospital under section 72
of the Mental Health Act, 1959' notwithstanding the Court of Appeal's judgment in
Morris'''. There the Court held that although the judge's discretion to make a hospital
order under section 60 of the 1959 Act was "very wide indeed", the basic principle
must be that, where punishment as such was not intended but the sole object of the
sentence was that the prisoner should receive mental treatment until he can safely be
discharged, a proper exercise of that discretion demanded that steps should be taken to
exercise the powers under section 60 to make a hospital order and that the matter
should not be left to be dealt with by the Secretary of State under section 72.
By 1980 only 11% of Dell's sample of life sentence section 2 offenders had
been transferred to Broadmoor under section 72 and only 63% had received hospital
treatment within the prison system'''. None of the men with determinate sentences
had been transferred and only 21% were recorded as having any kind of psychiatric
treatment in prison' s . The Home Secretary can only move a prisoner to a special
hospital under section 72 if the D.H.S.S. is prepared to make a place available'''.
Because of overcrowding, such places were not available during Dell's research period
1142 ibid
1143 ibid p.52
1144 ibid p.21
1145 ibid
1146 [ ! 961] Crim.L.R.481
1147 S.Dell Murder into Manslaughter op cit p.44
1148 ibid
1149 ibid
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for five men for whom they were sought'''. Two had clearly been sentenced with the
possibility of a section 72 transfer in the judge's mind'''.
Dell's case studies reveal the injustice which can result from inadequate
funding of the mental health services. In the first case the prison medical officer's
court report for the trial said:
"He suffers from inherited, periodic manic depressive insanity, and was
so suffering at the material time. .he does not at present need hospital
treatment but might again develop an episode of further
insanity.. Should he receive a prison sentence, his transfer to hospital
(could) be speedily effected'''.
This man became psychotic again almost immediately after he was sentenced
to life imprisonment in 1976 but despite five years' attempts on the part of the prison
authorities to obtain him a special hospital place under section 72, he was still in
prison by the time data collection ceased in 1980". The other man who had been
sentenced with the possibility of section 72 in mind, was suffering from a paranoid
psychosis'''. At his trial the prison medical officer had given evidence that a life
sentence with a view to section 72 was an appropriate disposal and the judge in
sentencing him to life imprisonment had said:
"Such psychiatric assistance as you may need can be given to you by
action of the Secretary of State under s72"1155.
However, two years after the doctors had completed the section 72 papers, his
transfer had still not been effected'''.
1150 ibid
1151 ibid
1152 ibid
1153 ibid
"54 ibid
1155 ibid p.45
1156 ibid
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Perhaps a significant reason for the decline in special hospital
recommendations by prison medical officers and the increased resort to imprisonment,
was the change in professional opinion about the treatability of psychopaths'', a
description given by prison medical officers to 42% of Dell's subjects."". However,
this was not the only group which received more sentences of imprisonment.
Increased sentencing also occurred amongst the schizophrenics, although to a lesser
extent'. Of particular concern, was Dell's discovery of the increasing tendency over
the years for mentally ill offenders with a diagnosis of depression to be described in
court reports as recovered and no longer needing treatment'''. By the mid-seventies
30% of men with a diagnosis of depression were described as recovered by the time of
trial" compared with 3% in the late sixties'. This she attributes to the fact that over
the years it took longer to process the offenders through the courts (2.9 months on
average in the late sixties; 4.9 months by the mid-seventies) and the longer people are
held, the more opportunity there is for treatment and natural remission to take
effect'''. She also thinks it likely that at least some of the increase in the proportion of
men described as recovered is connected with the reporting doctors' changed attitudes
to the making of hospital recommendations'. The effect was that, unlike mentally ill
people described as improved or unchanged, this group ceased to be eligible for
hospital orders; nearly all of them (13/15) were given prison sentences 1165 . The
anomaly is that a diminished responsibility offender who is still mentally ill at the
time of his trial will almost without exception be made subject to a hospital order if
that is the unanimous recommendation of the examining doctors and when discharged,
everything possible will be done to assist him towards rehabilitation into the
community 1166.
 However, a person who has committed exactly the same sort of
1157 ibid p.19
1158 ibid p.37
1159 ibid p.14
1169 ibid p.21
1161 ibid p.22
1162 ibid p.72
1163 ibid
1164 ibid p.23
1165 S.Dell and A.Smith "Changes in the Sentencing of Diminished Responsibility Homicides" op cit
p.32
1166 S.Dell Murder into Manslaughter op cit p.42
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offence while suffering from exactly the same illness but who recovers before his trial
(perhaps only because he had to wait longer for it) will be sentenced to
imprisonment' 167 . It cannot be argued that he is more blameworthy or responsible than
his counterpart who was hospitalised; the only difference between them is that one
showed more improvement before his trial than the other'''.
The length of a section 2 offender's detention may also hinge on the
prison/hospital distinction as is evident from Dell's survey of restricted hospital
patients and life sentence prisoners, both convicted under section 2, both subject to
indefinite detention'''. Despite considerable diagnostic overlap in the population of
both groups"" the special hospital patients were released much quicker than their
prison counterparts'''. Even more alarming is Grounds' survey of prisoners
transferred to Broadmoor between 1960 and 1983 (not limited to diminished
responsibility offenders) which has revealed a trend in transfer occurring at a
progressively later stage of sentence which led in turn to later discharge, relative to the
expiry of sentence'.
The Butler Committee's proposed solution was the creation of secure hospital
units in each regional health authority area, to fill the "yawning gap" between the high
security special hospitals and the N.H.S. hospitals with no security at all'. Their
belief was that the units were crucial to the greater flexibility in placement that was
needed for mentally abnormal offenders and to the early relief of the prisons and the
special hospitals" 74 . They proposed that the necessary degree of security be achieved
partly, by a high ratio of staff to patients, partly by the regime and partly by the design
1167 ibid
1168 ibid
1169 S.Dell The Detention of Diminished Responsibility Homicide Offenders (1983) 23
Brit.J.Crimino1.50
1170 ibid p.55
1171 ibid p.54	
.
1172 A.Grounds "Transfer of Sentenced Prisoners to Hospital" [1990] Crim.L.R.544 p.547
1173 Interim Report of the (Butler) Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders Cmnd 5698 op cit
para.5
1174 ibid para.9
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and physical characteristics of the buildings'''. Aggressive psychopaths were
excluded from these recommendations'''.
Despite the Government's acceptance of these proposals'', the provision of
medium secure units has been tardy. 15 years later only 600 of the 2,000 beds
recommended by Butler had been provided"". This may account for the continued
underuse of the hospital order. The main causes of the delay in providing medium
secure units appear to be inadequate funding of the mental health services and
misunderstanding about the purpose of regional secure units'''. Bluglass has found
that little emphasis has been given to developing the units as part of a comprehensive
service including special hospitals, N.H.S. hospitals, secure units and a forensic
service in the community as recommended by Butler, and that there has been an
evident lack of cooperation between mental health professionals'.
In 1978 the Henchy Committee followed its proposal to introduce the defence
of diminished responsibility into Irish law with the recommendation that a court
should be able to order that a particular person should be detained in such a
"designated unit" as is best calculated to meet his situation'''. They did not propose
that the Government should build these units, but that the Minister of Health should
be empowered to designate any psychiatric centre to be a designated centre'''. The
Committee envisaged a flexible system of transfers between units including the
Central Mental Hospital'''.
The Henchy Committee's recommendation on disposal was short-sighted in
the extreme, in its failure to provide for an increased number of secure hospital places.
There may have been an adequate number in 1978 but there certainly is not now.
1175 ibid para.12
1176 ibid
1177 R.Bluglass op cit p.490
1178 Lord Longford Prisoner or Patient (London, 1992) p.15
1179 See R.Bluglass op cit
1180 ibid p.491
1181 Third Interim Report of the InterDepartmental Committee on Mentally Ill and Maladjusted Persons
Prl.(8275) op cit para.13
1183 ibid
1182 ibid
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Their perfunctory dealing of the subject never touched on the issue of security. A
logical question which requires answering is whether the ordinary psychiatric
hospitals would be willing to house diminished responsibility murderers. Given the
present reluctance of ordinary psychiatric hospitals to admit patients on transfer from
Dundrumum, Henchy's recommendations that the psychiatric hospitals should, in
appropriate cases, take patients directly following sentence would do nothing to
improve the present position. If anything it would exacerbate it.
The Henchy Committee's report, like Butler's, came after the findings of a
1976 survey on the need for psychiatric facilities in the Oxford region. This survey
found that there were more mentally subnormal or borderline subnormal offenders
than mentally ill offenders misplaced in prison or the community and recommended
that two types of unit were likely to be needed, one for the mentally ill and a second,
separate unit for the mentally subnormal'''. Bluglass identified a deficiency in
Butler's recommendations arising from patients in need of long-term care".
Designated centres close to family and friends would, admittedly, provide support for
those patients in need of long-term treatment and care. However, the Irish
Government must accompany the introduction of diminished responsibility with a
massive injection of finance into high and medium security hospitalisation to deal
with those diminished responsibility murderers who need these conditions. Whilst the
building of medium security hospitals may not be viable given Ireland's small
population, greater security should be provided in designated psychiatric hospitals for
diminished responsibility murderers, coupled with a higher staff: patient ratio. Only
with increased funding will the reluctance of ordinary psychiatric hospitals to accept
patients from Dundrum be relieved.
But the Irish Government's financial commitment must not end here.
Ashworth and Gostin have opined that "the task of dealing with mentally disordered
offenders should be approached on the basis that the law should facilitate treatment
where it is possible and available, but that in general a person should not be deprived
1184 F.McAuley op cit p.128
1185 M.Faulk op cit pp.689 & 670
1186 R.Bluglass op cit p.491
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of his liberty unless that is essential and, if the court does form that view, he should
not be deprived of his liberty for a period longer than is necessary u1187. This guideline
shows that the Government must also commit resources to funding the probation
service if an Irish diminished responsibility defence is to prove satisfactory. Due to
delays in bringing cases to trial, during which the effects of treatment and natural
remission can take effect, some diminished responsibility murderers may no longer
require treatment. Others may require psychiatric assistance but their disorder may not
be of a degree that warrants their hospitalisation. Probation with a condition of
psychiatric treatment and conditional discharge may therefore be necessary to prevent
an Irish diminished responsibility defence from being in breach of Article 40.4.1 of
the Irish Constitution and Article 5(1)(e) of the European Convention on Human
Rights, and for the satisfactory operation of the defence.
3.10 CONCLUSION
In an endeavour to break from the grip of English precedent following
independence, the Irish courts have chosen to concentrate on improving the wording
of the Irish insanity defence, rather than adopt a defence of diminished responsibility.
The Irish control test created in Doyle, underscores the impossibility of devising a
satisfactory formulation of the insanity defence. The deficiencies of this test lie in its
preservation of the McNaghten Rules in cases of delusion and in its broad application
in other examples of insanity. The effect of its broadness is exacerbated by
unsatisfactory procedures surrounding the law on insanity in Ireland, such as the
obligation on the prosecution to raise insanity where the evidence suggests it, despite
unwillingness on the part of the defence, and the impossibility of challenging a
finding of guilty but insane. Coupled with the practice of mandatory indefinite
committal, the Irish insanity defence infringes the constitutional right to liberty under
the Irish Constitution and a possible unenumerated guarantee against cruel and
unusual punishment. Furthermore, the decision in Doyle, which is a paragon of
1187 A.Ashworth and L.Gostin "Mentally Disordered Offenders and the Sentencing process" [1984]
Crim.L.R.195 p.207
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judicial legislation, infringes the separation of powers guarantee in the Irish
Constitution. There is also evidence that the Irish insanity defence is in breach of the
European Convention, both in its definition of the degree of mental illness which
warrants compulsory hospitalisation and the unsatisfactory procedure for release of
those found insane.
The Irish control test confirms that reformulating the insanity defence will
always be surrounded by controversy. Aware of this, a movement in favour of an Irish
diminished responsibility defence has been slowly gathering momentum since the late
1970's. This movement, now at its zenith, has been vividly illustrated by calls from
the Judiciary, academic commentators and politicians for its introduction into Irish
law and by the protest of a Limerick jury at its lack of availability in a recent murder
trial.
An Irish defence of diminished responsibility which focuses on the particular
abnormality of the defendant will enable juries to give expression to their true feelings
about a defendant's culpability and thus enable judges to give a disposal most likely to
meet a defendant's needs. By examining whether the defendant was less responsible, it
will dispense with the need to look at responsibility as an all or nothing concept, the
source of much of the controversy surrounding the insanity defence. By giving
recognition to the psychiatric viepwoint of mental illness it will resolve the
medico/legal tension underpinning the polemic over the insanity defence. Finally, the
defence will remedy several defects in the law on infanticide.
When introducing diminished responsibility into Irish law, the Irish
Legislature should use clear, straightforward language in formulating the defence.
This will be a significant improvement on its English counterpart. Its terms should
allow the psychiatric profession a wide berth when testifying as to diminished
responsibility. Not only should the requirement of mental disorder give recognition to
the psychiatric viewpoint but the issue of impaired responsibility should be framed so
as to enable psychiatric testimony on this issue. Undoubtedly, it is the failure of the
English Legislature to differentiate the roles of jury and expert witness which has
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contributed to the evolution of a successful partnership between legal and medical
professions in the working of the diminished responsibility defence.
A defence of diminished responsibility in Ireland cannot operate successfully
without the provision of suitable psychiatric assistance for those diminished
responsibility murderers who will benefit from it. This will require a considerable
financial commitment on the Government's part to providing the requisite facilities. A
valuable lesson can be learned from the English Government's failure to provide
financially for these facilities. Placing the burden of proof on the prosecution and
allowing the prosecution to charge diminished responsibility manslaughter will give
expression to the foundation of humanity on which the defence is built. It is hoped
that the Irish Legislature will commit themselves whole-heartedly to providing this
defence and will finally put paid to what has been described as "the abrogation of
responsibility by the Oireachtas to reform, or in this case even to form, the law'''.
1188 P.Charleton op cit p.171
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OVERVIEW
The recent announcement by the Irish Minister for Justice that a Criminal Law
(Insanity) Bill is at "an advanced stage of preparation" may signal the convergence of
Irish and English law on the issue of diminished responsibility.
This thesis has shown that the introduction of diminished responsibility will be
the most satisfactory solution to the Herculean challenge posed by reformulation of
the insanity defence. This is exemplified by the English defence of diminished
responsibility which has resolved the controversy over where the boundary between
responsibility and irresponsibility should be drawn and over which of the legal or
medical professions should have the final say in drawing this line.
This conflict has been at the heart of the controversy surrounding the
McNaghten Rules since the time of their inception. By tracing the proposals to
introduce irresistible impulse (both in England and in Ireland), a product test (in the
United States) and a justly responsible test (in England and the United States) I have
shown the impossibility of satisfactorily reformulating the insanity defence. This has
been reinforced by the fate of the American Law Institute's test, the Butler
Committee's proposed test and the abolitionists' proposal, each of which has attracted
a wealth of criticism.
It was the introduction of diminished responsibility into English law which
proved to be the solution to the polemic. Although admitted as a fob to ward off the
proponents advocating abolition of the death penalty, the English defence has done
much more than spare undeserving murderers from a conviction of murder. It has
provided legal recognition to irresistible impulses which were the forum for over 100
years' conflict between law and medicine over the insanity defence. The admission of
the irresistible impulse as a species of diminished responsibility marked the beginning
of a happy partnership between law and medicine in the working of the diminished
responsibility defence. Evidence of this partnership can be seen in the willingness of
the courts to listen to medical testimony on various mental abnormalities for the
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purpose of a diminished responsibility defence, thus legitimising the medical view of
mental disorder. It is also evident in the willingness of the courts to listen to medical
testimony on the issue of substantially impaired mental responsibility. The partnership
is revealed in the Crown's practice of accepting the plea where the medical evidence
of diminished responsibility is unanimous and the ruling of the Court of Appeal
requiring that in these cases the case should not go to trial, in the absence of outside
evidence indicating normality. A paradigmatic example of the working of this
partnership is in the law's insistence on medical testimony, thus according special
status to the medical profession in the operation of the defence, while at the same time
retaining its right to try diminished responsibility cases, despite unanimous evidence
of mental abnormality, in appropriate cases.
The diminished responsibility defence has stepped in to save mentally
abnormal killers from a murder conviction where the defences of provocation or
automatism would have failed them. It has also saved mentally abnormal murderers
from an inappropriate finding of insanity with consequent mandatory indefinite
hospitalisation.
Despite initial reluctance to entertain the possibility of a diminished
responsibility defence in Ireland following independence from England's rule, the
defence now has considerable support in Ireland. The most impressive examples of
support are the entreaties to the Legislature by the Irish Judiciary and the objection of
a Limerick jury to the inapplicability of the defence in Irish law. Frustration is
considerable at the Legislature's inertia in the field of criminal insanity. It is hoped,
therefore, that this year's promise of Legislative action will be a genuine one.
Apart from the defence's following, there are several factors which militate in
favour of an Irish diminished responsibility defence. These are, the unsatisfactory test
of insanity in Irish law and the impossibility of devising a controversy-free
formulation of the insanity defence. The discomfort about the Irish insanity defence
stems from its wide application coupled with the inflexible disposal which follows it,
its infringement of the right to liberty under the Irish Constitution in addition to the
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separation of powers guarantee, and a possible guarantee against cruel and unusual
punishment. The Irish insanity defence is also in breach of Articles 5(1)(e) and 5(4) of
the European Convention on Human Rights.
A diminished responsibility defence with its premise of partial responsibility
would solve the heartburnings likely to accompany any attempt to reformulate the
insanity defence because of its foundation on a rigid distinction between responsibility
and irresponsibility. This has traditionally resulted in offenders judged insane by
medical or contemporary standards, being held sane and responsible. Diminished
responsibility would provide a satisfactory medium for dealing with the mentally
abnormal murderer, and in doing so would recognise the medical view of insanity,
leading to a resolution of the medico-legal tension underpinning much of the
controversy surrounding the insanity defence. The recognition of partial responsibility
would, of course, enable the courts to focus more accurately on the defendant's degree
of guilt and would facilitate a disposition best calculated to reflect his culpability and
to meet his needs.
It is to be hoped therefore, that the Irish Legislature will understand the need
to legitimise the medical view of insanity in order to effect a resolution of the
controversy. For this to be achieved, medical testimony should be a practical
necessity. Coupled with a clear statement of the defence's limits this will spare the
courts from the necessity of delineating the boundary of an Irish diminished
responsibility defence. Defining the defence in terms which allow the psychiatric
profession to pronounce on the issue of impaired responsibility will recognise the
difficulty of the jury's task and lead to the evolution of a happy partnership between
law and medicine. In order to give effect to the spirit of humanity which underlies the
defence, the Legislature should place the burden of proof on the prosecution, allow
charges of diminished responsibility manslaughter and accompany the introduction of
the legislation with a corresponding commitment to providing the resources needed to
deal with a diminished responsibility manslaughter population.
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